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THE SOUTHERN OVERLAND MAIL
AND STAGECOACH LINE, 1857-1861.
By OSCAR OSBURN WINTHER
MASSIVE westward migration following the discovery
T HE
of gold in California and the Mexican Cession in 1848
produced, in its wake, a crying demapd for adequate communication between the old East and the new West. There
were high hopes that' a ,raih;oad would someday span the
continent, but meanwhile the West demanded regular mail
and stagecoach services between the then existing rail terminals on the banks of the Mississippi River and the distant
shores of the Pacific Ocean. Prior to 1848 only the most
limited, casual, and cumbersome of transportational facilities
existed in this area, and these were deemed hopelessly inadequate in meeting the requirements, not only of pivotal California but of other western communities as well.
The trans-Mississippi West could not, as a region, prescribe national policy. Nevertheless, its inhabitants enjoyed
a position of strength from which they might, and did, exert
significant influences upon 'American business interests and
at the nation's capital with regard to matters concerned with
the region's welfare. "California is far distant;" wrote Congressman R. H. Stantort in a'report on post offices:;tlld post
roads in 1850, "and it appears to me, that I 'am stating a self..;
evident proposition when I say that government itself must
either open a way to that distant land, or encourage its citizens so to do...."1 By pursuance of a policy whereby United
1.

RepOTts oj Committees, House of Representatives, 31 Cong., 2 sess., no. 95, p. 1.
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States contracts for ~\rerland mail, services were to be
awarded to private entrepreneurs, the Federal government
adopted, in effect, both of the objectives voiced by Congressman Stanton. During the succeeding six years several
federally organized mail routes were established in the trans'Mississippi West to augment the fragmentary ones begun
prior to mid-centu'ry, But since none of these far western
services operating prior to 1856 provided for either regular
or rapid passenger and mail services between the settled East
and the Pacific coast, it is not surprising to observe that vehement demands for such arose. Popular petitions and
entreaties unfortunately became enmeshed with. sectional
politics, and delays were inevitable orders of the day.
.Plans by the Federal government calling for the establishment of regular transcontinental stagecoach mail service
were first considered in the wake of an 1852-53 act of Congress providing for a survey of a proposed Pacific railroad.
It was generally realized at this time that construction of
such a railroad would be several years ill the building and
that measures should be taken to improve and extend existing mail and general transportational facilities serving the
trans-MississippiWest. 2 A diversity of plans was proposed.
At first many of these were directed toward augmenting
existing services provided by the Pacific Mail Steamship
Company, often referred to as,the [W.H.] "Aspinwall Contract," whereby mails were carried by steamers to and from
New York City and Chagres, overland across the Isthinus,
.and again by steamers between Panama and ports in Oregon
and California. For instance, on February 15, 1853, Postmaster General James Campbell let a contract whereby mails
would be conveyed twice weekly between New York and San
Francisco by combined steamer and overland services involving use qf the historic ,Mexican land route connecting Vera
Cruz and Acapulco. 3 And on next October 20, Campbell, in his
reports to President Millard Fillmore, proposed; but did not
2. LeRoy R. Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849-1869 (Cleveland, 1926), ch. 3. See
also Curtis Nettels, "The Overland Mail Issue During the Eifties," The Missouri Historical Review, XVIlI (July, 1924), pp. 521-24.
3. Report of the Postmaster General, Sen. Docs., 33 Cong., special sess., no. 1,
pp.I-5.
' '
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officially recommend, the transport of mail between New
York and San Francisco via New Orleans and Nicaraguaon
a twenty-'seven day schedule.4 Also during 1853 and for three
years following, the Postmaster General's anImal reports b~. speak a greatly increased activity centering upon extension
of mail services by means of horse-drawn vehicles in several
but scattered portions of the trans-Mississippi West.
Meanwhiie, resolutions from the state of California continued to descend upon the Washington lawmakers. A joint
re~olution of the California State Legislature, approved
March 18, 1854, asked that its Senators be "instructed" and
its Representatives "requestedt to advocate passage of a law
by Congress authorizing augmented weekly mail services between the two oceans, by routes considered "most expeditious
and practical." 5 In another joint resolution by the California
Legislature (not dated but received by the Senate December
17, 1853) it is interesting to observe a specific request for
improved military and post roads across the Plains. These
were deemed "absolutely necessary.for the preservation of
the lives and the property of the emigrants who ~Tish to settle
within our borders." 6
No less perturbed by the lack of adequate communication
with the East were the people of New Mexico who in 1850
registered a population of 61,547 exclusive of Indians. 7 New
Mexico had been organized as a Territory at mid-century
and five years later its Legislature likewise pleaded with offidaIs in Washington for more adequate communication
services. "Your memorialists, the council and house of representatives of the Territory of New Mexico," reads a Memorial.
dated. December 29, 1855, addressed to Postmaster General
Campbell, "would respectfully request, that the people of this
Territory have suffered for many years for want' of a semimonthly mail between this Territory and the United States.
4. Report of the Postmaster General, op. cit., 1 sess., vol. III, pp. 768-70.
5. l4Resolutions of the Legislature of California,~' Sf!n. Misc. Docs., 33 Cong., 1
sess., no. 49.
6. Ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2. sess., no. 2. See also "Resolution of the Legislature of
California" favoring construction of overland mail and wagon routes which would in..
elude "good roads protected by military stations . . . 0'" ibid., no. 57, pp. 1-2.
.
7. The Seventh Censu~: Report of the Superintendent of the Census • .. (Washington, D. C., 1853), p. 134.
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Our geographical position, being in the centre of the American continent without navigable rivers or means of communication by rail-road, renders our situation as remote from the
federal capital in communications through mail facilities as
the Sandwich Islands." This Memorial then went on to assert
that "The least time in which a reply can be had to any com'"
munication from this Territory, is three months, and only
then by prompt attention being given to it, and we seldom get
a reply from the eastern cities under four months.... We
think that we deserve, and know that we need, the boon asked
for in this memorial. We would, therefore, call your attention·
to this subject." 8
The problem facing Congress was, therefore, not so much
one of being unmindful of the need for extending regular
overland mail services to the trans-Mississippi West; rather
it was one of reaching an agreement on specific routes to be
established. Intense sectional· controversy clearly thwarted
agreement.on numerous practical proposals. For example, .
during the months from February through April, 1856, no
less than four separate bills, and one again during the following August, were introduced in Congress designed to extend
overland mail service to San Francisco. 9 But none of these
were enacted into law.
Finally, out of this succession of unsuccessful attempts to
arrive at an accord on an overland mail bill, an agreeable, if
not truly acceptable, formula was approved by both houses
of Congress, namely, leave the matter of the exact course or
route for the contractors to decide upon so long as the eastern
terminus would be on the Mississippi River and the western
one at San Francisco.10
With this formula agreed upon one of several attempts to
push ~ measure through Congress was destined to succeed.
This. final achievement was due in part to careful planning
and procedural operations by the sponsors, chief of whom
were John S. Phelps of Missouri in the House and William
8.

L"W8 of the Territory Of New Mexico • .• 1855-56 (Santa Fe, 1856), PP. 142,

144.

.9. Nettels, "The Overland Mail·lssue in the Fifties," op. cit., pp. 523-25.
10. Rupert N. ,Richardson and Carl Coke Rister, The Greater Southwest (Glendale,
Calif., 1935), pp'. 232-33 ; see also Hafen, The Overu.nd M"il, p. 83.
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M. Gwin of California, in the Senate.11 Provisions for the
service actually took the form of :an amendment to a Post
Office appropriation bill drafted by a senatorial committee
on which both Senators Gwin and Thomas Jefferson Rusk
of Texas, played a leading part. Both these 'Senators, were
staunch advocates of an overland mail system which would
include California and, so far as Rusk was concerned, the
Lone Star State.
In formulating its proposal the Committee cle~rly profited'
from past failures in Congress. Moreover, its proposal reflected knowledge gleaned from the Reports of Explorations
and Surveys . .. 1853-J,. relative to a proposed railroad to the
Pacific, from holders of previous mail contracts within the
trans-Mississippi West area, and from firsthand experiences
of overland mail operators. Accordingly the Committee, in
recognizing the problem of sectional interests, chose not to
prescribe a precise route. The Amendment simply stated that
the Postmaster GeneraJ be authorized t6\ contract for transMississippi mail service "from such point on the Mississippi
river as contractors may select." 12 Moreover; the Committee
made a realistic proposal on' the matter of remuneration
to contract holders, a sum intended to attract responsiple
bidders.
The proposed Amendment first reached,the Senate floor
where Senator John B. Weller of California introduced it on
August 16, 1856, shortly before adjournment of the first
session of the Thirty-fourth Congress. In this first round
the Amendment receiv~d smooth but indecisive treatment. In
-defense of the measure, Senator Weller expressed with
telling effect his desire to have the United States mails (those
not. earmarked for delivery abroad)' carried over all-American territory rather than, as was then the situation, be
dependent upon "foreign Governments [referring to the Aspinwall contract] for their permission to pass our mailrfrom
one State to an'other." And with telling sarcasm Senator
Weller reminded his colleagues that while Congress had pro11. F. P. Rose, "Butterfield Overland Mail Company," The Arkansas Hi8torical
Quarterly (Spring; 1956), p. 62.
12. The Congre8sicmal Globe, 34 Cong., 3 sess., Appendix, p. 321. See also Hafen,
The Overland Mail, p. 84.
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vided for two military roads for the Far West, it would
appear that there were those for whom the "liberties of. the
country" were endangered by the establishment of an overland mail service. 13 In retort Senator James M. Mason of
Virginia recognized the hazards to persons as well as to the
mails in crossing the Isthmus, but asked how soon it would be
before "an armed force, at a cost of hundreds of thousands
of dollars," would be needed "to protect this mail to California across the continent?"14 Senator Alfred Iverson,
Georgia, implied that in pushing this me'asure the California
Senators were perhaps more interested in personal political
credit with their constituents. Senator IversOIi.was reminded
of constituents who raised their price for votes and about
whom the officeseeker had said: " 'My dear friends, always
dear, but now dearer than ever:''' 15 The Amendment reached
a vote and passed in the Senate before adjournment, but it
failed passage in the Conference Committee. 16
. The problem of an overland mail service was thereby
back on the lap of the Senate Committee where numerous
new'proposals were soon to be submitted. During February
of 1857 when the Thirty-fourth Congress was again in session there came from this Committee a renewed amendment,
the text of which was not greatly unlike the one rejected
during the previous August. Again the proposal took- the
form of an Amendment to a Post Office Appropriations Bill.
This time, February 27, 1857, the debate on the proposal
became more protracted than had been the case in the pre..
vious session. On this occasion Senator Gwin participated
actively in debate on the Senate floor in behalf of the overland
mail measure. Tht:! California Senator pointed out, among
other things,. that his State was in the grips of a gigantic
steamship monopoly (the Pacific Steamship Company) and
that the only way to break this stranglehold was to establish
overland mail service. The Senate, he said, had passed a bill
. 13. The Congressitmal Globe, 34 Cong., 1 sess., pt. 3, p. 2202.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 2203.
16. Hafen, The Overland Mail, P. 84. The Conference Committee refers to one
representing both Houses of Congress and one which acts upon bills such as the above
where differences between a HOllS; version and the Senate version of a measure exist.
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providing telegraph service; "Now give us a mail [service]."
He went on- to say that" the government has provided for
military wagon roads; now let it make use of these roads.
Moreover, should a war come, it would place ocean service
at the mercy of an enemy; whereas, by implication, an overland mail service through all-American territory would be
relatively safe,17
"The objections to the bill appear not to have been to the
establishment of a service such as was proposed but to the
discretionary powers given the Postmaster General and the
contractors in matters pertaining to the route to be adopted.
What assurances were there, asked Senator John Bell of
Tennessee, that the most practical route would be followed?
The Tennessee Senator alluded to the obstacles presented by
the Rocky and Sierra Madre ranges," and dangers of Indian
attacks. What assurances were there that once the route was
established, the operators would not plead for military protection of their facilities and operations?lS Senator John J.
Crittenden, Kentucky, likewise used these arguments as a
basis for opposing the amendment. "Wait," he said, "until
your line can go a little-further towards supporting itselfwait until safety, at least, shall attend your mails and the
passengers on board your stage-coaches, before you undertake to establish this sort of system." 19 Senator Robert
Toombs of Georgia advanced the same line of reasoning, and
he stated further that by providing ocean mail service for
the Pacific coast the government had "done no injustice to
California."20 Finally; after protracted debate, a "yeas" and
"nays" vote was asked on the Amendment which would provide the trans-Mississippi service. There were twenty_four
Senators who voted in favor of the measure; ten were opposed. In view of sectional interests and sentiments prevailing during this eve of the Civil War, the alignment or
distribution of these votes forms an unexpected pattern with
the exception that all senators representing states to be directly benefited by the service voted for the Amendment. All
17.
IS.
19.
20.

The Congressional Globe, 34 Cong., 3 sess., Appendix, PP. 307, 308.
Ibid., pp. 309, 310.
Ibid., pp. 312-13.
Ibid., p. 315.
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ten of the opposition votes, including one from. the border
state of Kentucky"came from the South. And the North, least
expected to favor an all-Southern route, gave its solid
support.21
So with this vote cast the original Bill as amended was
again sent to the Conference Committee where it was approved and returned to both Houses ;. with the full Post Office
measure it·was given final approval. On March 3, 1857, the
Bill, including the amendment, became "An Act making Appropriations for the Service of the Post-Office Department
during the fiscal Year ending the thirtieth of June, eighteen
hundred and fifty eight." Sections 10-13 inclusive contained
the Amendment, and this reads as follows: 22
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That the PostmasterGeneral be, and he is hereby, authorized to contract for the
conveyance of the entire letter. mail from such point on the
Mississippi River, as the contractors may select, to San Francisco, in the State of California, for six years, at a cost not
exceeding three hundred thousand dollars per annum for semimonthly, four hundred and fifty thousand dollars for weekly,
or six hundred thousand dollars for semi-weekly service; to be
performed semi-monthly, weekly, or semi-weekly, at the option
of the Postmaster-General.
, SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the contract
shall require the service to be performed with good four-horse
21.

Voting for the Amendment were:
Judah P. Benjamin, Louisiana
Sam Houston, ,Texas
William Bigle'r, Pennsylvania
Robert W. Johnson, Arkansas
Jacob Collamer, Vermont
George W. Jones, Iowa
Stephen A. Douglas, Illinois
Amos Nourse, Maine
Thomas G. Pratt, Maryland
Charles Durkee, Wisconsin
Hamilton Fish, New York
Thomas J. Rusk, Texas
Graham N. Fitch, Indiana
William H. Seward, New York
Solomon Foot, Vermont
John Slidell, Louisiana
Lafayette S. Foster, Connecticut
Charles ,E. Stuart, Michigan
William M. Gwin, California
John R. Thomson, New Jersey
Jam~ S.. Green, M.issouri
John B. Weller, California
James Harlan, Iowa
Henry Wilson, Massachusetts
Those opposed were:
Asa Biggs, North Carolina
James M.,Mason, Virginia
Clement C. Clay, Jr., Alabama
David S. Reid, North Carolina
John J. Crittenden, Kentucky
John B. Thompson', Kentucky
Robert M:T. Hunter, Virginia
Robert Toombs, Georgia
James C. Jones, Tennessee
David Levy Yulee, Florida
See ibid., p. 321; also Biographical Directory of the American CongreBs, 1774, ·1927 (Washington, 1928):
22. United States, Statutes at Large, 34-35 Cong., vol. XI, p. 190.
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coaches, or spring wagons, suitable for the. conveyance of passengers, as well as the safety and security of the mails.
SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the contractors
shall have the right of preemption to three hundred and twenty
acres of any land not then disposed of or reserved, at each point
necessary for a station, not to be nearer than ten miles from
each other; and provided, that no mineral hmd shall be thus
preempted.
SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the said service
shall be performed within twenty-five days for each trip; and
that before entering into such contract, the PostmasterGeneral shall be satisfied of the ability and disposition of the
parties bona fide and in good faith to perform the said contract,
and shall require good and sufficient security for. the performance of the same; the service to commence within twelve
months after the signing of the contract.

Developments pertaining to the selection of a route failed
to materialize as envisaged by many supporters of the Act.
The Postmaster General whose duty it was to implement this
enactment was Aaron Venable Brown. He was a Virginian
by birth but he had been a Tennesseean of long standing and
of high political rank before 1857 at which time President
James Buchanan 'appointed Brown to head 'the United States
Post Office Department.
,
Bearing in mind the latitude allowed the bidders and the
freedom granted the Postmaster General under the terms of
the above quoted Act, it is of interest to observe subsequent
happenings. Postmaster General Brown has, in effect, related these developments in his official report to the President
in 1859, the end of Brown's first two-year stewardship. In
all, eight legitimate bids were received. A ninth failed' to
meet the specifications and was therefore held in~alid. Three
of the eight were submitted by John Butterfield and associates ; the others by James E. Birch; James Glover; S. Howell
and A. E. Pace; David D. Mitchell, Samuel B. Churchill,
William Gilpin, and others; and finally, James Johnson Jr.
and Joseph Clark. Out of these eight bidders, the three .by
Butterfield proposed southern routes passing through New
Mexico Territory. Only one offered a central route, and two
indicated no specific route at all. 23
23.

RepoTt of the Postmaster GtmeTal. December I, 1859, in Sen. Ex. Doc8., 35
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Diverse as these proposed routes were, none were wholly
acceptable to Brown. After what he referred to as "full and
mature consideration," the Postmaster General prescribed
(contrary to Section 10 which states that "the contractors
may select") a route which had not been wholly designated
,in anyone of the eight legitimate bids submitted. The route
designated by Brown (he referred to this as an "order") was
to have two, rather than one, eastern termini - Memphis,
Tennessee, and St. Louis, Missouri. Lines from these two
places were to converge at Fort Smith, Arkansas; thence on
to Preston, Texas; cross the Rio Grande aboveEl Paso; then
go on to Fort Yuma, Los Angeles, and finally San Francisco.
"The foregoing route is selected," reported Brown, "for the
overland mail service to California, as combining, in my .
judgment, more advantages and fewer disadvantages than
any other." 24 All bidders, some <;>f whom had specified somewhat similar courses, consented to having their bids ex,"
tended to apply to the above route. 25
Brown selected from among the bidders a firm representing very substantial financial backing, one offering the
greatest background of experience in Western transport
enterprises, and one whose individual members were best
known at the time to the American public. Brown awarded
the contract to John Butterfield of Utica, New York, and his
associates who included William B., Dinsmore, New York
City; William G. Fargo, Buffalo; James V. P. Gardner, Utica;
Marcus L. Kinyon, Rome, New York; Alexander Holland,
New York City; and Hamilton Spencer, Bloomington,
.
Illinois. 26
Together these seven joint-bidders represented not only
stage-coach interests but, even to. a greater extent, the interests of the leading express concerns in the United States. 27
Cong., 1 sess., PP. 987-88. The Report devotes a section, pp. 986-1011, to what is entitled
'-Overland Mail Service to California."
24. Ibid., P. 988.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. A. L. Stimson, History of the Express Companies (New York, 1858), passim;
Oscar Osburn Winther, Express and Stagecoach Days in CaliJcwnia (Stanford, 1936),
pp. 43, 54, 54n, 55, 55n; Grant Foreman, "The California Overland Mail Route through
Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, IX (September, 1931), p. 302; Harper's MagaZine,
LI (1875). p. 322.·
(
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Strong a contender for the award as was James Birch, who
represented the great California Stage Company, it is .doubtful that even he could have matched the resources of the
Butterfield group. The express enterprise, first created by
W. F. Harnden at Boston in 1839, had enjoyed a growth and
. expansion matched only by the railroads. Among the pioneers
and successful operators of the express business in New York
and vicinity were Butterfield, Dinsmore, and Fargo. The first
of these had been instrumental in forming Butterfield, Wasson and Company Express which became identified with the
New York Central Railroad; the second, Dinsmore, had been
a partner in Adams and Company Express; and the third
was, as the general public well knew, a partner in the famed
firm of Wells, Fargo and Company.28
The terms of the contract, hereafter officially designated
as number 12,578, specified that letter mail should be carried
twice weekly each way over the prescribed route; not more than twenty-five days were to elapse for each trip. Themails
were to be secured in a "boot," preferably under the driver's
seat "free from wet or other injury," and should be delivered
at post offices enroute. Furthermore, the contract called for
use of "good four-horse post coaches or spring wagons,"
vehicles which could accommodate passengers as well as post.
Finally, service was to begin within a period. of twelve
months. In return for these services the operators were to
receive $600,000 per annum for a period of six years. Tne
contract hearing the above terms and numerous others pertaining to penalties and guarantees was duly signed on
September 11,1857.29
. In retrospect, the most challenging part of this remarkable document is the matter concerning roads, or the lack .of
them. The estimated distance of the prescribed route - constituting as it did a deep, arc-like dip into the South - was
2,795 miles. so In further justifying: this far southern course,
28.

Ibid.

29. The
pp.989-93.

contract appears in full in Report of the Postmaster General, op. cit.,

30. Ibid., p. 1003. For the exact mileage of the route as subsequently established,
see tabulation in Roscoe P. Conkling and Margaret B. Conkling, The Butterfield Overland Mail, 1857-1869 (Glendale, Calif., 1947), II, p. 365. Mileage figures vary slightly,
..depending on who has made calculations, but differences are, unappr,eciable.
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Postmaster General Brown commented at length upon its
climatic and topographical advantages. He admitted that this
route would pass over many mountain ranges ; that it would
go through country uninhabited, even untrodden, by white
people; and that this region· was in places inadequately supplied with water. But all these obstacles could be overcome.
Here Brown drew upon a report by Captain Randolph B.
Marcy 31 who had long,acquaintanceship with the arid Southwest. Mincy had described' a terrain where "nature, in her
wise economy, has adorned the entire face of the country
with a luxuriant verdure of different kinds of grama grass,
affording the most nutritious sustenance for animals."32
Brown also submitted the views of John R. Bartlett, Commissioner of the United States-Mexican boundary line, in
support of a southern route. He drew upon a communication
by Bartlett published ih the Providence (Rhode Island)
Journal '(August 18, 1857) in which the Commissioner had
written in generally favorable terms of the region's smo~th
terrain and suitability for wagon transit. 33
Brown's staunch defense of a southern route did not allay
all criticism of his choice, either within or outside Congress.
Many Northerners and Westerners freely and openly castigated Brown for his choice of what they called the "Ox Bow
Route." It was, said the Chicago Tribune, "One of the greatest swindles ever perpetrated upon the country by the slaveholders." 34 But a decision had been made', and steps to provide
regular overland mail, service to California moved swiftly
from the political· and legal arena into the area of field
preparations.
In anticipation of the contract award a company organization with requisite financhil backing had been formed by
the Butterfield group. The firm was known legally as "The
Overland Mail Company." With John Butterfield as presi:ll.
1866).

32.

Randolph B. Marcy. Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border (New York,

Report of the Postmaster General, op. cit.• p. 998.
33. Ibid., pp. 1005-11. See also John R. Bartlett, Personal Narrative of Expwrations .•• Connected with the United States and Mexican Boundary Commission, During
the Years 1850, '51, '52, and '53 (New York, 1854), 2 vols.
. 34. Quoted in Ray A. Billington, The Far Western Frontier, 1830-1860 (New York,
1956), p. 279.

(
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dent, it had been organized as a joint-stock company under
the statutes of New York State with a capital stock of two
million dollars. 35 Thus with an effective business organization
and with adequate capital, preparations for the overland
service could, and did, move forward with impressive speed
and on an equally impressive scale. Since, as previously stated,
the contract allowed but twelve months during which all
preparations for the service 'Would have to be made, good
planning and utmost speed were mandatory.
Even though the Postmaster General, had designated
specific places through which the line should pass, decision
on the routes by which these official landmarks would be
joined was left to the discretion of the company officials. So
one of the first major tasks was to stake out the prescribed
route in the field and to prepare the roadbed. That the Company moved swiftly to this task is clearly evident. Decisions
in this important matter were dictated by many factors, chief
of which were utility and practicality. Existing railroad and
wagon-road facilities were utilized wherever this could be
done with economy.
, The first east to west portion was' the Pacific Railroad
(subsequently the Missouri Pacific) then extending west-'
ward from the terminal city of St. Louis to Tipton, Missouri.
This was a distance of 160 miles. 'From Tipton the wagon
road would wind southward through the Ozark Mountains'
and on to Fort Smith, Arkansas, on the Canadian River.
There the mail line was to be joined by the 318-mile Memphis
extension (via Little Rock) as prescribed by the, contract.
At Fort Smith the route followed a smooth southwesterly
course, passing slightly east of Fort Washita, then into Texas
by way of Forts Belknap and Chadbourne and on to the Rio
Grande River; then up this stream for a distance of about 75
miles to Ef' Paso, or Franklin. Fittingly enough, the old town
of El Paso was to become the dividing point, administratively
as well as in terms of distance, between the afore-mentioned
eastern portion of the line and that which lay to the West. 36
35. Conkling and Conkling, op. cit., I, p. 123; III,' Plate 10. Other officers were:
William B. Dinsmore, Vice-President; Johnson Livingston, Secretary; and William G.
Fargo, 0;' the Board of Directors.
36. 'Report of the Postmaster General, Sen. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 sesS., vol. IV,
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From El Paso the Company. was to blaze a westward
course across water-scant, Indian:'ridden Ne:w Mexico. It was
to reach Tucson, Arizona, 360 miles west of the Rio Grande;
then go to the Gila River and along this stream to its confluence with the Colorado at torrid Fort Yuma. Much of this
portion of the proposed route was over previously unmarked
trails. But as Captain Marcy had contended earlier, the terrain provided a natural roadbed with water at a premium.
From this historic outpost of civilization, Fort Yuma, the
route was to dip slightly below the Mexican .border before
pursuing its northwestward gyrations to its goal, San Francisco. The California portion was to pass across Imperial
Valley, then wind its way over the Santa Rosa Mountains to
Los Angeles. The final stretch north was to be over Tejon
Pass and on through the San JoaquIn Valley, finally cutting
across Pacheco Pass, Santa Clara Valley, and along the San
Francisco Peninsula to its Pacific coast terminus. 37 •
.For better or for worse, this was to be the 2,795,.mile route
of the Overland Mail. The task facing Butterfield was one
calling for unusual organizational ability and great resourcefulness. Butterfield appears to have offered both as he moved
swiftly into the job, not only of laying out and preparing a
road but in stocking it or organizing it for service.
Following delineations of the route, Butterfield divided
operations between his eastern and his western sections. Into
these two elongated divisions he sent his superintendents,
construction crews, horses and mule~, food supplies, and
equipment. Some road grading was done, but this was kept
to a minimum. Station sites were located and stations with
animal corrals constructed; water was searched for and wells
were dug; and if no water was to be found at desired places,
arrangements for hauling it were made. Bridges, where fords
would not suffice, were also built. Forage and grain for live. stock for operatio~al purposes were provided. All these, and
countless other, arrangements were made before the service
began. Approximately 800 men were employed to operate the
PP. 742-43. By far the most detailed descriptions of the entire route. accompanied by
excelIent maps, are to be found in Conkling and Conkling, Butterfield Overla.nd Mail.
The former are contained in vols. I-II; the maps are at end of vol. III.
37. Ibid.
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line. Distributed and on hand were over 1,000 horses and 500
mules, approximately 250 .stagecoaches and special mail
wagons, scores of freight wagons and water wagons, harnesses, food, and other assorted equipment and supplies. On
hand, too, were superintendents, station keepers, black-.
smiths, herders, roustabouts, and, most important of all,
stage drivers and conductors. In terms of monetary investment, this represented an expenditure of about a million
dollars before receipts. 38
In keeping with contract specifications (Section 11) that
service be performed with good rolling stock, "suitable for
the conveyance of passengers as well as the safety and security of the mails," 39 the Overland Mail Company arranged
.for the purchase and delivery of the best coaches American
manufacturers were capable of producing. Among these were
the famous "Concord" coaches manufactured by the Abbot(Downing Company of Concord, New Hampshire. These
coaches were known throughout the nation' as sturdy, but.
nevertheless comfortable, vehicles capable of withstanding
the rigors of bumpy f,rontier roads. Th~ir oval-shaped bodies
rested on heavy thoroughbraces, or straps slung between "the
front and rear axles. This suspension enabled the coach
bodies to roll rather than jerk or bounce when wheels hit obstrl;lctionsor'sank into depressions on nature's roads. A Concord coach, costing about one thousand dollars, would seat
nine to twelve inside, two on the driver's seat, and as many
.on top as could find a place to' sit down. 40 Less favored by
Butterfield was the "Troy" coach manufactured by Eaton,
Gilbert and Company at Troy, New York. The Troy coach,
of an earlier vintage, was fastlosing out in competition'with
the Concord by the time of the Overland Mail. It was a more
lumbering vehicle, but, like the Concord,carried passengers
inside and on top. Each type had a rear boot which housed
luggage, and space under the driver's. seat for the mail38.. Foreman, "Overland Mail Route Through Oklahoma," op. cit., p. 302.
39. Report of the Postmaster General, op. cit., p. 990.
40. For an account of the history and description of the Concord coaches see Elmer
M. Hunt, "Abbot-Downing and the Concord Coach," Historical New Hampshire (November 1945). Pp. 1-20. See also Winther, Express and Stagecoach Days in California,
pp. 97-98.
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bags. Still a third type was the "Celerity" wagon, one
subsequently known in popular parlance simply as the "mud'wagon." Man)1factured by James Goold, Albany, New York,
this coach was more elongated in appearance due in part to
its low body and absence of top seats.
It was'less
comfortable
.
'.
for day riding, but its unupholstered seats could be adjusted
for night-time sleeping. It too had thoroughbraces; and due
to comparative iightness and maneuverability was favored
for mountain driving.42 ,
Four- to six-horse teams were used to pull these coaches
which, in addition to the weight of the vehicles and passen:.
gers, included baggage (forty pounds allowed for each customer) and from five to six hundred pounds of mai1. 43
Successful operation of this projected mail and passenger
service depended also, as previously stated, on the erection;
equippirig, a~d staffing of way-stations. In towns throu~h
which the line passed, stations were provided in hotels·'or
other Dusiness buildings much as bus lines provide ticket offices within small towns today. But since Butterfield found it
necessary to establish stations averaging. in distance about
twenty miles apart, he found it necessary to build scores of
them in open country~ I~ doing this the Company used
building materials closest at hand.,.stone was used in barren
mountainous regions; ado1?e was used in rockless desert; and
of course rough Jogs and cut lumber were utilized in areas
where wood was readily available. Thes,e stations varied in
size and in scope of operation. But it was not uncommon for
self-sustaining stations (those located in open, relatively uninhabited country) to be establishments of sufficient proportions to accommodate anywhere from four to ten employees
and a few oyernight guests who, due to travei fatigue, elected
to make stopovers on their journey. Provision likewise had
to be made for livestock, but for this purpose corrals usually
sufficed. 44
\

41.
p.148.
42.
43.
General,
44.
p.150.

William ,Banning and George H. Banning. Six HOTses (New York, 1928),

Ibid.,. Conkling and Conkling, op. cit., I, p. 133.
G. Bailey, "Great Overland Mail," Appendix to Report of the Postmaster
SIm. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 S"';8., vol. IV, p. 741.
Conkling and Conkling, op. cit., I, P. 135; Banning and Banning, op. cit.,
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Taken as ~. whole, these preparations were tremendous.
But wh~n on September 16, 1858, service was to commence,
Butterfield and his associates and employees had met requirements; The line; as finally organized for. operational
. purposes, was not only divided into an East and West divi'sion with 'F~ankIin (El Paso) as the division point, out the
line as a whole -was organized into nine separate divisions.
Within these. divisions there were at first 141 stations, the
number withiIi. each division varying considerably due to
respective degree of settlement. Therefore Division One, San
Francisco to Los Angeles, a total of 462 miles, had 35 stations,
varying in. distance apart from eight to twenty-four miles.
Noticeably different was Division Four, Tucson to Franklin
(El Paso). Over this 360-mile stretch which crossed all of
the present state of New Mexico, there were only fourteen
stations. These ranged in distances apart from fourteen to
'fifty-two miles. The latter distance was between Cook's
Spring and Picacho (opposite Dona Ana) on the west bank
of the Rio Grande, New Mexico. In charge of each station
, was an "agent"; in charge of one or more divisions was a
"superintendent.".45
Postage rates were fixed by the Government at ten cents
per letter; rates for packages would vary in accordance with
further regulations. Senders of such letters were required
to mark them "via overland," or "per overland mail." Pas-.
senger fares from St. ~ouis to San Francisco, or vice versa,
45. Report of the Postmaster General, Sen. Docs.• 35 Cong., 2 sess., vol. IV, pp. 742-

a

43. This contains a complete list of the stations and distances between each. The following is a summary tabulation:
Time Schedule
Distance
Diviby hours and
Division Points
in miles
minutes
sion
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
Nine

San Francisco-Los -Angeles
Los Angeles-Fort ¥uma
Fort Yuma-Tucson
Tucson-Franklin (EI Paso)
Franklin (EI Paso)-Fort Chadbourne
Fort Chadbourne-Colbert's Ferry (Red River)
Colbert's Ferry-Fort Smith
.
Fort Smith-Tipton
Tipton'-St. Louis (Railroad)

Totals
Total lapse of time: 24 days, 20 hours, 35 minutes.

462
282
280
360
458
282¥.,
192
318¥.,
160

2,795

80

72 :20
71:45

82
126 :30
65:25
38

48:55

11:40
596 :35
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were, after some experimentation, set at two hundred dollars.
Passengers were given the choice of preparing their own
. meals or buying them at company stations. 46 So with these
and countless other details taken care of, the Overland Mail
Company was ready to begin its service on the last day of .
gra:ce allowed under the contract - September 16, 1858.
For all the debate and widespread interest in the establishment of· a regular overland mail, the actual inauguration
of the service took place without much fanfare. The Missouri
Republican, for example, reported on events at St. Louis in a
most matter-of-fact manner, saying: "The first overland
mail for San Francisco, Cal., . . . takes its departure this
morning from the St. Louis Post Office, at 7 o'clock. It goes
by the way of the Pacific Railroad to Tipton, from whence it
will be conveyed in coaches and spring wagons the whole of
the distance. Mr. J. Butterfield who has given his personal
supervision to the work of getting this mail fairly under way
in all its parts, goes out with it to Springfield." The Republican endorsed the undertaking and extended its special compliments to Postmaster General Brown for having "done
more for the mail service in Missouri and the West, in his
brief period of office, than anyone of his predecessors for a
whole term." 47
Alone ip. arranging for newspaper coverage of the first
westward trek of the Overland
Mail was the New York H. er. '
ald, which dispatched a special correspondent to make this
initial trip with instructions to make reports. This he did in
the form of six articles to this newspaper, subsequently published in the H erald. 48 Given this unique assignment was the
youthful (twenty-three-year-old) Waterman L. Ormsby who,
as it turned out, became the one and only "through" westbound passenger on this now historic journey taken a century
46. Ibid., vol. X, doc. 48, P. 2. See also Rockwell D. Hunt and William S. Ament,
Oxcart to Airplane (Los Angeles, 1929), Pp. 92-94.
47. The (St. Louis) Missouri Republican, September 16,1858.
48. The New York Herald articles by Ormsby, republished and edited, appear in
Lyle H. Wright and Josephine M. Bynum, eds., The Butterfield Overland Mail by Waterman ·L. Ormsby (San Marino, California, 1942). Hereafter cited as Ormsby, The Butterfield Overland Mail. An article based solely on Ormsby's account is one by Hybernia
Grace, "The First Trip West on the Butterfield Stage," West Texas Hist<>rical Association Year Book, VIn (June 1932), pp. 62-74.
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ago. Over the first portion of the route Ormsby and John
Butterfield were fellow; passengers, and this fortunate situation provided the Herald reporter with a firsthand source for
much of the background information sought for his articles.
The ten-hour train trip across' Missouri farm country was
made on schedule, and a mere nine-minute transfer from rail
to four-horse stagecoach at Tipton 49 was apparently done
without disruption of the Butterfield timetable. 50
Ormsby's s,econd communication, sent from near the Red
Riv:er, Indian Territory, reported his reactions to constant
day-and-night coach travel. On this first lap of the stageline
the correspondent's attention was alerted particularly to
covered wagon migrations which appeared constantly in
progress. "All along the wildest western roads these [covered
wagon]. hotels may be met in every direction," he reported,
"enlivening the way by their camp fires at night...." At first'
night driving bothered Ormsby as he recalled' his reading of
Indian-infested forests and plains and as stump and brush
seemed to become transformed into "lurking foe." On and on
they rolled as the coach "rocked to and fro on the rough road,
likea vessel moving on the sea." 51
Dispatch three covered the route from Fayetteville to
Fort Smith through the Ozark Range over which the road
was "steep, rugged, jagged, rough; and mountainous." At a
place about a hundred miles east of El Paso, on September
28th, came the dramatic moment of meeting. the first eastbound stage from San Francisco. Ormsby's fifth dispatch was
, written at Tucson ;:tnd relates his reactions to travel across
the uninhabited "wilds of Texas, along its lonely plains and
barren hills and dangerous frontier to the Rio Grande." Here
the new trail was barely,in evidence, water was scarce, stations were farther apart than elsewhere, and teams of wild
49. One source reported that on this fir~t trip the mails were transferred from
t~ain to coach at Jefferson City, but evidence indicates that themailbagstraveled.as

scheduled, to Tipton before being resbipped by' coach. See Monas N. Squires, "The
Butterfield Overland Mail in Missouri," The Missouri Historical Review, XXVI (July
1932), p. 334.
,
50. Ormsby, 'The Butterfield Overland Mail, pp. 12, 16. The September 16, 1858;
westbound timetable, the one followed by Ormsby, is reproduced in facsimile in Frontispiece of this book. On the reverse side of this timetable appears a list of nineteen special
instructions issued by President Butterfield to his employees.
51. Ibid.
./
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mules were at times sllbstituted for tamed well-broken horses.
.Station facilities were of crudest types. At one of these (Conolly's) seats were "inverted pails or nature's chair." He reported the absence of plates and the use of four tin cups for
their black, unsweetened coffee.. Solid food at this station
consisted of hardtack' baked over hot' coals, each man
breaking off a piece' as desired and buttering by use of a
ppcket knife. But even butter was a luxury in these parts. 52
Ormsby's final reports on his journey over the Butterfield
Overland Mail line were written at San Francisco and were
dated October loth and 13th, following the conclusion of his
near-twenty-five-day journey. These last letters offer a recapitulation of his travel experiences and make observations
on the line as a whole: To say;· as he did upon arrival at Sa~
Francisco, that "I feel almost fresh enough to undertake it
[the trip] again" is perhap~ an exaggeration. He deemed the
southern plains and desert the most "dangerous 'part" of his.
journey but none the less exciting and i:Qteresting; he found
a diet of hardtack, dried beef, raw onions, and' black coffee a
bit trying in places, the scarcity of water aggravating, the
jolting of the stage rugged; but many of the difficulties encountered were capable of being removed. He did not belittle
the danger from Indian attacks, and recommended "thorough
military protection." He was fulsome in his praise of the
Company employees. In summary he said: "To many Americans who travel for pleasure this route will be a favorite.
Relieved from all danger of seasickness and the dull monotony of a sea voyage, they can travel by comfortable stages,
stopping at such interesting points as they may choose for
rest, and enjoying many opportunities for viewing the beautiful, the wonderful, and the sublime pr9ducts of nature....
The overland mail is, at any rate, a fixed fact." 53
, Ormsby's account of the. first westward passage has been
matched, fortunately, by a report on the first eastbound trip
given by G. t ?]Bailey, a special agent for the Post Office
Department. Bailey's account differs from the former in two
respects; it is an official report addressed to Postmaster Gen52,
53.

Ibid.,
Ibid.,

22, 41 f1'.
130.

pp,
p.
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eral Brown, and it is brief. The report, emanating from
Washington, D. C, and dated October 18, 1858, was transmitted by Brown to President James Buchanan with the
prophetic words: "It will be an important document, not less
instructive at the present time than it may be interesting and
curious to those who, in after times, may be desirous to know
by what energy, skill,and perseverance the vast wilderness
was first penetrated by the mail stages of the United States,
and the two great oceans united by the longest and most important land route ever established in any country." 54
In writing his report Bailey related that he traveled from
Washington out to San FranCisco over the facilities of the
Aspinwall and Panama concern. The initial eastbound stage
departed from San Francisco's Plaza September 14th, two
days ahead of the contract deadline. Even though "attended
with many difficulties and embarrassments," according to
Bailey, this trip was made within the prescribed time limit,
the elapsed time being twenty':four days, eigh~een hours, and
twenty-six minutes.
Bailey reported that, in his opinion, the Company had
complied with the essential conditions of the contract. He
said the line was stocked with "substantially-built" Concord
coaches, permanent stations had either been erected or were
in the process of being built, water was being specially dispatched to stations where none was obtainable on the prem- ,
ises. "Thus far,." he reported, "the experiment
ha's proved
\
successful." The Company, he said, had conquered the physica:I obstacles, but he warned that it had yet to demonstrate
_ the ability to cope with possible Indian troubles. 55
The prompt and successful completion of these initial
trips appears to have sparked public imagination concerning
this gigantic staging venture for the first time. Upon receiving the news of the arrival of the eastbound coach at St.
,Louis, President 'Buchanan, from the nation's capital, telegraphed his congratulations to John Butterfield, saying in
part: -"It is a glorious triumph for civilization and th~
,

54.
55.

Report of the, Postmaster General, Sen,
Ibid., Appendix, pp. 739-41.

,

Do~8"

35 Cong" 2 sess., voL IV, p. 718.
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. Union." 56 At St. Louis where the first departure of the Butterfield coach passed without fanfare, the arrival at this city
of the first eastbound mail- and passenger-bearing coach was
greeted wiJh public'cheers. The coach was escorted through
the streets l,eading to the post office by: crowds of people led
by a brass band. And at San Francisco, reported the San
. Francisco Bulletin, "a shout was raised, that ran with the
rapidity of an.electric flash .along Montgomery street, which
throughout5ts length was crowded by an.excited populace." 57
Nor did this enthusiasm necessarily abate with the' first
transits. J. M. Farwell, special correspondent for San Francisco's Alta California, reported upon the termination at St.
Louis of his first trip over the route, November 10, 1858: "I
... find quite as much excitement existing among the people,
upon the question of the overland communication, ~s there
was in San Francisco; when I left there some weeks ago. I
have been literally besieged with queries in regard to the
route.... "58
.
The goodwill expressed by the public at the inception of.
the service fortunately continued. 59 Salvaged reactions in the
form of travelers' accounts and newspaper commentary tend
to convey a favorable reaction to the service offered' by the
Overland Mail even though many Northerners and Westerners never became reconciled to the location of the "Ox
Bow" route as such. There exists, for example, the reminiscent account of H. D. Barrows. In 1896 Barrows recalled for
members of. the Southern California Historical Society a ride
he and his wife took during December, 1860. They traveled
via the "Overland" from Los Angeles to St.Louis in "thor;.
ough-brace mud wagons." "Of cQurse the journey was somewhat tedious," he said, "but ... the weariness of stage travel
was less· disagreeable,
than sea-sickness." He commented,
I
5.6. Quoted i)l LeRoy. R. Hafen, "Butterfield's Overland Mail," California Historical
Society Quarterly, II (October, 1923), p. 219. A summary of newspaper sentiment in
Missouri is to be found in Squires, "The Butterfield Overland Mail in Missouri," op. cit.,
pp. 340-41.
.
57. Quoted in Hafen, op. cit., p. 219.
58. [Walter' Barnes Lang], comp., The First Overland Mail: Butterfield Trail
(n. p., 1940). p. 127..
59. Criticism against the line was seldom if ever of the service on the Butterfield
Overland Mail; such-was directed against the use of the.extreme southern, or "Ox Bow"
route. See Squires, "The Butterfield Overland Mail in Missouri," p. 341.
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that at first sleeping aboard the coach was difficult but after
a couple of days this could be done "without difficulty, either
day or night;" When at their journey's end the Barrows
found accommodations at the Planters' House, at St. Louis
where after, and not before, a night's rest they took a warm
bath and changed their apparel. After this, "somewhat the
worse for wear and tear and dust," they felt "as good as
new;"60
To the end the Company adhered to the charge that the
mails must go through. Reports indicate that when passenger
stages also carrying mail were delayed the mails would be
rushed ahead by means of special light and fast coaches or by
means of riders. William Tallack, an Englishman traveling
ellstbound over the line in 1860, relates such a special transfer
of ,the mails in order that they might make scheduled connections with the Pacific Railroad at Tipton: 6i It is' also recorded how on one occasion, near Indian Wells, Arizona, the
mail bags were forwardeq by two riders. Subsequently these
riders were to be caught in a dust storm in which they, not
only became separated from each other but from their horses
as well. But the mail, somewhat delayed, went through to the
next station. Mishaps, most often due to broken axles, were
common, but somehow the mails and passengers moved forward. Loss of horses due to Indian thefts, especially by the
Texas Comanches, were numbered in the hundreds. But these
misfortunes did not disrupt overland service, whichaccording to one contemporary writer never once failed to meet
the scheduled delivery of the mails. 62
In spite of splendid service records there were individuals
and groups, especially those with political associations, whose. '
actions were ultimately to have a disruptive effect, upon the
Overland Mitil. In Congress. there were critical elements,
namely those who because of sectional partisanship and those
who on grounds of economy opposed this Southern line. UI60. fl. D. Barrows, "A Two Thousand Mile Stage Ride," Annual Publication of the
Historical Society of Southern California (1896), pp. 40-41, 43.
61. Lang, op. cit., P. 162.
62. Rupert N. Richardson, "Some Details, of the Southern Overland Mail," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXIX (July, 1925), PP. 1-18; Muriel H. Wright, "Historic
Places on the Old Stage Line From Fort Smith to Red River," Chronicles ,of okiahoma,
XI (June, 1933), pp.'798-822.
'
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timately the decisive disruptive force was the outbreak of
the Civil War.
,
When, for example, the postal appropriations bill came
up for debates in the Senate during May and June, 1860,
attempts' were made to interfere with the Butterfield contract. This took the form of the sponsorship by Senator Milton S. Latham of a central route, St. Louis to Placerville,
California,63 and by proposing a re-routing (subject to the
Company's approval) of mail.over the Butterfield line. Senator Trusten Polk of Missouri arose to object, for he was
opposed to any interference with the Butterfield contract.
Polk related that this contract had been'in operation for two
years and that the contractors had "never failed to perform
their part." Georgia's Senator Iverson, much as Latham had
done, favored modifications in the Butterfield contract. Iverson even went so far as to suggest a shift in the eastern
terminus of this line from St. Louis to either Vicksburg or
New Orleans. -Senator WilliamK. Sebastian of Arkansas,
like Missouri's Senator Polk, came to the defense of the
Butterfield line: "They -have achieved a success that does
honor to the enterprise and energy of. our American citizens.
. . . I propose to leave this line just as it is."64 New Hampshire's Senator John P. Hale, while satisfied with the Company's performance,scored small returns in the' form of
postal receipts..65 These receipts (totaling $71,378.63) were
considered a small return on anunnual government invest""
ment of $600,000 in the enterpriie. Finally, on June 19, 1860,
Senator Latham's bill to establish a central overland mail
route was laid aside and the controversy ended. 66

.

63. The Congressional Globe. 35 Cong.• 2 sess.• pt. 2. P. 2459. This action was at
least in part prompted by a resolution passed by the California State Legislature and
sent to its United States Senators asking for "daily" overland mail service. See Hse.
Misc. 'Docs.• 36 Cong:. lsess.• vol. V. p. 1064.
64. The Congressional Globe. 36 Cong.• 1 sess., pt. 3. p. 3147.
65. The report on the volume of postal business. September, 1858. through March,
1860. indicates the following:
Letters received from the West, 244.764; Amount of postages. $23.276.11
Letters sent to the West.
441,196;....
"
48.102.52
Total ,received and sent.
685.960; Total postageS,
71.378.63
See ibid.• Appendix. P. 2461.
66. For, S,enate debates during May and June. 1860. referred' to above, see ibid.,
PP. 2458-61; PP. 2113-15, 2458-61, 3146-51. It was the opinion of J. S. Black. Attorney
General, as expressed iI,l a letter to Postmaster General Joseph Holt (Brown's successor).
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Meanwhile the Butterfield mail and passenger coaches
rolled on with amazing regularity. It was said of the Butterfield Overland Mail by the Los Angeles Star ~ "The arrival of
the stages of the Overland Mail,had been heretofore as regular as the index on the clock points to the hour, as true as
the dial to the sun. During all seasons" in cold and heat,
in winter and summer, the overland stage has kept its
time.'... "67
The record reveals that the average time of transit over,
this line, even during the worst seasons of the year, was
twenty-one days and fifteen hours. This was comfortably
below the mandatory twenty-five days:68 By 1860 the volume
Of mail had increased perceptibly, and the passenger (mostly
non-through) traffic had reached near-maximum 'capacity.69
But forces beyond an individual man's powers to conquer
spelled doom for the "Ox Bow" line. Secession and outbre:ak
of the Civil War made disbandonmentof the line imperative.
Early in 1861 secessionist elements in the South began 'either
the confiscation or destruction of the Company's livestock,
equipment, and road bridges, and thereby put an end, by
March 6, to regular through service.
Even before this disruption occ~rred, the United States
Senate had initiated action intended to put an end to the "Ox
Bow" route, if not to the Butterfield Company itself. On
that it was doubtful that the Butterfield contract could legally be annulled Or modified.
Congress had empowered the Postmaster General to enter into a contract which he
did without including in said contract the customary Iprovisions allowing for subsequent
change. "On the whole," s~id Black, u my · opinion is, that yC?u cannot charige. the service
and reduce the pay of these contractors without violating the faith which the Government pledged to them by the agreement of your predecessor." This opinion Holt transmitted to the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads. Doubtless this opinion
had a restraining influence on those Senators who sought to kill the Butterfield line
through modification or annulment of the 1857 contract. See Sen. Ex. Docs.• 36 Cong., 1
sess.• vol. IX. doc. 26, pp. 1-5 ; see also Congressional Glebe, 36 Cong., 1 sess., pp. 2459-60.
67. Lo's Angeles Star. October 1. 1859. quotation from Foreman. "The California
Ov'erland Mail Route Through Oklahoma," op. cit.• p. 316.
68. Congressional Globe, 36 Cong .• 1 sess.• pt. 3, p. 2459.
69. Conkling and Conkling. Butterfield Overland Mail. II. p. '321. No complete
record of passenger traffic existS. Rupert N. Richardson, in '~Some· Details of the
Southern Overland Mail," op. cit.• pp. 6-9, arrives at passenger estimates for 1858-59
by means of close scrutiny of newspaper reports of arrivals and departures at St. Louis
and San Francisco. He concludes that the total number of "through passengers" for
1858 numbered only about 150 each way. Volume came from selling tr'msportation over
sections o'f the route, in other words~ serving local transportation needs. Ocean steamers
retained the bulk of the coast-to-coast passenger trade.
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February 22, 1861, it bill was again introducedin the Senate
which would direct the Postmaster General to modify the
contract by making arrangement for the establishment of a
central overland route and for the transport of East-West
mails on such a route. By acts of C.ongress, March 2 and 12,
1861, the end was decreed. Congress ordered the modification
of the original contract calling for the transfer of the overland
mail service from the southernto a central route. 7Q A threemonth period of disruption of overland mail service ensued,
for it was July 18,1861, before service over the central route
to extend from St. Joseph, Missouri, to Sacramento was inaugurated. In making this shift the physical assets of the
original Overland Mail Company were transferred to ~he new
line and were put in service over a five-hundred-mile division
between Salt Lake City and Virginia City, Nevada. Service
over the other sections of the central route was, by government agreement, managed through sub-let arrangements by
other concerns. 71 In this manner the southern overland
service ended. Thus came to a close a dramatic, picturesque,
pioneer experiment in overland passenger and mail service
across the wide stretches of the American Southwest on the
eve of the Civil War.
70.
71.

Congressional Globe, 36 Cong., 2 sess., pt. 2, pp. 1109 fr.
Conkling and Conkling, Butterfield Overland Mail, II, pp. 337-38.

SPANISH TRANSPORTATION.IN THE
SOUTHWEST; 1540-1846
By MAX L. MOORHEAD
of transportation in the American Southwest
T. isHEasHISTORY
old as travel itself. Although its most primitive

forms - the man-borne pack and the dog-drawn travois persisted in use until quite recent times, these were largely
superseded by Spanish techniques involving large domesticated animals and the 'wheel. The present study is concerned
with these more advanced methods, their development in the
region at large, and their particular application to the
province of New Mexico. This, then, is a study of the horse,
mule, burro, and ox; of the cart and wagon; and, especially,
of the organization and .operation of the caravan. Most
sighificantly, it is the history of a' life-line of a frontier
civilization.
.The pedestrian pace of primitive travel was quickened in
1540 by the arrival of domesticated horses, for Coronado's
expedition is credited not only with having brought the first
of these animals into the Southwest but ;;tlso with having
proved the practicability of the pack-train and the saddlehorse in that arid and broken land. However, the early assumption that these particular horses procreated the famous
wild mustangs of the region has now been adequately disproved. According to Coronado'smlister roll at Compostela,
all except two of his 556 horses were stallions, 1 and unless
several other mares were recruited after this inspection was
made, such as.may have escaped from the train could hardly
have reproduced themselves in the wilderness. The marked
Spanish preference for the stallion rules out the likelihood
that many mares accompanied the expedition at all, .much
less escaped and survived at this early date. More probably,
the wild herds of the Southwest stemmed from domesticated stock brought into New Mexico by Onate in 1598 or by
subsequent colonizing parties.
1. Arthur S. Aiton (ed.), HCoronado's Muster Roll," American Historical Review,
Vol. XLIV, No.3 (April, 1939),557,565.
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For many years the Spanish colonists, in New Mexico
drew for their horses on tpe stock farms of the interior, and
as lat~ as the eighteenth century there was a shortage of
horses in'the province, for in 1778 the commandant-inspector
at Chihuahua was complaining that merchant caravans visiting his city from New,Mexico were returning with considerably more horses than they had arrived with, and that
measures should be taken to discourage this practice. 2 Eventually, however, New Mexicans were enlarging their herds
from the wild horses of the mesas ,and canyons, and by the
nIneteenth century the mustang itself had become the dominant breed of the province. Although still priding themselves
on their skill in horsemanship, the New Mexicans had now
become indifferent toward animal husbandry, and the propagation of their mounts was being left almost entirely to
chance. ,Traders from the United States found their horses
than American breeds but also hardier and
much smaller
I
more spirited. 3
The poor man's beast of burden was almost always the
burro, a more diminutive animal than the horse or mule but
infinitely more patient and submissive than either. The burro
came to dominate the more localized,:farm-to-market trans,portation and was frequently saddled with a load much larger
if not
heavier than itself. It
was not: uncommon
for a whole
,
.
.
"
family of rancheros to ride into town on the back of a single
donkey.4 The Spanish jacks and jennets of the Southwest also
played a more important role as breeding stock., Together
with the horse they produced a much superior beast of burden
-themule.
Much, has been written about the Spanish horse in the
conquest of the New World, and admittedly the pageantry of
the Spanish' provinces has sparkled with equestrian glory,
but the unsung hero of transportation in the Southwest was
unquestionably the Spanish mule. Only one mule accom,

,

2. Jose Rubio to Gov. Francisco Trebol Navarro, Chihuahua, January 20, 1778,
Spanish Archives, Item 711, Historical Society of New Mexico Collection, at Santa Fe.
3, Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies (4th ed., 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1850),
I, 178-79.
4. Ibid., I, 187.
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panied the Coronado expedition,5 but more than a hundred of
these worthies entered New Mexico with Ofiate. 6 And thereafter this prosaic beast - an ungainly, sterile hybridliterally bore the white man's burden in the occupation of the
region. The mule could pack a load of up to four hundred
pounds and could negotiate trails far too precipitous for
wagons or even horses. An atajo, or mule train, could remain
on the road for five or six hours without rest and cover from
twelve to fifteen miles a day. As many as two hundred would
travel in a single train 'under the management of a crew of
six arrieros, or muleteers, for each forty or fifty animals. The
skill,. efficiency, and ~ndurance of both the inule and the
arriero became almost legendary.
It is from the observations of foreign travellers, men ",ho'
were fas'cinated by what was locally routine, that we are able
to reconstruct the techniques of packing by mule train in the
SouthwesU In preparing the atajo for a jornada, or day's
journey, the arrieros would drive the grazing mules to their
line of packs, secure each with a deftly thrown riata, or noose,
and,working in pairs, go about the time-honored method of
loading, First they blind-folded each ,mule with the traditional tapajos, a piece of embroidered leather, so that it would
not become frightened in the ensuing operations', Then the
salea, a soft piece of raw sheepskin, was thrown over its back,
to be followed by the xerga, a woolen blanket, and then the
,aparejo, or pack-saddle, The latter was a large leather pouch
stuffed with straw to prevent the packing cases from chafing
the mule's back. The aparejo was fastened first with a broad
hempen belt slung 'under the mule's belly and drawn corsettight and then witl1 a wide crupper to keep it from slipping
forward during the jostling 9f the march. Next caine the
carga, or load, which although weighing more than the'
5. Aiton (ed), "Coronado's Muster Roll," loco cit., 565.
6. Inspection of Juan de Frias Salazar, Rio San Geronimo, January 8, 1598, in
George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey (eds.), Don Juan de Onate, Colonizer of New
Mexico, 1595-16Z8 (2 vols., Albuquerque, 1953), I, 215-308,
, '7. Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, I, 106, 180-82; George Wilkes Kendall, Narrative of the Texan-Santa Fe E~pedition (6th ed" 2 vola., Ne~ York, 1847), 169-72;
George Frederick Augustus Ruxton, Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains
(New York, 1847), 90-91, 180-81.
. '
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arriero'himself was pitched aboard with a single heave and
, adjusted so as to balance evenly on the mule's back. Usually
two packages or crates were coupled together with ropes and
made to hang on -either side. The carga was then bound to
the aparejo with a complicated network of knotted ropes
and protected from the rain by a petate, or mat, which was
thrown .over the entire pack. This done, the blind-fbld was
removed, and the animal was ready to travel.
Although' painfully tight at the outset,. the girths and
ropes gradually loosened during the j,ourney as the weight
of the load settled theaparejo, and a major occupation of the
arrieros was t9 tighten them again from time to time during
the march. This was. usually accomplished with
. such speed
and dexterity that no delay was occasioned for the train as a
~hole. So well were.the ~ules trained to their task that none
attempted to overtake its predecessor on the road. Furthermore, when the arrieros prepared for each new day's journey,
each mule instinctively went to its own pack and patiently
stood by until it was hoisted onto its back and secured. By
the nineteenth century the atajo had become a highly institutionalized organization.
The mule served not only as a beast of burden but also as
a draft animal, sharing this service with the ox. Mostof the
wagons and carts accompanying Onate's expedition in 1598
, were drawn by oxen,8 but the mule gradually replaced the ox
for this kind of duty. The few carriages and coaches owned
by Spanish dignitaries in the Southwest were drawn by mules
rather than horses, and 'Yhen the Missouri traders appeared
in the nineteeth century with their covered wagons, about
half of them' exhibited a preference for mules over oxen.
. Oxen in equal numbers could ,pull heavier loads, particularly
through muddy or sandy stretches, but they also tended to
wear out sooner than mules and to )weaken on the highland
diet of short, dry grass. Most of the traders readily exchanged their jaded American oxen for Mexican mules, for
~lthough costing more per head, they endured more strenu8. Record of Marches, 1596-98, in Hammond and Rey (eds.), Don Juan de Onate,
I, 309-28.
.
,
.
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ous travel. Furthermore, the Mexican breed of mules seldom
had to be shod. 9
Among the Mexicans oxen were used principally for
drawing the locally-manufactured carreta. Owing to the
scarcity of iron and steel in the region, the carreta was made
almost entirely of wood - the axle of pine and all other parts
of brittle cottonwood, the whole fastened together with
wooden pegs and rawhide thongs. The bed and· body of the
ox-cart was a rectangular block, usually about four feet long,
two and a half feet wide, and abqut a foot thick. It was
crudely hewn from a single cottonwood trunk, and pro-·
truding knobs were left on either side. A hole was then drilled
or burned through the block, piercing both knobs, which then
became the hubs, and a pine rod was inserted to serve as an
axle. Two relatively round sections, each about four feet in
diameter, were then sawed from the same tree trunk and
drilled at the approximate center to serve as wheels. These
were secured to the axle with pegs; a pole for a tongue was
attached to the body with rawhide;, and four posts were
imbedded in the corners of the body block to complete the
rude contraption. Oxen were attached with the yoke lashed
behind rather than in front of their horns according to
. Mexican custom, and when the cart was in motion the wheels
staggered and wobbled, emitting distressing screeches and
groans which could be heard for miles. A spare axle for each
day's travel was an essential part of the equipment.1o These·
primitive carts ~nd the lowly ·pack burros constituted the
chief means of transportation· along the lesser roads and
trails.
The first wagons or carts of the Southwest were those
which arrived in 1590 with the ill-fated Gaspar Castano de
Sosa. The published records of this expedition make frequent
reference to the accompanying wheeled vehicles, but they
neither identify them precisely nor indicate how many made
the tripP Apparently they were of sturdy construction, for
they survived the rugged journey from Coahuila by way of
9. Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, I, 35-36.
10. Kendall, Narrative of the Texan-Santa Fe Expedition, II, 44-46.
11. Dorothy Hull, "Castano de SOBa's Expedition to New Mexico in 1590," Old
Santa Fe, III (October, 1916), 305-32.
.
,
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the ,Pecos canyon and also the return trip down the Rio
Grande valley. The ruts left by these wagons or carts were
still visIble in the EI Paso district when Onate's expedition
arrived in '1598. 12 Onate's own party brought- eighty-three
wagons, carts, and carriages into New Mexico. They were
variously described as carros, carretas, and carrozas. All may
have been merely two-wheeled vehicles, but some had ironrimmed wheels, covered tops, and teams of from six to twenty
oxen. 13 Twenty-two of these vehicles failed to arrive at the
pueblos with the main train, having been left on the road for
lack of oxen strength,14 but presumably they were subsequently recovered. The trail blazed by these carts or wagons
from the silver mines of what is now Durango to the pueblos
"of the upper Rio Grande was never erased. Indeed, this became the camino real, or public highway, linking the farflung New Mexican outposts with civilization in the south.
It was the most important wagon road in the Southwest for
the next two centuries. '
,
.
Although Onate opened the historic road to New Mexico,
the transportation system which kept the colonies alive was
first organized and operated by, Franciscan missionaries.
This system, established under royal subsidy shortly ~fter
1609, was designed to supply only the needs of the provincial
missions. It provided for a train of wagons that would be
dispatched from Mexico City every, three years, taking approximately six months to' cover the "fifteen hundred miles
and remaining in New Mexico for a like period of time ,before
starting bl':!-ck. Actually no such schedule was maintained, and
sometimes six or seven years elapsed between the train's arrivais. 'Furthermore, the' mission wagons came to serve the
lay communities quite as much as the 'religious establishments, and by. the latter part of the seventeenth century this
caravan service constituted almost the sole mea,ns of communications between the viceregal capital and the New
Mexican settle~ents.15
12. Record of Marches, 1596-98, in Hammond and Rey (eds.l, DO'n Juan de Onate,
1.315-16.
.
13. Inspection of Juan de Frias Salazar, in ibid.. I, 215.308.,
14. Record of Marches, 1596-98. in ibid., I, 328.
15. France V. S,choles, "The Supply Service of the New Mexican Missions in the
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According to royal specifications, the missionary supply
service was performed by thirty-two wagons operating in
two sections, or trains, and managed by four mayordomos, or
wagon masters, each responsible for eight wagons. The train
was to be accompanied by a military escort of from twelve to .
fourteen soldiers and by numerous spare draft animals and
beef cattle. The wagons themselves were of heavy construc'"
tion, each capable of carrying two tons of cargo and, when
fully laden, requiring a team of eight mules. These were fourwheeled 'wagons, equipped with iron tires weighing twenty·seven pounds apiece and with arched coverings of canvas like
those of the later "prairie schooners." Certain other specifications suggest the rugged nature of the long, unimproved
road they travelled. from Mexico City to Santa Fe. Each
group of eight wagons was required to carry sixteen spare
axles, 150 extra spokes, twenty-four reserve tires, five hundred pounds of lubricating tallow, twenty-four pounds of
cord for repairing the cover and cargo wrappings, and an
assortment of nails, bolts, washers, harping pins, cleats,
linch pins, and ribs. Among the r~quired tools for each trip
were hammers, sledges, adzes, axes, picks, and crowbars. 16
Although theoretically maintained for the exclusive use
. of the religious establishments of New Mexico, the triennial
caravan became in fact a public conveyance. Government
officials and eVEm private merchants commandeered the
wagons for their own use, and eventually all the people, merchandise, and mail that went to and from the province depended upon the mission wagons. The contractors who
,furnished the wagons for the service sometimes used them
for their own private profit and by so doing often delayed the
arrival of the mission supplies. In 1665, for instance, they
sold space in half of the wagons to passengers and to merchants sending commercial freight to the mines of Zacatecas
. and Parra!. In 1674, after complaining repeatedly of such
practices, the friars managed to buy the wagons and mules,
from the contractors and operate the service on their own,17
Seventeenth Century," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW', Vol. V, Nos. I, 2, 4 (January.
April, October, 1930),93-115,186-210,386-404.
16. Contract of April 30, 1631, in ibid., 105-109.
17. Ibid., 395-96, 398.
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But even then the wagons were used for secular purposes..
This was especially true in 1680, when the general revolt of
the Pueblo tribes wiped out the ,Spanish settlements of New
Mexico and sent more than two thousand refugees fleeing on
foot to the EI Paso district. These unfortunates were saved
from starvation and exposure by the timely arrival of twentyfour wagons of supplies which the father commissary had
ordered for their relief from the south. 1s
Early in the eighteenth century; after the reoccupation
of N~w Mexico, the mission supplies were once more transported by private contractors, and again merchants availed
themselves of the service. Furthermore, judging from an
ensuing law suit, the friars themselves assumed at least partial responsibility for the safe delivery of merchandise. A
consignment of drygoods, tobacco, chocolate, and sugar which
was carried bythe mission caravan of 1714 was damaged by
a flash flood while crossing the Rio N azas in northern Durango, whereupon the owner of 'the goods, a merchant from
Parral, brought suit against the custodian of the New Mexican missions., The claimant held responsible not only the custodian but also the wagon master, to whom the friars had
given power of attorney, and the endorser of the consignment
as well, the latter being the actual owner of the wagons and
mules. The merchant hoped to attach the w~gons and mules
until damages were paid, but the outcome of the litigation is
not revealed in the preserved records,19
During the early part of that century the caravans operating to and from Mexico City seem not to have followed a
fixed schedule even though they carried the regular mail. In
1712, for instance, caravan left for-the south in May. By
, order of the governor its departure was announced at Santa
Fe twelve days in advance by the town crier with drum and

a

18. ' Fray Francisco de Ayeta to the Commissary General. Real Chico, December
20,1680, in Charles W. Hackett (ed.), The Revolt of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico
and Otcrm,n'sAttempted Reconquest, 1680-1682 (2 vols., Albuquerque, 1942), I, 212-13.
19. Testimony of Juan Hartus Vallejo', Juan Gonzalez de Retana, Nicolas Butrin,
and Antonio Sanchez, Parral and Mexico City, February 23 to September 26, 1714,
Archivo F:ranciscano, Custodia de Nuevo Mexico, Legaio 6, Documento 5, in the Biblioteca Nacional" at Mexico City.
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bugle accompaniment. By the middle of the century, when
the caravan had become an annual service, it left New Mexico
each December,21 but eventually the season for its departure
was autumn and usually the month of November.' This allowed the merchants of the province adequate time in which
to attend the fair held at Taos in July or August and return
with trade goods from the Comanches and other nomadic
tribes that were marketable in the interior provinces. 22 Although a regular caravan left S,anta Fe in November of each
year throughout the latter part of the eighteenth century and
well into the nineteenth, other trains were made up from
time to time for special purposes, particularly for carrying
official dispatches to the south.
All caravans, whether regular or special, ran the risk of
.attack by predatory bands of Indians, especially in the long
stretches of unoccupied terrain through which the camino
real p~ssed. When these trains were not provided with mili- .
tary escort, they at least depended upon strength in numbers.
But this was not always adequate. In 1760, when two hundred
armed· men accompanied the caravan, it was attacked between El Paso del Norte and Chihuahua by a band of Indians
who, although outnumbered, by the defenders, managed
nonetheless to capture, a large number of horses. 23 It was
customary 'for local militia to furnish protection for the annual trains, escorting them to and from designated points on
or near the provincial boundaries. The regular caravan
leaving Santa Fe in November of 1780 was accompanied as
far as the Jornada del Muerto by an unusually large force
under the governor himself. Don Juan Bautista de An'za,
being enroute to Sonora, obligingly timed his departure to
fit that of the caravan and remained with it as far as Fray
Cristobal. For the next fifty-three miles, over the deserted
20. Bando' of Gov. M~rquez de la Penuela, Santa Fe, 'May 10, 1712, Spanish
Archives, Item 17. Historical Society of New Mexico. .
21. Bishop Pedro Tamar6n, Visita del Obispado de Durango, 1759-1763, ff, 130-35,
transcript in the Bancroft Library, at Berkeley, California.
22. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History (5 vols.,
Cedar Rapids, la., 1911-1917), l, 453-54.
.
. 23. Tamar6n, Visita del Obispado de Durango, ff. 130-35..
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Jornada, the train was without . protection. However, by
. previous arrangement it was met at the spring of E;l PerriHo
by a captain and forty soldiers from the southern presidios.
of San Elizario andCarrizal, who escorted it to the city of
Chihuahua.24 In August of 1800, when another governor set
out for the south on official business with an escort of thirtytwo troops, several merchants and rancheros took advantage
of the protection to drive their livestock and carry produce
to the southern markets even though a regl;llar caravan was
scheduled to leave three months later: This particular informal train included 18,784 sheep, 213 head of cattle, and
a pack train laden with woolen goods and peltries. 25 Two
years later, in June, a company of citizens and Indians joined
a body of troops who were on their way to Chihuahua with a
dispatch from the governor to'the commandant-general, the
entire caravan consisting of eighty-six persons. 26
. Mail transportation did not depend exclusively on the
caravans. Dispatch riders were much faster; especially when
. working in relays. In 1807 the New Mexican riders exchanged packets withtho'se of Nueva Vizcaya at EI Paso del
Norte,27 but during the early years of the national period the
exchange point was moved some twenty-eight miles north,
to the Rancho del Bracito. The riders from the south left
Chihuahua on the first and fifteenth of each month and
reached the latter point in thirteen days. As Bracito was.
approximately half way· between Chihuahua and. Santa Fe,
the relay
probably traversed the entire distance of 690
miles
,
'
I
in from twenty to twenty-eight days, whereas forty days
were normally required by the caravans. By the 1840.'s the
mail servi6e between Santa Fe and Chihuahua had become
very irregular and uncertain, the riders being almost totally
24. Anza, Diary of Expedition to Sonora, in Alfred B; Thomas (ed.)', FOrgotten
Frontiers:, A Study of the Spanish Indian F'olicy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, GO'Vernor Of New Mexico, 1777·1787 (Norman, Okla., 1932), 197-99.
'
25. Gov. Fernando de Chacon to Pedro de Nava, El Paso del Norte, August 30,
1800, Spanish Archives, Hem 1503, Historical Society of New Mexico.
26. Chacon to Joaquin Ugarte, Santa Fe, June 14, 1802, Spanish Archives, Item
1604, Historical Society of N,ew Mexico.
27. Nemesio Salcedo to Gov. Joaquin Alencaster, Chihuahua, March 5, 1806,
Spanish Archives, Item 1972, HistOrical Society of New Mexico; Elliott Coues (ed.),
'The Expeditions of Zebulon Montgomery Pike (2 vols" New York, 1895), II, 632.
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at the mercy of hostile Indians while on the road. Then the
service amounted to a mere express, operating only when
important occasion demanded. 28
The independence of Mexico from Spain, achieved in
1821, wrought a number of important changes in the transportation of the Southwest. In the first place, even the scant
protection formerly offered caravans by Spanish garrison
forces was now gone, the young Mexican nation being unable
to provide adequate troops for its northern frontier. Indian
depredations became 'even more severe than in the past. In
the second place, the achievement of independence liberated
New Mexico from its economic reliance on the south, and a
regular annual caravan trade, between the Mexican and
American frontier settlements - the celebrated Santa Fe
trade with Missouri - was inaugurated that same year.
Thereafter for the next quarter of a century, until the American invasion annexed New Mexico to the United States, '
,'Spanish and Mexican techniques of transportation were increasingly modified by American influence.
The introduction of the, Conestoga wagon constituted
something ,of a revolution in the region's transportation, for
although large wagons had been common in tl}e caravans of
the seventeenth century, they seem to have been largely 'displaced by pack mules during the eighteenth and early nine-,
teenth centuries. The first American wagons to reach Santa
Fe were the three brought in by William Becknell and his
trading party in 1822. 29 At least twenty-five wagons came
with the Missouri caravan of 1824, and thereafter until 1843
.from thirty to 130 arrived annually. In 1843 there were 230,
and,in 1846 over 30P arrived in the wake of the Army of the
West. so Most of these wagons returned to Missouri with the
traders, but some ·weresold in New Mexico.. The Americans .
had less need for them on their return trip with specie and
bullion than on the way out with bulky cargoes of drygoods.
28. Jose Antonio Escudero, Noticias Estad£sticas de Chihuahua (Mexico, 1834),
186; Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, II, 67-68.
29. "The Journals of Captain Thomas Becknell," Missouri Historical Review, Vol.
IV, No.2 (January, 1910), 79-80.
, 30. Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, II, 160; Col. Alexander Doniphan to Adj.
Gen. Roger Jones, Chihuahua, March 4, 1847, 30 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Docs" vol. I.
498·502.
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Some New Mexican merchants, such as Jose Chavez y Castillo, went to the United States to purchase wagons. Chavez
. brought eleven of them to Santa Fe in 1841.31 The cost.of
large American wagons was estimated by one trader as two '
hundred dollars while mules were to be had for forty dollars
and oxen at between seventeen and eighteen. 32
Several makes of American wagons were introduced into
New Mexico by the Santa Fe traders, but the favorite was
the so-called Conestoga -=>then manufactured at Pittsburgh
but patterned after the historic covered wagons' of Pennsylvania's Lancaster County. The distinctive features of this
"prairie schooner" were its sagging bed and outward-leaning
sideboards and tail-gate (all of which encouraged the cargo
to settle toward the center of the wagon) ; its billowing white
canvas hood supported by towering arches which leaned fore
and aft at the ends to protect the openings from sun and rain;
and its traditional construction materials' - white oak for
the spokes and framing, gum for the hubs, hickory for the
axle trees and cover arches, and poplar for the boards, all
amply reinforced with black ironwork. 33 The cargo in these
wagons was protected from the elements not only by the
vaulted canvas top but also by interior sheeting which was
sometimes doubled and insulated between layers with a mackinaw blanket. As a precaution 'against water damage occur-ring when the wagon was upset while fording a river, the
packages themselves were often wrapped with painted burlap.34 On long trips the wagons usually carried spare axles
and also ample supplies of resin and tallow for lubricatIon.
The iron tires wore well, but in the hot, dry plains of the
Southwest they became loosened when, the wooden wheels
s4rank and had to be wedged tight or cut through in order
to take up the slack. The spokes also shrank in the arid eli31.. Manuel'Alvarez, Memorial to Secretary of State Daniel Webster, Washington,
February I, 1842, pp~ 5-6, in U. S. Consular Despatches, Santa Fe, vol. T, National
Archives, at Washington.
\
David Waldo, Table of Expenses, in Thomas Jefferson Farnham, Travels in
the Great Western Prairies, the Anahuac and Rocky Mountains, and in Oregon Territory
(New York, 1843),33.
"
33. John Omwake and others, The Conestoga Six-Horse Bell Teams of Eastern
Pennsylvania (Cincinnati, 1930), 17, 62-72.
34. Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, T, 39-40.
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mate and had to be bound with leather to keep them from
turning,in their sockets. 35
The employment of American wagons on the highways of
Mexico would have been prohibited if a presidential decree
issued in 1842 had been enforced. This order, designed to .preserve the surfaces of the national 'roads, banned the use of
all wagons having either tires less than the standard Mexican.
width' of eight inches or loads in excess of two hundred
arrobas, that is, about five thousand pOlinds. 36 Protests
against this requirement came not so much from the American traders as from those of Mexico itself, particularly the
merchants. of Chihuahua, who were now using American
wagons in cons~derable·numbers; They insisted that not only
their commerci~l livelihood but also their very defense de.,.
pended upon these newly-acquired vehicles; whereas pack
mules were easily stampeded by attacking Indians, the
wagons made excellent parapets; and the narrower tires did
no harm whatsoever to the roads of northern Mexico,.which
, were natural highways and never had to be resurfaced ~r
improved artificially. On the strength of such arguments as
these the national authorities agreed to submit the regulation
to the congress for possible amendment in 1846 and meanwhile to allow a number of Chihuahua traders to use 'American wagons, but the outbreak of war with the United States
in that year prevented further modification. 37 Actually. this
obj'eqtionable regulation was never enforced in the northern
frontier provinces~
The Conestogas were commonly employed by both Mexican and Missouri traders well into the war years. Merchants
who did not own wagons could freight their goods from Independence, Missouri, to Santa Fe (a distance of 775 miles) in,
another's train at a cost of only nine cents a pound. Since the
average wagon carried 4,500 pounds of goods, the freightage
35. Ibid., I, 104; Report of Lt. J. W. Abert of His Examination of New Mexico
in the Years 1846-47, 30 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Docs., no. 7, p. 446.
36. Decree of Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, Mexico, January 14, 1842, in
Manuel Dublan and Jose Maria Lozano (eds.), Legi8laci6n mexicana 0 colecci6n c~mpleta
de laB disPQsiciones l.egisw.tivas expedidas deode la independencia de w. RepUblica (42
vols.'in 45 parts, Mexico, 1876-1912), IV, 97.
37. The correspondence on this subject appears in the Fomento-Camino file, Torno
13, Expediente 283, in the Archivo General y Publica 'de la Nacion, at Mexico City.
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on a 'load,of goods, which was valued at from two thousand:
to three thousand dollars, was only about four hundred dol'lars a wagon. 38 To this and the original cost of the goods,
however, there was added a tariff which the New Mexican
authorities collected at Santa Fe.
The ever-changing rates of Mexico's national tariff together with the infinite means employed by AmeriCan traders
to evade the duties finally fnduced one New'Mex;ican governor, who was himself an important inve'stor in the trade,
to establish a 'purely arbitrary rate of five hundred dollars
per wagon-load without reference to either the quantity or
quality of the importation. Legal duties had usually averaged
from one thousand to two thousand dollars per load, so the
new rate was disadvantageous to the merchants only in that
it was enforceable. In effect, however, it induced, the traders
to use larger wagons; some of them carrying up to ten thousand pounds, ,whereby they doubled-the volume of their importation without increasing the customs duty. On reaching
the New Mexican frontier with these oversized wagons"
moreover, they could redistribute their cargo among fewer
vehicles and, by destroying the emptied ones, reduce the perwagon tax still further, and finally by selling the salvaged,
iron parts at the inflated' prices of New Mexico, they could
gain an additional profit: Such practices as these eventually
caused the governor to res~ore the legal ad valerem rates. 39
As previously indicated, the roads of the Southwest were
entirely unimproved prior to the American occupation. Only
the sun-dried and travel-packed natural 'soil constituted a
surface. Only the well-worn ruts marked the route itself.
'I1here being no bridges, streams and rivers which crossed the
-trails had to be forded. In the dry season this was usually
done at no risk and with little difficulty, but the crossing of
the Rio Grande at EI Paso del Norte was dangerous, owing
to quicksand , and a swift current, even when the water was
I'
38. Bill of lading, Independence, August 27, 1844, and Manuel Alvarez to Robert J.
Walker, Independence, June 18, 1845, Alvarez Papers, B. M. Read Collection, Historical
Society of New Mexico.
..
39. Charles Bent to Manuel Alvarez, Taos, November 12, 1844, Alvarez Papers,
Historical Society of New Mexico; Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, I, 112-13; David
Coyner, The Lost Trappers (Cin~innati, 1849), 216-17.

SPANISH TRANSPORTATION

121

lo~. Sometiql.es at flood-tide the caravan merchants had to
unload their cargoes and ferry them across in dug-out canoes
or convert the wagons themselves into rafts by buoying the
beds with empty water kegs. At other times they dismantledthe wagons and ferried them across a section at a time, each
precariously balanced on a single pirogue. On such occasions
the. make-shift crafts frequently overturned, and the dampened cargo had to be unpacked and dried in the sun bef9re
the journey could.be continued. 40 .
.
Only two bridges seem ever to have been built on the
camino real of New Mexico, and neither of these endured for
long. In the latter part of the eighteenth century there was
a bridge across the Rio Grande at EI Paso del Norte. It was
over five hundred feet long and seventeen wide, a simple bed
of pine logs supported by eight caissons~ A supplementary
span crossed the large irrigation ditch on the right bank, but
both structures demanded frequent repair and replacement",
during the early years of the nineteenth century.41 Farther
north in the' same period another bridge crossed the river toil'
San Felipe~ It likewise was a simple bed of pine logs resting
on eight caissons. These supports were merely wooden crates
filledrwith stone, sand, and clay and sunk into the river bed.
. The span itself had no hand rails and would support neither
carriages nor wagons. It had been·built by Indian labor which·
had been drafted from several pueblos of the Rio Abajo sometime 'before 1791, but by 1846 it had been entirely )Vashed
away.42
There were no wayside inns on the roaqs of the Southwest, not even on the camino real, arid sometimes caravans
had to frave.l days on· end without passing a town or rancho
where shelter or sustenance could be obtained. On most of
-,------ '

40. Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, II, 75; James Hobbs, Wild Life in the Far
West: Personal Ad,ientures of a Border Mountain Man (Waterford, Conn., 1875), 76.
41. .Gov. Fernando Chac6n to Pedro. de Nava, El Paso del Norte, August 30 and
October 17, 1800; Chacon to Joaquin Ugarte, June 14, 1802; and Rafael Montes to
Pedro Maria de Allende, El Paso del Norte, April 4, 1816, Spanish Archives, Items 1503.
1512,1604; and 2658, Historical Society of New M~xico; Coues (ed.); The E",pediti<Yn8
Of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, II, 740.
42. Report of Trials held at Santa Fe and Isleta, December 22, 1791, to April I,
1792, Spanish Archives, Item 1175, Historical Society of New Mexico; Coues (ed.), The
E",pediti<Yn8 of Zebulon Montgomery Pike, II, 717; Report of Lt. Abert, 30 Cong., 1
sess., Se'!. E",. Docs., no. 7,.461-62.
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the roads, however, the barren landscape was relieved at
almost regular intervals by'natur,al oases -water holes, pastures, or woods - and these became established campsites.
Whether merely a spring, a patch of grass, or a grove of
cottonwoods along the river, each such resting place bore a
name of its own and a distinctive reputation. Although situ-'
ated many miles from any human habitation, such oases
appeared on the maps of the day as prominently as regular
towns, and it was the spirited determination of each arriero
or mayordomo to bring his train to the venerated site before
nightfall. To camp in the open country (that is, at a nameless
pl~ce) would entail a discomfort which was as much spiritual
as physical. 43
There were, of course, several long, deserted stretches
known as jornadas, which caravans tried to cross rapidlyin a single day if possible - in order to reach the water and
pastu'rage'-beyond. The length of a day's march was deter.;.
mined not only by'the means of transportation, by the weight
of the
and by the difficulty of the terrain, but also by
the availability Qf water. Travel between closely spaced
springs or along running rivers tended to be leisurely, but
across the waterless stretches it was usually a forced march.
Many of the distinctive features of Spanish and Mexican
transportation in the Southwest were dictated,by' geographic'
conditions. The sparse pastures of grama grass, the scarcity
of water, and the ,precipitousness of mountain trails which
characterized the landscape all made special demands~ The
distance between settlements' and the hostility ot Indians
were other factors. For long-distance hauling, the terrain required that 'mules rather than horses or oxen would bear the
burdens and draw the wagons. In short, for each peculiarity
of the region and of the task the Spaniards developed specific
techniques, the soundness of which are adequately borne out
by the adaptations which the more technologically advanced
Anglo-Americans made of them when they occupied the same
land:

cargo,

43,

Gregg, Commerce ,of the Pra-iries, II, 69.

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION IN THE
SOUTHWEST, 1848-1860
By A VERAM B. BENDER
transportation has ever presented a problem in
the nation's history. From the time of Braddock's illfated expedition, inadequate transportation facilities· illustrated the paramount necessity of moving men and supplies
rapidly to the seat of military operations and has served as
no small factor in the development of routes into and across
the western country.1 The War of 1812 again emphasized this
essentjal need. Absence of gooq roads, it was asserted in the
halls of Congress, was responsible for disaster in the early
part of the war and increased transportation costs by many
millions of dollars. 2 In the 1830's and 1840's, with the filling
in of the Old Northwest and Southwest, the need for adequate
. transportation commercially as well as militarily became
more pressing and the Federal government hearkened to the
call by building roads. 3
But it was in the years between the Mexican and Civil
Wars, when the nation's boundaries reached the Pacific; that
this problem reached, a more acute stage. With the extended
frontier came the California gold discovery and the mighty
emigrant waves to the El Dorado. The problem of frontier·
defense, ever present from the beginning of the nation's history, was' truly formidable now. The frontier was much
longer and more remote, and the pioneers, though more.

M

ILITARY

Unless otherwise indicated, the manuscript materials used in the preparation of this
article are in the National Archives. Abbreviations used are: AGO.,-Adjutant General's
Office. CGS-Commissary General of Subsistence. EOG--Engineers; Office of the Chief.
HA-Headquarters of the Army. ID-Indian Division. LB-Letter Book or Books. LRLetters Received. Land R-Letters and Reports. LS-Letters Sent. LC-Library of
Congress. MHS-Missouri Historical Society. PWRO-Pacific Wagon Roads Office. QGO .
-Quartermaster General's Office. SI-Secretary of the Interior. SW-Secretary of War.
SGO-Surgeon General'; Office. TEB-Topographical Engineers Bur~au.
1. Balthasar Meyer· and Caroline E. McGi1l, Hi8tOTY of TTanspoTtation in the
United S~ate8 befOTe 1860 (Washington, 1917), 90.
2. It is probable that $60,000,000 were spent for transportation during the War of
1812. Ibid.• 58-59, 91; CongTe8monal Debates, 21 Cong., 1 sess., VI, 637~655.
3. W. Turrentine Jackson; Wagon Roads West (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952),
7-9;
, "The Army Engineers as Road Builders in Territorial Iowa,"
Iowa Joufflal of HistoTY, XLVII (Jan., 1949),15-33.
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numerous, .were often dangerously scattered. The Indian was
too close to the white man. The National government had acquired an a!lded responsibility - defense of the new frontier.
For more than fifty years, the white man's government,
in, search for the ideal method of dealing with the Indian, constantly held out an olive branch in one hand and a sword in
the other. While it transferred the red man to new homes
and gave him gifts or annuities, it also established a chain of
forts at the edge of the frontier settlements. Stockaded works.
in the Indian country, declared Governor LewisCass of Michigan Territory would "over-awe the Indians, and ... restrain
their perpetual disposition to war."4 Prior to the Mexican
War some fifty military posts guarded the ~atiolf. It soon
became apparent, however, that the extreme western outposts, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian
border,5 would have to be strengthened. Within the next
dozen years, a,new. cordon 6f 'forts was gradually extended
from the'Mississippi River westward along the Arkansas to
the Rio Grande, the Gila, the Great Colorado' and the Pacific
Ocean. 6
Military stations called for transportation and supply,
and to furnish the scattered frontier army with subsistence
and other necessities presented no small task Officers charged
with this duty surely had no sinecure. 7 Garrisons usually
required four types of materiel: ordnance supplies; military
clothing and equipment; medical and hospital supplies; and
subsistence stores. At some of the western posts, garrisoned
by mounted troops, forage was an additional primary essential. Arms and ammunition were purchased or manufactured
by the' ordnance department and distributed to the posts
where they were needed. Large quantities of firearms and
4. Francis Paul Prucha, Broada:£ and Baycmet: The Role of the United States
Army in the Development of the Northwest, 1~15-1860 (State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, Madison, 1953), 14; Lewis Cass, Memoir on Northwest defense, January 11,
1826, "Military Roa~ in Michigan," Hse. Rpts., 19 Cong., 1 sess., no. 42, p. 13.
5. For the chain of western outposts, se.e Sen. Docs., 29 Cong., 1 sess., 'no. 1,
pp. 220c-220g; Sen. Eo;. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., no. I, pt. 2, p. 121.
,6. In 1859, Secretary of War Floyd reported 130 permanent garrisons, posts and
camps scattered over an area of 3,000,000 square miles. Ibid., 36 Cong., 1 sess., II.
no. 2, p. 3,
7. Prucha, Broadax and Baycmet, 150; Sen. Eo;. Docs., 32 Cong.• 1 sess., I, no. I,
,~~

,
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munitions were manufactured in government arsenals in the
. eastern states from materials purchased in Philadelphia and
other eastern cities. 8
Military clothing and garrison equipment - uniforms,
hats, shoes, knapsacks,blanket:;, tents, and numerous other
. articles - were manufactured 9 or purchased by the quartermaster's department in the East or on the Pacific 'coast and
were shipped to the nearest military posts and stations. 10 .
From the East also were sent medical and hospital supplies,
though these constituted a rather small part of the total shipments to the interior posts. l l
Subsistence stores were furnished by the Commissary
G.eneral of, Subsistence, who procured the supplies by contract or by purchase on the open market. Flour, beans, pork,
and other staples were contracted for in Washington and in
other principal cities as New York, Baltimore, Charleston,
New Orleans, St. Louis, and San Francisco after advertising
for bids in the newspapJrs, giving time and place of delivery.
Lowest bids were accepted. For the frontier posts attempts
.were made to secure supplies in the vicinity. Contracts for
flour and fresh beef were made by the assistant commissaries
at the individual posts"after sealed bids had been received.
Thus, flour for troops in New Mexico was procured by contract and made from wheat grown in that Territory and the
neighboring provinces of Mexico. On the Pacific coast, whenever economy would permit, this article was obtained from
the mills in the vicinity of the posts. Fresh beef for the Texas
posts and on the Pacific was procured in neighboring areas.
For the troops in New Mexico, cattle on the hoof were obtained in.that Territory, the department grazing and feeding
the animals until they' wererequ~red for use as food. 12 Sub~
8.
9.

Sen Docs., 29 Cong., 2 sesB., I, no. I, pp. 149..162-165.
During the Mexican War the Office of Army Clothing and Equipage, a b~anch

of the quartermaster's department with headquarters' at Philadelphia, operated bootee
and tent establiBhments which produced more than 12,000 hootees and 16,000 tents.
Rse. Ex. Docs., 30 Cong., 2 BeBS., I, no. I, pp. 240-241.
10. United States, Statutes at Large, III, 298, V, 513, IX, 149-150 (Hereafter cited
aB Statutes at Large) ; American State Papers: Military Affairs, II, 252; Hlie. Ex. Docs.,'
30 Cong., 2 BesS., I, no. I, pp. 240-241; St. LouiB Daily Missouri Republican, Feb. 10,
July 11, 1848, Dec. 22, 1849 (Hereafter cited as Daily Missouri Republican) •
. 11. Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 BeBS., III, no. 11, pp. 6-7.
12. Hse. Ez. Docs.) 30 'Cong., 2 sess., I; no. 1, p. 244; ibid., 35 Cong., 1 sess., no. 2,
pt. 2, p. 161; Sen. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 sess., no. I, pt. 3, p. 800; ibid., 36 Cong., 2
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, sistence stores were issued not to troops alone but also to
, Indians, government surveying and exploring parties, and to '
suffering emigrants,13
,
Food supplies for a given post or group of posts were generally contracted for in a single lot, the contractor undertaking to supply all the necessary items ---: from salt pork to
candles - in accordance with specifications drawn up by the
Quartermaster General of Subsistence. The annual contracts
were generally quite sizable business' transactions. In 1849,
for example, the year's subsistence stores at Fort Leaven.,
worth amounted to nearly $27,000. 14 In 1850 twenty-three
food contracts were made for the military stations in the
'
SouthwesU 5
In view of the huge quantities of supplies involved and
the importance of prompt delivery large bonds were usually
required, but contracts were not always fulfilled to the satisfaction of the army. Because of the great distances from the
source of supply, subsistence stores did not always reach
their destination without serious loss or dam~ge.l~ Despite
these shortcomings, the frontier soldier,as a rule, had plenty
to eat, although he was limited as to variety. The reports of
the Commissary General of Subsistence show that contractors furnished some twelve articles of food, but beef, pork,
soup, bread, and coffee formed all endless chain in the
soldier's menu. In comparison with the forty-odd, articles
available at the close of the century, the daily ratio£' seems
quite meagerY One essential food - fresh vegetables - the
soldier on the frontier lacked - a deficiency which greatly
undermined his health. To supply this need some posts experimented' with kitchen gardens, but without !puch success. 18
Bess., no. I, pt. 2, p. 237; Marcy to commanding officer in California, Nov. 28, 1848,
LS,SW.
13. Sen. Ex. Docs" 33 Cong., 1 sess" II, no. I, pt. 2, p. 141.
14. For the amounts, annual cost, and variations in price of subsistence stores at
the Southwestern posts, see Register of Contracts, Book 7 and LB, Subsistence Department, CGS, 1848-1863,
15. ,Sen. Ex. Docs" 31 Cong" 2 sess., III, no. 11, pp. 8-10.
16. Ibid., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. I, pt. I, p. 221. See also note 62 infra.
17. 'Register of Contracts, Book 7 (1848-1863), CGS; Handbook of Subsistence
Stores (Washington, 1896).
18. General Order, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, Sept. 11, 1818; General
Order No. I, AGO, Jan., 8, 1851, no. 3, Feb. 9, 1854, no. 18, April 4, 1868, AGO; "Ancient
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The military stations on the frontier, of course, had other
requirements, which were the responsibility of the Quartermaster General. His department arranged for the transportation and quartering of the troops, provided them with fuel,
straw and forage, as well as secured materials needed for
constructing barracks, hospitals, and other post facilities. 19
As with subsistence stores, these supplies and services were
secured by contract as well as by purchase on the open
market - the latter being preferred by the Commissary Gen.eral of Subsistence, since it was more economical, more certain, and se~ured a superior grade of goods. 20
Supplying the posts near the older settlements with
forage and the large variety of needed building materials
was a comparatively simple matter. But on the distant frontiers, .this posed a real problem. In New Mexico great difficultywas experienced in securing' forage for the trains and
horses of the mounted troops, .the shortage being accentuated
by California-bound emigrants who managed to secure whatever surplus there was: In California the grain supply for
some years had to be obtained from foreign countries and
forage at considerable distances. At posts in treeless areas,
bunks and benches were a luxury. Fort Quitman, Texas, for
example, did not have "lumber enough for coffins."21 I~ California, lumber, lime, and bricks' had to be "sought for at
places remote from the [principal] depot [Benicia]."22 Because 'of the wood shortage, buildings to be used as barracks
\ and storehouses in California in 1850 were sent from Maine
and assembled in the Presidio of San Francisco. Major General Persifor F. Smith recommended that "iron houses" be
sent to the Pacific coast for use as barracks. And 'continued
General Smith, "if iron houses ... [prove] feasible," they
Santa Fe," 3-4, Bancroft Library; Rodney Glisan, A Journal of Army Life (San Francisco, 1874), 111-112; Hse. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 2, P. 133.
19. Statutes at Large, III, 426, IX, 149-150; Lurton J. Inge~soll, A History of the
War Department of the United States -(Washington, 1879) ,182-183; American State
Papers: Military Affairs, II, 247-252; Sen. Ex. Docs., 33 Cong., 2 sess., II, no. 1, P. 13.
20. Statutes at Large, IX, 149-150; Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 2,
p. 122; ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 sess., II, no. 1, pt. 2, p. 170; ibid., 34 Cong., 3 sess., III.
no. 5, pp. 258-259.
21. Ibid., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, PP. 124, 252, 277; Cooper to Lawson,
April 4, June 12, 1849, LR, SGO; Mansfield to Thomas, Nov. 7, 1860, LR, AGO.
22. -Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, p. 251.
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may serve "as comfortable habitation for our troops in the
newly acquired territories, and on all frontier portions of our
country." During 1850 "six small iron buildings were sent
from New York to California as an experiment. 23
Military supplies and equipment were generally sent to
central supply depots and from there forwarded to their
respective final destinations. A number of key depots supplied
military posts in a neighboring area; Jefferson Barracks, in
the outskirts of St. Louis, was an important supply depot. On
August 16, 1848, the Steamer "Fort Wayne" arrived in St.
Louis,having on board 300 tons of ordnance stores, consisting of 'bombs, balls, cartridges, etc., to be landed at Jefferson'
Barracks and intended for western service. 24 'Prior to 1845
Fort Leavenworth had been an extreme outpost but after the
Mexican War it became an important intermediate depot,
supplying the chain of posts along the Oregon route and
throughout New' Mexico. In the' fiscal. year ending June 30,
1851, more than 3,000,000 pounds of military stores were
transported overland from Fort Leavenworth to the principal western outposts - forts Kearny, Laramie, Scott, Hall,
and Santa Fe -'at a cost to the government of nearly $350,000. Of this vast amount of subsistence stores; about one..:
third was freighted by D. Waldo, 'Brown, Russell & Co., one
of 'fifteen contractors, and, was destined for Santa Fe. 25
Indianola and New O~leans were- important supply dis..:
tributing centers for many of the posts in'Texas, New Mexico, and in the Cherokee (Oklahoma) country. 'During, the
two year period, 1849-1851, more' than 5,300,000 pounds of
military supplies were transferred from Indianola. to San
Antonio and from there to the other Texas postS. 26 Since the
commencement of the Mexican War, San Antonio, headquarters of the Eighth Military Department, had become the
23. Ibid.; 123, 246. 254; Jesup to Conrad, Nov. 21, 1850, Land R, book 1, p. 323,
QGO.
24. Daily Missouri Republican, Aug. 17, 1848.
, 25. Among the principal items of subsistence stores, in some shipments. whiskey
included. Sen.. Err;. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 1, pp. 222, 289, 295-296;
Ogden to Jesup, Sept. 6, 30, 1850 [Enclosure: Fort Leavenworth], LR, QGO; Gibson
to Taylor, Sept. 16, Oct. 21, 1850, Feb. 3, 1851, LB 29, pp. 66.. 108, 109, 220, Gibson to
Taylor [n.d.], 1854, LB 32, p. 98, CGS.
26. Sen. Err;. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 sesS., I, no. 1, pt. 1, pp. 109, 267.

was

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION

129

principal supply depot in the interior of Texas. 27 During the
fiscal year ~nding June 30, 1851, it sent out more than 2,185,000 pounds of military supplies. Like the other supply depots,
it also furnished transportation to detachments of troops
bound for the interior. 28
Santa Fe was the main -military supply depot in New
Mexico but with the establishment of Fort Union in 1851
that post became the principal distributing point. To it came
regularly supply trains from Texas as well as considerable
commercial traffic from the Missouri River. 29 In its heyday
(at the close of the Civil War) Fort Union, a bristling symbol
of United States authority, sheltered some 3,000 military personnel and civilians and had become the largest military
establishment on the plains and the supply center for forty
'or fifty lesser forts within a radius of 500 miles. 30 Albuquerque was the important distributing center for quartermaster's 'stores,Sl and colorful Fort Yuma, at the junction of
the Colorado and Gila rivers, s,erved as the grand supply.
depot for the posts in the Arizona' cOl,mtry.32 Until the latter
1850's when Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives opened the upper
Colorado to steam navigation,33 supplying Fort Yuma from
San Diego, more than 225 miles overland and across a vast
,desert, was a tremendous ordeal and extremely expensive. 34
27. Eight stations (forts Martin Scott, Mason, Chadbourne, McKavett, Inge, Clark,
Ewell, and Merrill) drew their quartermaster's supplies wholly from San Antonio, and
this depot occasionally furnished ten others (Austin, Indianola, Corpus Christi, forts
Croghan, Graham, Worth, Belknap, Phantom Hill, Duncan and McIntosh). Ibid., 276277; William G. Freeman, "Report of Inspection of Eighth Military Department, April
22, 1853," AGO.
28. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 1, pp. 254-258.
29. Ibid., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 2, p. 300; R. L. Duffus, The Santa Fe Trail
'(New York, 1930), 227-239; Daily MissoUri Republican, March 2,6, .1853.
30. The famed outpost of the old Santa Fe Trail, established in 1851 and abandoned
in 1891, was given National Monument status by act of Congress, approved by President Eisenhower June 28, 1954. William A. Bell, New Tracks in' North America: A
Journal of Travels and Adventure (London, 1869), I, 122; "Chronology of. Fort Union,"
El Palacio, Jan. 19, 1951; Las Vegas Daily Optic, Nov. 4, 1955; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
April 19, 1956.
.
31. Scott to Cooper, Oct. 3, 1859 [Enclosure: J. E. Johnston to A. A. General, HA,
Aug. 24, 1859] LR, AGO.
. 32. Averam,B. Bender, The March of Empire: Frontier Defense in the Southwest,
181,8-1860 (Lawrence, Kans., 1952).-42; Hse. Ex. Docs., 34 Cong., 3 sess., no. 76, p. 34;
Eugene Bandel, Frontier Life in the Army, 1851,-1861 (Ralph P. Bieber, ed., Glendale,
Calif.; 1932),260; "Medical History of Fort Yuma, 1850-1873," AGO.
33. Bender, The March of Empire, 84-87.
34. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 2 sess., II, no. I, p. 84.
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On the Pacific coast the principal military depots were San
Francisco and Benicia. 35 .
Land and water, of course, forrned the principal media of
military transportation. Prior to 1845 the problem of trans~
~ porting men and supplies was comparatively simple. At that
time, the remote frontier posts and their distances from
navigation were fairly close and easily accessible; some being
reached by steamboats and others by steam navigation and
wagons. 36 After the acquisition of Texas, the Oregon country,
and the Mexican Cession,however, when the west of the
former frontier line was pushed to the Pacific, military transportation posed a new problem and for two more decades,
pack and wagon train were to be the principal vehicles in the
Far West. "There is not, as far as I can learn," wrote Secretary: of War Conrad in his report of 1851, "a steamboat or
railroad line, or even an ordinary turnpike road in Texas,
New Mexico, California or Oregon." 37 Despite Conrad's pessimism, the· amount of military transportation increased
enormously in the dozeri years preceding the Civil War, and
the media were constantly being improved.
With respect to water transportation the army seems to
have enjoyed a measure of self-sufficiency. Prior to the advent
of the steamboat, army posts situated on navigable waters
possessed some boats which were generally operated by the
troops.38 By the latter 1840's and 1850's a variety of government water craft served as military transports along the
Atlantic seaboard, the Pacific coast area, the Gulf ports, and
the principal western rivers. 39 The operation of such vessels
was generally let out to private contractors. 40
35. For the history of Benicia Barracks and the distinction between Benicia Barracks, Benicia Arsenal, and Benicia Ordnance Depot-all situated on the same property
-see Bandel, Frontier Life in the Army, 63-64, 309-310; Sen. Ex. Does., 32 Cong., 1
sess., no. 1, pt. I, pp. 309-310; "Outline Index of Forts and Stations" [Benicia Barracks], AGO..
Forts Snelling, Leavenworth, Wilkins, Gibson, and Smith were accessible by
steamboat; Forts Jesup, Atkinson, and Towson were 24 miles from steamboat navigation, by wagons; Fort· Washita
miles and Fort Scott
miles from steamboat
navigation, by wagons. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. 1, pt. 1, p. 109.
37. Ibid.,
Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet,
Brant to Jesup, Oct.
"Ft.. Snelling," LR, QGO.
Jesup to Crawford, Nov.
Land R, book
p.
QGO.
40. Sen. Ex. Does.,
Cong., sess., III, no. 11, p.
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The army also entered into contracts for transportation
of troops, animals, and supplies in the contractors' own vessels, plying between eastern ports and the Pacific coast, as
well as between military posts in Texas and California. 41
Army quartermasters arranged for the travsportatioll; of
large quantities of military equipment, subsistence, ordnance,
and hospital stores, and other commodities needed by the
garrisons, including building materials, and even saw mills
and grist mills. When large quantities were contracted for,
the charge was usually expressed at a specified rate per 100
pounds; small shipments were usually charged higher rates
for the same distances. The rates also varied with the distance, nature of the supplies, as well as from year to year
and from one contractor to another. 42
Transportation of troops was a primary consideration,
for troops were constantly transferred· from eastern rendezvous to the frontier, where they replaced men who had served
their terms or WJ;lO had slipped into the wilderness. 43 There
was a steady movement of soldiers from post to post. Moreover, changes in defense policy entailed heavy troop movements as established forts 'were abandoned and new ones
built to meet new Indian threats or to protect the advancing
frontier of settlement. 44
Charges for transporting military personnel, as in the
case of supplies, also varied from place to place, year to year,
and contractor to contractor. In August, 1849, Major J. Bel- ger engaged J. W. Goshee to transport on the steamer"Autocrat". from Jefferson Barracks to New Orleans 22 officers
and 354 men of the Seventh Infantry with 108 horses and
mules and 20 wagons and forage for the sum of $10 each for'
the officers, $3 each for the men, $5 each for the horses and
mules, $6.50 each for the wagons and 20 cents per 100 pounds
for extra freight. In June of th~ following year Col. T. F.
41. Ibid., 21-23; ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 BesS., .VI, no. 7, pp. 8-11, 23; ibid., 34
Cong., 3 sess., VII, no. 32, Pp. 4-5, 7, 10-13,24.
42. Examples of variation in military transportation charges per 100 pounds via
steamer are given in ibid., 34 COI,lg., 1 and 2 seBS., VI, no. 7, p. 23; ibid., 34 Cong., 3
sess., VII, no. 32, pp. 4-5, 10-11.
43. In 1853 Secretary of War Davis estimated that "more than one-third of the
army must every year be recruited, and transferred from the depots to their regiments."
Ibid., 33 Cong., 1 sess., no. I, pt. 2, p. 8.
44. Bender, The March of Empire, 32-44.
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Hunt entered into contract with S. B. Frost to transport on
the steamer "Concordia" from New 'Orleans to Jefferson Bar.racks five companies of Seventh Infantry with their baggage
and stores and horses belonging to the command for $1,350.
In the same month Col. Hunt entered into an identical agreement with Q. C. Bradley to carry a similar contingent on the
steamer "Cora No.2," but the sum was $2,000. Five years
later the steamer "Sam Cloon," transporting 29 men and 1
officer between the same points, received $5 per man and $20
for the officer. 45
"The same lack of uniformity in transportation charges
prevailed in m.oving troops from department. to department
as well as from post to post in the same military department. 46 Part of the military shipments also included transportation of Indian goods, officers' families to frontier posts
and Indians to their new homes. Thus, in March, 1850, Col.
T. F. Hunt entered into a contract with Lewis Snapp to transport on the steamboat "Cotton Plant" from New Orleans to
Fort Gibson, "such numbers of Indians with their provisions
& c., as may be sent on board for the sum of $10.00 each."47
Overland transportation supplemented shipments by
water. The wide distribution of the distant posts with portions of the garrisons mounted, created a need for thousands
of horses, oxen, and mules for. mounting guides, spies, escorts,
and troops. In 1848':'1849, the movement of troops by land to
Oregon, Santa Fe,-and EI Paso required more than 800
wagons, 3,500 horses and mules, and 3,7000xen.48
The War Department utilized public as well as private
media; and, in the interests o(economy and convenience, the
army provided as much of its own transportation as possible.
45. s.... Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., III, no. 11, pp. 14, 17; ibid.• 34 Cong., 1 and
2 sess., VI, no. 7, p. 8.
.
46. Contract: E. A. Ogden with William Stewart, Feb. 2, 1849, "Contract Books,"
no. 11, p. 234, QGO; S ..... Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., III, no. 11, p.' 17; ibid., 34 Cong.,
1 and 2 sess., VI, no: 7, PP. 14, 22; ibid., 34 Cong., 3 sess., VII, no. 32, Pp. 29-31.
47. Ibid., 31 Cong., 2 sess., III, no. 11, p. 14; Jesup to Crawford, Feb. 26, 1849,
L Bnd R, book I, P. 83; Jesup to Davis, April 2, 1855, book 3, p. 142" QGO; LS, sr, ID
(1848-1860).
'
48. Carl Coke Rister, Th. Southwest.r.. Frontier, 1865-1881 (Cleveland, 1928),
296; HS6. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, p. 122; Jesup to Crawford, Nov. I,
1849, L Bnd R, book I, p. 282, QGO.
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· The quartermaster's department generally maintained in
many of its army posts and units at least some means of
"public transportation." Many of the garrisons had teams of
horses, mules, or oxen, which were essential for hauling hay,
fuel, and lumber from adjacent areas, as well as supplies over
longer distances.
Government trains transported company officers' baggage, subsistence, quartermaster's stores, medical, ordnance
and other supplies - usually forage. 49 Between May and
· September, 1849, Captain and Assistant Quartermaster S. G.
French conducted an army train of about 275 wagons and
2,500 animals from San Antonio to EI Paso, a distance of
more than 670 miles. 50 In the following year an army train
·of 267 wagons and carts, escorted by two companies of
Mounted Infantry, carried 767,000 pounds of subsistence
stores between the same points. 51 The b.ulk of the army supplies in 1850-1851- more than 2,000,000 pounds-was
transported from San Antonio in government mule wagons. 52
The transportation of nearly all public supplies, in 1852,
emanating from Fort Union was by public teams. Quartermaster General Jesup and other military officers favored this
method since it was "less expensive than ... by private con-.
tract." Although ox trains were generally used because of
the scarcity of water and lack of forage in the territory, mule
power was believed more economical and more reliable, 53 A
typical example of the movement of troops and supplies' to
the Pacific by public train was that of Captain Rufus Ingalls,
Assistant Quartermaster to Col. E. J. Steptoe's command,
who conducted the military train of about 300 men, 750
animals, and 70 wagons, from Fort Leavenworth to California in 1854-1855. "I neither lost nor abandoned anything
on the way and the horses and mules were in fine condition.
The wagons were very acceptable ...," wrote Ingalls at the
49. Arrie Barrett, "Federal Military Outposts in Texas, 1846-1861," P. 41, M. A.
thesis, Univer8ity of Texa8, 1927.
50. Sen. Ex. Docs., '31 Cong.,·l 8eS8., XIV, no. 64, PP. 41-53; ibid., 31 Cong., 2
8esS., I, no. I, pt. 2, pp. 302, 316-323.
51. Brooke to Jones, June 13, 1850, LR, HA.
52. Hse. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 8eS8., no. 2, pt. I, p. 254.
53. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 2 8esS, II, no. I, P. 74.

/

134

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

end of his journey.54 Not all officers could make such favor.able reports. .
..
Throughout this period private contractors supplemented
government wagon trains. Between April and October, 1850,
fifteen contractors transported more than 3,174,000 pounds
of military supplies from Fort Leavenworth to western posts
at a cost of more than $342,000,55 and in the following year
seventeen contractors delivered similar amounts. 56 Between
July, 1850, and May, 1851, six contractors' trains forwarded
more than 255,000 pounds of supplies from San Antonio to
five military posts in Texas. 57
As the years progressed, more and more transport contracts were let by the army. In 1855 officers~of the quartermaster's department made 237 contracts for forage, fuel, and
transportation -;- the bulk dealing with the movement of
troops from east to westand between western posts. In 1856
a total of 248 contracts were entered into, and in the following year 318 were consummated, about 30% being for transportation of troops, stores, supplies, and ordnance. 58
The largest single contract (No. 65) for the movement
of supplies in 1857 was made by Assistant Quartermaster
T. L. Brent at Fort Leavenworth, with Majors and Waddell,
who agreed "to transport during the year ..., any quantity
of military supplies from 50,000 to 5,000,000 pounds, on
notice varying from ten to sixty days, according to the quantity to be transported, viz.: from forts Leavenworth and
. Riley, or Fort Union, New Mexico, to any post or depot that
is, or may be established in Kansas, New Mexico, the Gadsden Purchase, or in the Utah south of 40 0 . " The rates varied
froIl\ $1.12 to $3.50 perlOO pou~ds.59
54. Traveling along the trail of the 49'ers, Ingalls (Steptoe's command) arrived·in
Salt Lake City, August 31-, 1854, and remained there until the following spring; in June,
1855, the· command reached California. Ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2,
pp. 152-166.
55. Ogden to Jesup, Nov. 23, 1850 [Enclosure: "Ft. Leavenworth, Statement of
Operations, Apr.-Nov., 1850,"] ,LR, QGO.
56: Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1sess., I, no. I, pt. I, pp. 295-296.
67.

These stations were: Austin and San Antonio River, forts Merrill, Duncan,

and Croghan. Ibid., 255.
58. Ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 sess., VI, no. 7, PP. 1-27; ibid., 34 Cong., 3sess.,
no. 32, pp. 1-32 ; ibid., 35 Cong., 1sess., VII, no. 31, Pp. 2-35.
59.

Ibid., 8.

VII,
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The peak of military transportation was reached during
the "Mormon War" (1858) when the quartermaster's department was called upon to supply almost 5,000 wagons and
carriages, and more than 53,000 draught animals. Of this
vast array, contractors Russell, Majors, and Waddell fur.nished more than 4,000 wagons, 40,000 oxen, and 1,000 mules
as well as 4,000 men - in the program of hauling 16,000,000
pounds of army supplies to Utah. Freighting costs for that
year exceeded $4,500,000 and that of. the following yearaftermath of the Utah Expedition - more than $5,500;000,
a sum greater than that of any other single year spent for
military transportation between the Mexican and Civil
Wars. 60
Considerable quantities of military apd medical supplies
sent by water or overland did not always reach the1r destination without serious damage or total loss. During the Mexican War, quartermaster and commissary officers reported
damages and losses from improper packing and from wrecks
on the coast of Texas; lack of proper storage on the Rio
Grande also occasioned destruction of stores. 61
Inspectors general, boards of survey, and other military
officers, inspecting the western posts, found large quantities
of damaged subsistence stores arid clothing, and in many
instances condemned the spoiled goods. In 1851, for example,
a board of survey at Texas and New Mexican posts condemned more than 77,000 pounds of bacon and ham, and
smaller quantities of other food stuffS. 62 Inspector General
McCall reported that in transporting supplies to Fort Yuma
a loss of about 10% usually occurred. In overland transportation, especially during the summer months, when temperatures ranged between "140° and 150°," meat invariably
spoiled. 63
60. jbid., 35 Cong., 2 sess., III, no. I, pt. 3;' p. 797; Alexander Majors, Seventy
Years on the Frontier (New York, 1893), 142-144; Daily Missouri Republican, Aug. 27,
1858; Jesup to Floyd, Nov. 13, 1858, Oct. 31, 1859, Land R, book 4, pp. 491, 495, book 5,
p. 173, QGO. ,
.
61. Sen. Docs., 29 Cong., 2 sess;, I, no. 1, p. 190; Jesup to S. W., Jan. 1, 1847,
Jesup to Gibson, .Jan. 2, 1847, "Jesup Correspondence," Le.
.
62. Sen. Ex. Docs., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. 1, pt. I, PP. 251-253; Jesup to Floyd,
Nov. 21, 1857, Land R, book 4, p. 131, QGO; Gibson to Plympton, 'Jan. 19, 1855, LB 33,
p. 28, CGS. See note 16 supra.
63. McCall to Scott, June 14, 1852 [Enclosure: Fort Yuma], LR, QGO.
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On the Pacific coast, supplies carried by water were sometimes lost or seriously damaged. Late in December, 1851, the
government transport schooner "Captain Lincoln," sailing
from San Francisco northward. with a detachment of dragoons ·and stores, stranded, and more than 28,000 pounds of
various articles of food were badly damaged. 64 In 1859 Lieutenant Julian May, commissary officer at Fort Union reported
that stores consigned to him were "much damaged in transportation, especially sugar and such other articles as are not
protected by strong boxes." A large quantity of sugar, May
continued, "was spoiled by being brought out under bacon."
In the same year Inspector General J. E. Johnston found the
flour at Albuquerque quite bad. 65
Medical supplies and equipment were regularly damaged,
destroyed, or lost in transit to the more distant stations, the
Surgeon General complained. "Among the losses sustained
during the last year, [1851] ..." he reported. "about $2,000,
value ... lost by sinking of the steamer 'Jefferson' in the Arkansas River and about $500 lost in transportation from: ...
Benicia to other posts in California." Many medical supplies
were a total loss due to their perishable character and improper containers. Losses also resulted from breakage and in
trans-shipment - from ship to steamboat, from,steamer to
steamer, and then on a "long and divided line of transportation in wagons or on pack horses;" 66
Moreover, there was always a' transportation personnel
problem! Captains of sailing vessels and steamers, temporary
storekeepers, wagon masters; conductors of pack horsemen,
teamsters and muleteers rarely understood the delicate character of medicines and medical supplies. "These people," declared Surgeon General Lawson, "handle a box containing
the choicest medicines as' roughly and' recklessly as if they
were boxes of camp kettles and mess pans, or a bundle of
spades and pick-axes." 67
A special type of medical supply - wine, brandy and
64. Sen. Ex. Doc8., 32 Cong., 2 sess., II, no. 1, pp. 109, 116.
. 65. Scott to Cooper, Oct. 3, 1859 [Enclosures: Johnston to Acting Adjutant General, HA, Aug. 18, 24, 1859], LR, AGO.
66. Sen. Ex. Doc8., 33 Cong., 1 sess., II, no. 1, pt. 2, p. 144; ibid., 32 Cong., 2 sess.,
II, no. 1, p. 136.
67. Ibid., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 sess., II, no~ 1, pt. 2, P. 175.
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other spirituous liquor - caused the Surgeon General particular concern. The loss of this article was so great and the
arrival of the small remnant so irregular at'the military stations, that the Surgeon General was i~ a quandary whether
"those groceries should be continued as articles of supply to
the hospitals at the distant posts." 68
The cost of military transportation grew by leaps and
bounds. To be sure, the size of the army - except during the
Mexican War'- remained small,69 but the troops were scatI
tered over a vast area. In 1855 the Quartermaster General
wrote: "Our small army . . . covers more ground, and its
operations are more extended than the armies of all continental Europe, west of Russia, including all the colonies of
those nations, .in addition to their European territories."7o
On the eve pf the Civil War more than 90% of the troops
were engaged in frontier duty.71
Supplying the numerous small posts in the remote interior'
and on the Pacific coast - at that ti~e considered in one of
the most unproductive regions in the world 72_ boosted trans:'
portation costs sky high. Prior to the acquisition of Texas,
the annual cost of transporting the entire military establishment was less than $120,000. 73 The Mexican War increased
the cost to more than $5,000,000; but during the succeeding
dozen years, because of our, new western Indian frontier,
transportation expenditures, averaged about $2,000,000 a
year, an increase of about 1,500%. The "Mormon War" or
Utah Expedition again boosted transportation costs to about
$5,000,000 for each year of a two~year period. 74 The annual
68. Hse. Err;. Docs:, 32 Cong., 2sess., I, rio., I, pt. 2, p. 136.
.
69; Prior to the Mexican War our regular army numbered 6,500 men, reaching
a peak strength of more than ~7,OOO by 1848. Upon the restoration of peace it was
again reduced to slightly more than 10,000. At the opening of the Civil War, it numbered
only 16,000 men. Sen. Docs., 29 Cong., 1sess., I, no. I, PP. 220a-220f; Statutes at Large,
IX, 11, 13-14, 123-124, 184; Hse. Err;. Docs., 30 Cong., 2sess., I, no. I, pp. 160, 184a, 184f,
184g; Sen. Err;. Docs., 37 Cong., 2sess., II, no. I, p. 5.
70. Ibid., 32 Cong., 1sess., I, no. I, pt. I, P. 109; ibid.. 34 Cong., 1 and 2sess., II,
no. I, pt. 2, pp. 21-22.
71. For the location of the various military units in 1860, see ibid., 36 Cong., 2
sess., II, no. I, pp. 214-229.
72. Ibid., 32 Cong., 1sess., I, no. I, pt. I, P. 110.
73. Ibid., 31 Cong., 2sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, PP. 8-9.
74. For the schedule of military transportation costs for 1848-1860, see Annual
Reports, Quartermaster General's Office, 1848-1860 and Statutes at- Large. IX-XII, inC1usive (Army, transportation).
o
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expenditure of the' quartermaster's department during this
period was greater than that of any other bureau in the army;
the cost of transportation ranged between one-third and onehalf of the Quartermaster's total allotment. 75 Generally, the
annual cost of military transportation was as great as the
pay of the entire regular army, and in critical years it was
greater. 76
Freight rates to the remote frontier posts were exceedingly high. The cost of shipping pork and flour, two of the
most important items of supply to military stations in Texas
and New Mexico, in 1850, is quite illuminating; To the near
interior posts 'in Texas, pork per barrel was $8.00 and flour,
$5.30; butto Paso del Norte, San Elizario, and Dona Ana the
freight on the same articles was $48.00 and $31.80 per 100
pounds respectively.77 On the Pacific coast transportation was
the greatest problem of the quartermaster's department and
,the most expensive branch of the service. The supply depot
at Benicia was particularly embarrassed by the manner in
which shipments were made from the Atlantic seaboard.
Public stores, for example, destined for San Diego, an intermediate point, were shipped to San Francisco with instructions to tranship them to the former place. Such backward
transportation usually added about 200 % to the original
freight bill,78 Due to vagaries in transportation and other
factors, some commodities on the Pacific coast cost 1,000ro
more than in the East. 79
Poor packing methods added greatly to transportation
costs. To be sure, the Office of Commissary General of Subsistence issued minute, detailed ins~ructions to officers. "The
flour you will have put up in strong double sacks, ... ; the bacon
should be packed in the tightest, strongest manner; the hams
75., Sm'. E". DOCB., 34 Cong., 1 and 2 sess., II, no. I, pt. 2, pp. 19-20; ibid., 34
Cong., 3 sess., III, no. 5, p. 253; ibid., 35 Cong., 1 sess., III, no. 11, PP. 155-156; ibid.,
35 Cong., 2sess., III, no. I, pt. 3, p. 794; ibid., 36 Cong., 1 sess., II, no. 2, PP. 617-619.
76. For the comparative annual costs of military transportation and pay of the
regular army for 1848-1860, see Annual Reports of Quartermaster General and Paymaster General for those years.
77. To Santa Fe and Las Vegas the freight for pork and flour per 100 pounds
was $32.00 and $21.30, respectively; to Taos, Socorro, Abiquiu and Savoyette, it Was
$41.00 and $27.56. Sen. E". DOCB., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, p. 5.
78. Ibid., 276.
79. Ibid., 266.
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should be put up in whiskey barrels at least four iron hoops
and the bacon in similar barrels or tight boxes well ironed." 80
But such orders apparently proved ineffective. Inspectors
General McCall and Swords and Quartermaster General
Jesup made sound suggestions for packing bread, bacon, and
other subsistence stores so as to reduce transportation costs,
but their recommendations went unheeded,81
The maintenance of numerous small posts in the Indian
country added materially to the cost of transportation and
military officers and members of Congress frequently questioned the wisdom of such a policy. Captain (later General)
John Pope of the Topographical Engineers, in a fifty-nine
page "Military Memoir ..." addressed to Secretary of War
Floyd, pointed out the weaknesses in the system of frontier
defense and proposed changes. 82 The Senate questioned 'the
War Department "whether the United States army might not
be so posted within the line of settlements as to diminish ...
the cost of transportation ..." 'and at the same time render
adequate frontier defen1?e.
Secretary of War Floyd's reply is enlightening: "There
is but little doubt that the policy is to mass troops at convenient points on or near the frontier, where forage and subsistence are cheap, and readily procured; but the character
of the service, the extent .of our territory, the habits of the
Indians, and the ever varying wants of our emigrant population make difficult to determine upon any fixed policy on this
subject. Whenever the [War] Department may be· able to
adopt such a plan, the cost of transportation will be diminished; but the condition of the Indian country and the straggling settlements towards the Pacific render such a policy, at
the present time impossible, with any reg;;trd for the protection of lives and property of our citizens."83 The Secretary
80, Gibson to Taylor, Sept. 27, 1849, LB 28, P. 199; Gibson to Waggaman, Apr. 5,
1855, LB 29, p. 287, CGS.
.
81. Sen. E.,. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., III, no. 26, pp. 22-23; ibid., 32 Cong., 1 sess.,
I, no. 1, pt. 1, p. 240; Jesup to S. W.; Jan. I, 1847, Jesup to Gibson, Jan. 2, 1847, "Jesup
Correspondence," LC.
82. John Pope, "A Military Memoir of the Country between the Mississippi River

and the Pacific Ocean with 8~me Account pf Frontier Defenses:' May 7, 1859, p .. 37,
LR, TEB.
·83. Sen. E.,. Docs.,
Cong., sess., VII, no.
P. 1.

35
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of War's answer was i~refutable. Military boards appointed
to study the problem also reported that excessive costs were
inevitable by the very nature of our extended frontier, the
system of numerous small posts, and the character of the
transportation system. 84
The condition of the western rivers and western roads
was another essential factor in an adequate and economical
system of military transportation. Troops and supplies, as
well as pioneers, depended upon the steamboats of the Mis-_
sissippi River and its branches to reach their destination.
Without the steamboat the West would have "remained a vast
wilderness," 85 declared one writer. Since the western streams
and land routes were far from ideal, the Federal government
in the nineteenth century inaugurated a western river and
road-improvement program which it has virtually continued
to the present day.
Prior to the Mexican War, the celebrated Robert E. Lee,
then a captain in the Corps of Engineers, performed yeoman
service on the upper Mississippi and Missouri rivers 86 and
Captain Henry Miller Shreve, Superintendent of Western
River Improvements, employing "Uncle Sam's tooth pullers"
- specially constructed. and equipped government steamboats - tackled the "treacherous monster," the raft of the
Red River of Louisiana. 87 Troops from Fort Jesup, Louisiana,
improved the navigation of the Sabine and government snag
boats labored on the Arkansas and on the Missouri. Between
1842 and 1845 Congress appropriated more than $308,000 for
the improvement of western rivers and officers of the Corps
of Topographical Engineers removed more than 133,000 obstructions and dangers to navigation. The army, in improv" ing the· western streams, not only made safer and faster
voyages possible, thereby cutting military and commercial
84. Lawson to Con"rad, Feb. 24, 1852, book 2, p. 203, LS, SGO; Pope, "Military
Memoir ... ," 3-4, LR, TEB.
85. Stella M. Drumm, "Robert E. Lee and the Improvement of the Mississippi
River," Missouri Historical Society, CoUcctions, VI (Feb., 1929), 16186. ibid., 161, 166-167.
.
I
87. It was not until 1838 that the great mass of entangled timber was penetrated,
and a half century more b~fore it was permanently obliterated. Norman Caldwell, "The
Red River Raft," Chrtmicles Of Oklahoma,"XIX (Sept., 1941), 257-259; Walter Prichard,
"Red River Raft," Dictitmary of American History, IV, 432.
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transportation costs, but also protected the frontier and encouraged settlement. 88
The acquisition of territory beyond the, Rocky Mountains
emphasized the need for the extension of the western river
improvement program on a grander scale. From 1849 to 1853
Quartermaster General Jesup repeatedly recommended not
only the construction of a good system of western roads but
also the improvement of western rivers with all their navigabie tributaries flowing through the Indian country. Such
improvements Jesup considered to be "military works of
greater importance in defense' of the country against the
Indian than the best system of fortifications that could be
adopted." The frontier settlers heartily approved such a
policy and pointed to the benefits that would accrue to commerce and to military transportation as well as to frontier
defense. 89 Congress, recognizing the logic of such arguments,
made the necessary appropriations, and within the next.
dozen years, army engineers surveyed the principal western
streams. Among these, the Rio Grande, the Red River, and
the Colorado of the West received the greatest attention.
Texas, with its long streams, but with numerous obstructions to steam navigation in some of the most populous and
commercially important parts of the State, served as an in:'
vitation and a challenge to army engineers.9o Military surveys'
extending from the Sabine to the Rio Grande and from the
Gulf to the R~d River, launched in the interest of commerce,
more economical transportation, and frontier defense resulted in improvements. 91
But of all the Texas streams,' army officers, merchants,
and planters considered the Rio Grande of the' greatest importance. Its navigability by steamers for only 500 miles was
believed entirely inadequate for commercial arid military
88.
MilitaTl/
89.
I, no. I,

Sen. Docs., 29 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. I, p. 347; Henry Putney Bee;.... The 'Western
Frontier, 1815-1846 (Philadelphia, 1935), 136·137. 175.
Sen. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 2 sess., I, no. I, pt. 2, P. 124; ibid., 32 Cong.• 1 sess.,
pt. I, pp. 222, 226; ibid., 33 Cong., 1 sess., II, no. I, pt. 2, p. 135.
90. Charles W. Ramsdell, "Internal Improvement Projects in Texas in the Fifties,"
Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Proceedings, IX (April, 1917), pt. I, P. 99;
Houston Democratic Telegraph and Texas RegilTter, Aug. 3, 1848.
91. Abert to Johnston, June 10, 1850, Abert to Kaufman, July 23, 1850, LS, TEB;
Whiting to Totten, March 2, 18, April 26, 30, 1853, Stevens to Totten, June 10, July 18,
1854, H. L. Smith to Totten, June 22, Aug. .15, 1853, Feb. 4, 1854, LR, EOC.
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needs. Removal of obstructions, many felt assured, would not
only facilitate .the sending of supplies to the upper military
posts and reduce transportation costs but also open the Rio
Grande cquntry to f~rther settlement and keep the Indians
in check,92
To test the. feasibility of steamboat navigation on this
.stream, a long list of army officers and engineers - Tilden,
Whiting, Gilbert, Love, Bryan, Smith (W. F. and M. L.), and
Michler - examined it for about 1,000 miles above its mouth.
The findings showed that navigation on the river could be
extended from about 600 to 800 miles from the Gulf. 93 Improvements on the Rio Grande were made after the Civil
War, but as late as the nineteen-thirties the stream continued
a menace to what men built and planted in its valley. Except
for a short distance from the Gulf, it is not navigable. "Its
quicksands have swallowed horses, wagons, cattle, sheep and
men." 94
The· Red River Raft, compared to· a "great serpent,".
always crawling upstream and forcing the river into new
lateral channels, impeding navigation and causing great
losses to valuable lands, had been a concern of white men for
more than a century. In the 1840's and 1850's settl~rs and
merchants urged removal of this "destroying angel"; Congressmen and military officers were desirous of finding the
sources of the stream in the interest of more adequate military transportation and frontier defense. Improved navigation on this stream, the champions maintained, would not
only stimulate commerce and encourage settlement but would
also prove of incalculable value in defending the frontier. 95
Early in July, 1848, Senator Henry Johnson of Louisiana
92. During this period troops at the Texas posts received supplies o'Cerland from
long distances and at considerable expense. The garrison at Laredo, for example, was
being supplied from Ringgold Barracks over a tedious route of 120 miles; the post at
Eagle Pass was· supplied from the same point, a distance of 224 miles; El Paso .received
its supplies from Port de la Vaca. 850 miles overland, at an annual cost of $200,000.
Johnston to Abert, April 27. 1850, Jan. 7, 1851, LR. TEB; New Orleans Da-ily Pica-yune,
Oct. 3, 1849 (Hereafter cited as Da-ily Pica-yune) .
Bender. The Ma-rch of Empire. 76-77.
94. Harvey Fergusson. Rio Grande (New York, 1933), 3-4.
95. John Bakeless. The Eyes of Discovery (Philadelphia, 1950). 348-349; Washington (Ark.) Telegraph. Jan. 23, March 27. 1850. Feb. 27. 1851, Oct. 26, 1853, March
29. 1854; Da-ily Pica-yune, Jan. 13, 1859 ; Congressional Globe. 35 Cong., 1 sess.• Appendix,
478; Jesup to Conrad, Dec. 20. 1851, LS, QGO.

93.
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introduced, a bill for a survey of the Red River from its mouth
to the head of navigation, and four years later Congress ap'propriated $100,000 for tlieremoval of the raft. 96 But progress was slow and inconclusive. For four years (1854-1858)
C. A. Fuller, "agent and engineer for the Red River improvement," labored diligently but unsuccessfully.97
Then a private venture with, capital from Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana made elaborate plan§ for the raft to
"disappear like frost before the sun." The coming of the
Civil War, however, interfered with the execution of the ingenious scheme, and for almost a quarter of a century longer
the obstinate raft continued to be a barrier to successful commercial and military transportation. 98
, But in tracing the Red River to its source goy~rnment
officers accomplished more definite, results. Despite futile
attempts of Freeman, Pike, and Long, by the mid-nineteenth
century interest in the stream was again reviveq. Correct
knowledge of its upper waters and source, it was believed,
would enable the government to establish a series of military
posts upon that stream and to trammort supplies upon,it into
the very heart of the Comanche country. Moreover, construction of a good military road from its headwaters to the Rio
Grande would greatly strength~n the defense of that fron, 'tier.: 9_Captain Randolph B. Marcy's memorable Red River
Survey of 1852, traced the river to its source and supplied
much significant information. Thus, after half a century of
trial and error by others, Marcy and his band of intrepid
explorers were the "first white men" to accomplish this
feat,100
96. By this' time Congress already had appropriated more than one-half million
dollars for· the removal of the great raft of Louisiana. Senate Bills and Resoluti<ms,
30 Cong., 1.sess., Bill 307 ; Statutes at Large, X, 57; Hse. Ex. Docs.• 32 Cong., 2eess.,
I, no. I. pt. 2, p. 72. '.
97. Washington (Ark.) Telegraph, Nov. 22, 1854, Dec. 3, 1856; Fuller to Abert,
Sept. 30, Oct. 4, 1854, Long to Abert. Oct. 3, 1855, Feb. 7, 19, May 17, July 24, 1856,
. Feb. 7, Nov. 2, 1857, Jan. 10, Oct. 10, 1858, April 11, 1859, LR, TEE.
98. By 1890 the federal government had appropriated $902,000 for improving
navigation on the Red River. Daily Picayune, March 17, July 10, 1860; Caldwell, "The
Red River Raft," Chronicles of Oklahoma, XIX, 263-266.
99. Daily Missouri Republican, April 5, 1853; Abert to Marcy, Nov. 17, 1848,
."United States Miscellaneous, California and New Mexico, 1846-1850," LC.
100. Sen. Ex. Docs.. , 32 Cong., 2sess., no. 54; Daily Missouri Republican, Aug. 27, '
1852, April, 5, 1853; Randolph B. Marcy, Thirty Years of Army Life on the Border.
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The Colorado of the West, like the Red River, was considered a potential medium of military transportation as well
as a link in the chain of frontier defense. White men, to be
sure, had visited its upper valleys from the days of the
conquistadores, but it was "the river of mystery" and the
region th~ough which it flowed remained as unknown as "if
it were in the center of Africa."lol After the Mexican War
this stream at once became important as a possible artery of
transportation to the newly established military posts. Provisioning Fort Yuma by pack train from California, for
example, proved extremely difficult and expensive. Government officers ,soon embarked on extensive surveys of the
Great Colorado,102
'
:
Lieutenant George H. Derby of the Topographical Engineers in the United States transport "Invincible," in the
winter of 1850-1851, ascended the river about tw~nty-five
miles and in a long boat paddled upstream sixty miles farther.
The new river route was at once put into_operation and within
two years steamboat navigation on the Colorado was assured. Steamers "Uncle Sam," "General Jesup," and "Colorado" carried cargoes of freight between the mouth of the
river and Fort Yuma. 103
To ascertain the practicability of water transportation
above that military post, Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives of the
Topographical Engineers, in the winter of 1857.,1858, ascended the Colorado in the iron steamer "Explorer," - to
Fort Yuma and then as far as the mouth, or head, of Black
Canyon, just belo~ the thirty":~ixth parallel. The trip was a
gruelling one and well-nigh ended in disaster. As the "Explorer" steamed up the river she was compelled to battle with
(New York, 1866), li9-l57; McClellan to Mother. May 7. 1852, McClellan to John McClellan, May 14, 1852, McClellan to Sister Maria, Sept. 6, 1852, McClellan, Letter8, III,
IV, LC.
101. Edwin Bryant, Wha.t ISo-w i.,. Co-lifem;", (New York, 1848), 275-276: Edward
S. Wallace, The GreM Reco-nnai88ance: Soldier8, Artists, o-nd Scienti8t8 on the Fro-ntier,
'18lt8-1861 (Boston, 1955), 163; Rse. Misc. Docs., 41 Cong., 3 sess., no. 12, p. 11.
102. Lewis R. Freeman, The Colorado River: Yesterday, Today, and To1rW'T'row
(New York, 1923), 142; Sen. Ex. Doc8., 32 Cong., 1 sess., I, no. I, pt. I, PP. 222-223;
ibid., 32 Cong., 2 sess., II, no. I, p. 91.
103. Ibid., 32 Cong., 1 sess., IX, no. 81, PP. 2-22; Rse. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 BesS.,
no. 114, PP. '23-24: H. H. Bancroft, Arizona and New Mexico (San Francisco, 1889),
490; Freeman Report, 146.147, AGO; "Medical History of Fort Yuma, 1859-1873," AGO.
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sandbars, snags, shoals, shifting sands, earthquakes, and
treacherous rapids. But Ives succeeded in his mission. The
expedition definitely established the practicability of steamboat navigation on the upper Colorado and opened a new
medium of transportation in the Southwest. 104 In the sixties
the new. artery saved thousands of dollars in the cost of
freighting military stores and gave fresh impetus to the development of the resources of Arizona. 105
Paralleling the western river improvement program was
the government policy of survey and construction of western
roads. In the late forties and early fifties many trails 106 could
be used to reach California and Oregon, but most of them
were accompanied by grave hardships. Shorter, less hazardous, and less expensive routes had to be found. In the interest
of military transportation, intimately associated with frontier defense, a long galaiXY of army officers and engineers
carried on a consistent program of reconnaissance and exploration across the greater part of the trans-Mississippi
West. Cooke, Marcy, Beale, and Simpson are but a few of the
official pathfinders who explored and mapped the least known
portions of the Southwest and made known the practicable
and impracticable routes across Texas, the territories of New
Mexico and Utah, and California - no small boon to soldier,
emigrant, and trader.
Lieutenant Colonel Philip St. George Cooke, who led the
Mormon Battalion to California during the Mexican War,
opened the well-known tra-il that bears his name - the first
wagon road through the' Southwest to California. The new
trail became popular with emigrants almost immediately.
Military units also used it. Practicable as a railroad route, it
was one of the reasons for the Gadsden Purchase. Today the
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific lines
104. Hse. Ex. Docs., 36 Cong., 1 sess" no. 90, pp. 21,,36, 38-130; Frederick S.
Dellenbaugh, The Romance of the Colorado River (New York, 1902), 160-167; San
Francisco Daily Alta California, May 12, 1858 (Hereafter cited as Daily, Alta California).
105. Hse. Misc. Docs., 41 Cong., 3 sess., no. 12, pp. 1, 2, 4, 12; Burton to Cooper,
Aug. 11, 1860, LR, AGO.
106. Ralph P.'Bieber. Southern Trails to California in 1849 (Glendale, Calif., 1937),
28-62; Grant Foreman, "Early Trails Through Oklahoma," Chronicles of Oklahoma, III
(June, 1925), 110-112; Octavius Thorndike Howe, Argonauts of '49 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1923),16,37-45.
'
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follow a portion of the trail from New Mexico to southern
California. 107
, In 1849 Captain Marcy opened a new trail from western
Arkansas' to Santa Fe. His outward march from Fort Smith
along' the south Canadian and through the Upper Cross
Timbers to Santa Fe, as well as his return trip across northern Texas, is well known. 108 The northern (outbound) trail
Marcy considered "as good as any in the known world";
Captain James H. Simpson, Marcy's chief reconnaissance
officer, described it as one of the best he had ever seen. The
southern route was also believed to be highly practicable and
soon became popular with overland travelers. The Butterfield
Stage Route - the first Overland Mail to the Pacific - followed Marcy's southern trail across Texas. 109
To find a shorter route to California as well as to select
lands suitable for Indian res~rvations, Lieutenant. Edward
F. Beale of the United States Navy, newly appointed Superintendent of Indian Affairs for California, led an expedition
from Westport, Missouri, to Los Angeles in the spring of
1853. Bent's Fort, the Huerfano River, Sangre de Cristo
Mountains, Cochatope [Cochetopa] Pass, and the Grand
River constituted important land marks along the 1,850-mile
trek. After a march of more than three months, Beale and
his small band of a dozen men succeeded in 'Qpening a new
route from the mouth of the Huerfano River, to the Little'
Salt LakeYo
Four years later Beale led a second exploring expedition
to the Far West. His survey, extend~ng from Fort Defiance
in present Arizona to eastern California, was a phase of the
elaborate Pacific Wagon Road program for which Congress
107. Hse. Ex. Docs., 30 Cong., 1 sess., no. 41; PP. 51-62; Philip St. George Cooke,
William Henry C. Whiting and Fran~ols Xavier Aubry, Exploring Southwestern Trails,
181,6-185J, (Ralph P. Bieber, ed., I':' collaboration with Averam B. Bender, Glendale,
1938), 29, 67-237; Daily PiclLyune, May 25, 1847.
,
108.' Hse. Ex. Docs., 31 Cong., 1 sess., VIII, no. 45, PP. 23, 28, 30-48, 52-77.
109. Ibid., 80-82; Daily Missouri Republican, March 31, 1853; Fort Smith Herald,
May 16, June 13, July 11, 25, Sept. 5, Nov. 2, 1849, M,,:y 4, 11, Nov. 8, 15, 22, Dec. 6,
1850; Marcy, Adventure on Red River: Report on the Exploration of the Headwaters Of
the Red River by Captain Randolph B. Marcy and Captain G. B. McClellan (Grant
Foreman, ed., Norman, Okla., 1937), p. vi.
110. Gwinn H. Heap, Central Route to the Pacific from the Valley of the Mississippi
to California: Journal of the Expedition (Philadelphia, 1854), 9-111,123-127; Hse. Ex.
Docs., 35 Cong., 1 sess., no. 174, p. 15.
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appropriated more than one-half million dollars. Beale was
superintendent of construction of the wagon road from Fort
Defiance to the Colorado River,111 and camels were used as
an experiment. ll2 Travelling principally along the thirtyfifth" parallel, Beale and his colorful cavalcade - a herd of
25 camels, Turk, Greek, and Armenian camel drivers, a drove
of several hmidred sheep, and a military escort - covered
about 4,000 miles through a wilderness of forest, plain and
desert, tested the value of camels as a medium of transportation, and marked a new route to the Pacific. 1l3
To test the practicability of his route in the winter season,
Beale, in the fall of the same year, conducted an elaborate
nine-month expedition from- western Arkansas to the Colorado River. 'His survey again proved the practicability of a
wagon route along the thirty-fifth parallel and showed that
the winter season was no obstacle. Although champions of
the competitive Southern Overland Mail route spoke disparagingly of Beale's route, denouncing his line as "worse
than a swindle - a humbug," nevertheless many spoke of it
in very laudatory terms and emigrants used it daily,114
Beale's surveys, supplemented by road improvement between
Fort Smith and Albuquerque and the co'nstruction of a road
.between Albuquerque and the Colorado River, l,aid the basis
for a through road from the Arkansas frontier to California.
Military transportation, as well as communiCation and travel,
was materially benefitted.115
While Beale was exploring along the thirty-fifth parallel,
Captain Simpson led reconnoitering expeditions north of
Beale's line for the purpose of opening more direct arid better
roads. to California and establishing military posts. In the
, fall of 1858 and spring of 1859 he succeeded in opening two
new wagon roads across the Great Basin of Utah, from Camp
111. Sta.tutes a.t Large, X, 639, XI; 162-163; Floyd to Beale, April 22, 1857, LB, SW.
112. Lewis Burt Lesley (ed.), Uncle Sa.m'8 Camels: The Journal of May Humphrey8 Stacey ... (Cambridge, 1929) ; Harlan D. Fowler, Camels to California (Stanford,
1950) ; Sen. Ex. Doc8., 34 Cong., 3 sess., no. 62,. pp. 1-238·; "Camels, 1848-1866," LR,
QGO.
113. H Be. Ex. Doc8., 35 Cong., 1 sess., no. 124, pp. 2, 38, 44-87; Da.ily MiB80uri Republican, Jan. 19, 1858.
.
114. Beale to Floyd, July 16, Dec. 15, 1859 [Enclosure: Crump to· Beale, n.d.],
LR, SW; Daily Mis80uri Republican, Sept. 4, 1859; Daily Alta. California, July 19, 1859.
115. Daily Mi880uri Republican, Nov. 9, 1858, Jan. 30, June 26, -Aug. 31, 1859.
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Floyd to Carson Valley, which shortened the distance from
Camp Floyd to San Francisco by more than 250 miles. Simpson advertised his routes in the western newspapers and soon
Californiaemigr~nts and others with large herds' of stock
were using them. The Overland Mail and Pony Express used
the northern route (Simpson's survey of his outward march
from Camp Floyd to Short Cut Pass) along which the Placerville and St. Joseph Telegraph Company extended its
,wiresYs
Construction of new roads and improvement of existing
arteries of transportation and ,travel accompanied these surveys. But Congress delayed action until it became thoroughly
convinced of the necessity of such a program. Between 1850
and 1856 the citizens of Missouri, Iowa, and California held
giant mass meetings in behalf of western roads and through
their legislatures, representatives, and senators periodically
petitiontld .Congress for cohstruction of military and post
roads across the plains and deserts,117 When 70,000 Californians pleaded for a military road from some point in
Missouri to Carson Valley in eastern California, Congress
yielded. In 1856 and 1857 it appropriated more than one-half
million dollars 118 and in less than two years the Department
of the Interior, through the newly established administrative
agency -Pacific Wagon Roads Office 1l9 ":-constructed three
Pacific wagon roads. One Toad, leading from Fort Ridgely;
Minnesota Territory, through Fort Kearny and South Pass,
extended to Honey Lake on the 'eastern border of California;
a second, supplementing Marcy's trail from Fort Smith to
Santa Fe, ran from Fort Defiance to the Colorado River near
116. 'Sen. Ex. IJ,ocs., 35 Cong., 2 sess., no. 40, 'pp. 3·39; ibid., 36 Cong., 1 sess., no. 1,
pt. 1, p. 106, no. 2, pt. 2, PP. 15, 221, no. 2, pt. 3, PP. 847-848; Simpson to Porter, Dec. 28,
1858 (Simpson's RepOrt); LR, TEB; ;Tames H. Simpson; Report of Explorations Across
the Great Basin of the Territory of Utah jor a Direct Wagon Rout~ from Camp Floyd
to Genoa in Carson Valley, 1859 (Washington, 1876), 3, 7, 25.148, 217; Salt Lake City
Deseret News, ;Tuly'20, 1859.
117. Sen. Journal, 31 Cong., 1 sess., 625; Sen. Rpts., 31 Cong., 2 sess., no. 240;
Hse. Journal, 32 Cong., 2 sess., 210; ibid., 34 Cong., 1 sess., pt. 1, p. 490; Hse. Rpts.,
32 Cong., 2 sess., no. 2; Daily Missouri Republican, Feb. 8, 12, 1855, May 6, 1856;
California Statutes, 1855 (Sacramento, 1855), 308; ;Tobn M. Bernhisel to Douglas, ;Tan.
29, Feb.. 2,' 1855, Stephen A. Douglas, Papers, University of Chicago Library.
118. Hse: Rpts., 34 Cong., 1 sess., no. 355; Statutes at Large, XI, 27, 162-163.
119. ;Tackson, Wagon Roads West, 178; Albert H. Campbell to;T. R. McCay, May
23, 1857, LS, SI, PW;aO, ID.
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the mouth of the Mohave River; the third road, running between the, thirty-second. and thirty-third parallels, connected El Paso and Fort Yuma. 120 Despite quarrels between
superintendents of road construction and engineers, charges
of favoritism, and mismanagement, the' roads were completed and proved of i~calculablevalue. 121
The El Paso-Fort Yu,ma road was of particular importance. In addition to the benefits accruing to military transportation, the Butterfield Mail and emigration were made
easier, settlement of areas leading to the road increased, and
the national
hold on California, Arizona, and New Mexico
I
was strengthened. At the opening of the Civil War the road
, ,was one of the routes over which California troops moved to
hold New Mexico in the Union. 122
During the same period the Federal government spent
nearly a million dollars additional for construction and improvements of roads in other portions of the West. 123 Five
new roads'btlilt by army engineers traversed the Territory o,f
New Mexico. One from Taos to Santa Fe connected the upper
posts of the Rio Grande Valley with, the capital. Another,
continuing from Santa Fe to Dona Alia, served as the most
,important artery of travel and communication north and
south, connecting Santa Fe with the military posts along the
Rio Grande and with those east and west of the river. A third·
road extended from Fort Union about 100 miles southwestward to Santa Fe. A road was also built from Canada to
Abiquiu, and another from Albuquerque' to Tecalote. The
Fort Union-Santa Fe road was perhaps the most imp.ortant;
for it was the principal entrance to the heart of the territory;
it afforde~ communication between that post and the headquarters of the military department, and it served as a porI.

120. Sen. Ex. Docs., 35 Cong., 2 sess., no. 36, pp. 7-36, 75-76; Jackson, Wagon
Roads West, 179-232, 241-256.
121. William M. F. Magraw to J. Thompson, March 25.. 1858, copies of true' bills
and indictments against James B. Leach, May 16, 1859, LE, Thompson to John Kirk,
June 17, 1858, and Campbell to Leach, ,March 12, 1861, LS, SI, PWRO, ID.
122. Jack L. Cross, "Federal Wagon Road Cohstructi~n in New Mexico Territory,
1846-1860," p. 95, M. A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1949.
123. Statutes at Large, IX, 306, 439, X, 151, 168, 203, 303, 306, 603, 604, 641;
Ex. Docs., 34 Cong., 3 sess., II, 390; Hse. Ex. Docs" 34 Cong., 1 sess., no. I, pt. 2,
pp. 43-44, 273, 468, 475-483; ibid., 35 Cong" 1 sess., no. 79, P. 3: Daily Missouri Republican. Aug. 25, 1855.
'
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tion of the great mail route between. the eastern states and
the largest settlement in the Territory. Besides serving the
military an,d commercial needs, New Mexico's pre~Civil War
military roads .pointed. the way for modern lines of communication in the future State. 124 Because of her peculiar land
system, Texas did not share in the federal road-building program, although her roads in the 1850's were most primitive ;125 Utah received but slight aid from Congress for
internal improvements and California, despite constant appeals for federal aid, was obliged to build her. own roads. 126
In the Far Northwest, however, the government played a
prominent part in the construction of highwaYs.127
On the eve of the Civil War practically every fort wason
or "near a well-constructed road. The new network, laid out
by army engineers 128 and built in part by soldiers, generally
had their termini in military installations. Although the,"Indian fighting" army. was generally not so fortunate 'as to
conduct its campaigns along military road surveys in the
trans-Mississippi country, nevertheless these improvements
facilitated the movement of troops and supply trains to the
western outposts and provided a continuous connection
between the forts or Indian agencies and the population
centers. Providing an adequate system of military and commercial transportation, prior to the Pacific railroads, was an
integral part of the government's policy of frontier defense
and paved the way for opening the new country.
124. Sen: Ex. Dacs.• 35 Cang., 2 sess., III. na. 1, pt. 3, pp. 1032, 1206-~209; ibid.,
36 Cong., 1 sess.; II, no. 2, pt 2, p. 693; Macomb to Abert, Oct. 30, 1860, LR, TEB; Jackson, Wayan Raads, West, 107-120; Cross, "Federal Wagon Road •.• ," pp. 97-98.
125. Emma~el Domenech, Missianary Adventur~s in Texas and Mexica, 1846-1852
(London, 1858), 26; Frederick Law Olmsted, A Jaurney ThTaugh Texas ()T a'Saddletrip on the 8authwestern Frontier (New York, 1857), 93, 239, 246.
126. San Francisco Daily National, Sept. 24, 1858; A. J. Bledsoe, Indian Wars of
the Northwest (San Francisco, 1885), 218; California, Assembly Journal, 1855 (Sacramento, 1855), 426-427 ; Sen. Misc. Docs., 33 Cong., 1 sess., no. 53, p. 1; Jackson, Wagon
Roads West, 146, 157.
.
127. Statutes at Large, X, 151, 303, 603-604, XI, 168, 337, XII, 19; Hse.Ex. Docs.,
36 Cong., 2 sess., VIII, no. 44; ibid., no. 64, pp. 3-17; Sen. Ex. Dacs., 37 Co'ng., 2 sess.,
II, no. I, pp. 124, 548; Jackson, Wagan Roads West, 257-318.
128. For the significance of the Engineers' Frontier, see Samuel Flagg Bemis,
"Captain John Mullan and the Engineers' Frontier," Washing tan Historical Quarterly,
XIV (July, 1923), 202.

RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST*
By WILLIAM S. GREEVER
HE FiRST railways through the Southwest were born of
.
the American dream of a transcontinental railroad. As
early as the i830's some people envisioned such a link between the established East and the undeveloped West. About
1845 a Yankee tea merchant, Asa Whitney, returned from
two years in China, filled with enthusiasm for the railroad
project. Hefelt especially its importance in securing a larger
share of the lucrative, expanding Oriental trade. His boundless enthusiasm aroused much interest among Congressmen,
but his casual attitude 'toward practical engineering difficulties distressed them and his request for a. federal land
.grant to aid in constructing the lipe divided them. They debated his specific proposal for seven years but never accepted
it. During the 1850's the solons discussed many other plans
for a transcontinental line. They were generally agreed there
should be such a line and that the only major city which had
yet arisen on the Pacific Coast, San Francisco, should be the terminal. They judged it inconceivable enough traffic would
ever develop to justify 'more than'one line, so they naturally
were deeply concerned over its precise location. Some southern Congressmen thought it should stick close to the Gulf and
the Mexican boundary, serving an area they felt was hospitable to large plantations and slavery. Some argued for a
route from Lake ,Superior to Puget Sound, tapping what they
believed was destined to become an area of small farms and
free labor. Others advocated a central route, the mos;t dir.ect
to San Francisco, serving also as a westward escape valve
for eager but impoverished farmers. Within each of these
three groups of Congressmen there was much division of
, opinion over the eastern terminal of the route they advocated.
Hardly a city on the Mississippi or west of it was without,
ambitions; towns which now would not be, considered lik~ly
candidates, such as Leavenworth, were then more on a basis

T

• This article is' primarily concerned with railway development in Arizona and New
Mexico.'
.
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of equality with today's metropolises and were major contenders. The squabble among the cities was dwarfed by the
quarrel between those who advocated and those who abhorred
the westward expansion of slavery. In the fiery controversy
the southerners adamantly demanded that the transcontinental railroad must be wholly in the south; some northerners as firmly insisted on the northern line but others were
willing to compromise,on that anathema of slaveholders, the
central route. So serious was the deadlock, and so firm the
conviction that never more than one railroad would be built,
that no authorization could be passed through Congress.
However, the famous Gadsden Purchase, valuable as a railway route, was made. Not until the Civil War, with the South
unable to protest what a Yankee Congress might do, were the
Central Pacific and Union Pacific chartered to build between
Council Bluffs and Sacramento.
The theoretical debates of the 1850's over location raised
the question of which was more practicable. To answer it
Cong:ress authorized the so-called Pacific Railroad Surveys
over five possible routes and learned, in 1856, that all were
suitable from an engineer's viewpoint. 1 Along the 32nd parallel, there was a series of explorations. Through southern
New Mexico and Arizona, Lt., Parke i~ 1854 made, a ,hasty
exploration of 27 days across 375 miles; 'the . . n ext year he"
retraced his steps more leisurely aIm confirmed his.'judgment
that the route was practical. In Texas" Capt. John Pope surveyed a 639-mile line in 83 days. In California, Lt. R. S.
Williamson spied out the lay of the land from Benicia to Ft.
Yuma, especially examining Walker's, Cajon and San Gorgonio passes. He concluded, if the railroad was to serve San
'Diego, that San Gorgonio was the only practical route.
Along the 35th parallel, Lt. A. W. Wnipple led a party
from Ft. Smith, Arkansas to California. To Santa Fe he virtually retraced the steps of an 1849 gold seekers' party escorted by Capt. R. B. Marcy; west of the Rio Grande Whipple
went over a region mostly never before explored. From the
river at Isleta to Cajon Pass in California, he laid out a route
1.
143.

G. L. Albright. OfJiciOl Explorati0'n8 jar Pacific Railroads (Berkeley, 1921). 103·

RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

153

now almost exactly followed by the Santa Fe Railroad. He
discovered in northern New Mexico and Arizona suitable
passes and west of the Colorado River encountered no obstacles to construction.
Another survey in New Mexico and Arizona was rim more
than a decade later by private enterprise. The Kansas Pacific
contemplated, but never built, a line to southern California.
It hired William J. Palmer in 1867 to lead an expedition over
a possible route from Salina, Kansas, to the Pacific, examining west of Albuquerque both the 32nd and the 35th parallels.
- Palmer reported the southern route the less' desirable. He
thought it had less arable _land and less timber than the
northern. He pointed out that the easier grades in New Mexico and Arizona were more than offset by the very difficult
mountai,ns barring direct entrance into San Diego. He discounted the usefulness of a branch to Guaymas, old Mexico,
because the harbor was too small to handle through traffic.
Palmer recommended the 35th parallel as shorter; as more
accessible from various parts of' the nation and as holding
g,reater potential prospects for originating traffic locally.2
Although Congress in 1862 had granted lan'd and financial
aid for building a transcontinental railroad along the central
route, not until 1866 did it turn to the northern and southern
routes. It then proffered land, but no money, to the Northern
Pacific for a 'line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound and to
the Atlantic and Pacific for 9ne from Springfield, Missouri,
west along the 35th parallel to the Pacific.
The origins of the Atlantic and Pacific lay in a company
named the Southwestern Pacific, organized in Missouri in
1849 to build'to the Pacific Ocean. 3 It accomplished little ,de2. . W. J. Palmer, Report of Surveys Across the Continent in 1867-68 on the ThirtyFifth and Thirty-Second ParaUels for a Route Extending the Kansas Pacific to the
Pacific Ocean at San Francisco and San Diego (Philadelphia, 1869), passim; W. A.
Bell, New Tracks in North America (London, 1870), pasSim.
3. The best authority on the history of the Atlantic and Pacific and Santa Fe railroads is L. L. Waters, Steel Trails to Santa Fe (Lawrence, Kansas, 1950). Previously
James Marshall took Waters' research material and issued a popularized "pot-boiler"
called Santa Fe: The Railroad That Built an Empire (New York, 1945). It 'contains
some details Waters did not use in his own book and omits others, but it must be used
with caution because Marshall wrote with a casual attitude toward accuracy. An older
but still useful and dependable study is G. D. Bradley, The Story of the Santa Fe
(Boston, 1920). There is also W. S. Greever, Arid Domain: The Santa Fe -Railway and
Its Western Land Grant (Stanford, 1954).
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spite a loan from the state of Missouri and a land grant; was
foreclosed and sold to the famous general John C. Fremont.
He renamed it the South Pacific and by 1870 had built from
just outside St. Louis to Springfield. He also played a major
role in launching the Atlantic and Pacific and in 1870 merged
the two companies. He'constructed southwestward through
Missouri into Indian Territory. By 1872 the Atlantic and
Pacific offered service from Pacific, just west of St. Louis,
to Vinita, I. T., 361 miles; it had spent $36,262,322.70 to build
the line. It had surveyed further west, depending heavily on
Palmer's earlier work, and in 1872 filed with Washington
authorities its map of definite location for a line to the Pacific..
Its representatives talked with San Franciscans but secured
no definite commitment of support. IIi 1873 it fell into the
financial hands of its enemies, the promoters of the Texas
and Pacific, and three years later it was bankrupt.
The major difficulty with the Atlantic and Pacific was
that investors refused to put money into so speculative an
enterprise: In Indian Territory white settlement was forbidden and the possibility seemed very remote that the railway
would ever secure title to its land grant there; in Texas there
was no federal land ; and further west there was a-grant but
little prospect of profit for years to come. In 1876 the railway
was sold at foreclosure to a group of bondholders: They re~
organized it as the St. Louis and San Francisco, popularly
known as the Frisco, and eventually developed it into a substantial midwestern carrier. It retained the original Atlantic
and Pacific c~arter, with its authorization to build west andits land grant, but the eagerness of the Frisco to complete the
project was no substitute for money; matters drifted for
awhile.
Meanwhile the Texas and Pacific had emerged as a substantial rivaJ.4 Its origins were in the San Diego and Gila,
Southern Pacific and Atlantic Railroad, organized in San
Diego in 1854 to build eastward to Yuma. It surveyed through
4. L. B. Lesley, "A Southern Transcontinental Railroad into California: Texas and
Pacific versUs Southern Pacific, 1865-1885," Pacific Histoncal Review, V (1936), 52-60;
N. C. WilSon and F. J. Taylor, Southern Pacific: The Roaring Story of a Fighting
Railroad (N~w York, 1952), 63-79. At first the enterprise was called the Texas Pacific,
but shortly the "and" was added.
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Warner Pass and secured the promise of a 10,000-acre land
subsidy, but accomplished nothing further. In 1869 it fell into
the hands of the Memphis El Paso and Pacific Railroad, a
paper road which went bankrupt the :Qext year. Others too
had the same general idea f9r a line; they persuaded Con,..
, gress in 1871 to charter the Texas and Pacific to build from
Marshall, on the eastern boundary of Texas, to San Diego.
They secured the right to earn aland grant of 40 sections a
mile in New Mexico and Arizona and 20 in California, on condition they complete the entire project within 10 years. They
selected Thomas A. Scott, president of the Pennsylvania
Railroad, as head of the T&P. He promptly absorbed the
Memphis El Paso and Pacific and the San Diego and Gila,
South~rn Pacific and Atlantic Railroads. Despite the financial
stringencies of the Panic of 1873, he completed 325 miles of
line in Texas and east of San Diego graded 10 miles without
laying rails.
But money proved so hard to raise that Scott, for the
moment, united the enterprises, but not the corporations, of
the Texas and Pacific and the Atlantic and Pacific. He would
build the T&P through to San Diego; the A&P southwestward
from Vinita, 1. T., 400 miles to a junction with the T&P; and
also lines from Vicksburg and New Orleans to Shreveport.
He would ,use San Gorgonio Pass in California rather than
try to go through the very rugged mountain range to the
south. He asked Congress in 1875 to guarantee the interest
on 5% bonds covering all this construction and argued elaborately that the government would be amply secured. 5 Meeting with vigorous opposition, Scott fought for three years
before conceding defeat. His enemy was the Central Pacific
and its subsidiary the Southern Pacific. Led by C. P. Huntington, chief of the "Big Four" who had financed the.two lines,
a group of lobbyists in Washington tried to preserve the CPSP railroad monopoly of California. Previously the Californians secured in the original T&P charter a proviso
authorizing the Southern Pacific to connect with the interloper at the .Colorado River. Now the Huntington forces
. demanded that Congress forbid the newcomer to enter Cali5.

Hse. Misc. Docs., 43 Cong., 2 sess., no. 36, part 1, 1-9.
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. fornia, especially to use San" Gorgonio Pass which the
Southern Pacific coveted for itself, and instead to authorize
the SP to build eastward from Yuma until it met the Texas
and Pacific. They played upon 'the mounting antipathy toward any further federal aid for railroads.
. Huntington,. in letters subsequently published, revealed
the intensity of the struggle. 6 He pointed out, "Scott is making a terrible effort, promising everything to everybody."
He 'commented, "Scott is making a very dirty fight and I shall
try very hard to pay him off, and if I do 'not live to see the
grass grow over him I shall be very mistaken." Huntington
employed a "good many men"'as lobbyists. Congress he characterized as "the hungriest set of men that ever got together"
and one California member as "a damned hog any way you
can fix hi,m."The financier grumbled that his agent Doctor
Gwin had failed to get any of his candidates appointed on the
Railway Commit~ee. Huntington debated whether it· was
worth the expenditure 'Of $200,000 to get Congress to pass an
SPbill rather than the proposed T&P measure. He considered
spending $25,000 to have Governor Safford of Arizona- call a
special legislative session to pass franchises favoring Huntington's roads. In later years he would. never explain to
Congressional investigating committees how he had used
company remittances f.or "legal expenses" of $75,000' and
$100,000 sent him in -Washington during his fight with Scott.
By whatever means" Huntington was victorious. ' .
While the fight in Congress was at its worst, the Texas
and Pacific attacked at the Colorado River. 7 With its own
rails still 1,200 miles east of Yuma, it sought to stall the
Southern Pacific at the California boundary by seizing the
one most favorable spot to build a bridge. First it secured a
permit from local army authorities to build within the Ft.
Yuma Military Reservation; then the SP got one; then the
two got a conditional one from the Secretary of War who,
a month later, revoked them both. The Southern Pacific, protesting it had already begun work, secured permission to
build'just enough more to prevent losing what it had already
6•. Congressional Record, 48 Cong., 1 sess., 789-791; Sen. Ex. Docs., 50 Cong., 1
sesS., no. 51, 3683-3756.
7. Hse. Misc. DO'cs'., 45 Cong., 2 sess., no. 33, passim.
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constructed. Instead it invited the army officers at Ft. Yuma
to a prolonged drunken party; while they roistered, it finished
its bridge completely. It was forbidden to use the structure
,by the Department of War, but in October 1877 President
Hayes authorized resumption of train service over it. Again
Huntington's railroad had won out. It was the last battle for
Scott, for defeated here and in Congress, he solg his T&P
stock to Jay Gould, a railway speculator more celebrated and
feared than respected.
'. Huntington met his new adversary in New York City and
they reached an understanding, though if either trusted the
other in the slightest it would have indeed been surprising.
They said they would extend their two lines until they met
somewhere in Texas, forming a transcontinental route.'
Huntington's Southern Pacific started building east from
Yuma in November 1878, with J. H. Strobridge, who previously had flung the' Central Pacific across the Sierras, in
charge. Just east of Maricopa he laid a railroad curve 5 miles
in length, then the longest in the world, and followed it with
47 miles of absolutely straight track. When he pushed the line
into Tucson On March 20, 1880, there was a great celebration
with a 'flock of telegrams dispatched to various dignitaries
including the Pope. Shortly back to the ,assembled group
came the alleged reply, "Am glad railroad has reached Tucson, but where in hell is Tucson? The Pope." The actual building of the line through New Mexico and Arizon'a was done by
the Pacific Improvement Company, which was owned by the
four leading financiers of the Southern Pacific. These men ~s
stockholders in the railroad required it to issue and turn over
to the improvement company large quantities of stocks and
bonds in payment. for work done. Originally the trackage
belonged to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of New
Mexico and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of Arizona. In 1885 the property of these two organizations was
leased to the Southern Pacific Company, chartered in Kentucky to do almost anything the mind of man could conceive,
provided only that it was not done in Kentucky; in 1902 the
two smaller corporations were merged into the larger one.S
8.

Stuart Daggett, Chapters <m the History of the Southern Pacific (New York,
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Huntington and his group were not content simply to
build eastward. They made a large investment in the Galveston Harrisburg and San Antonio, which connected with
. other railroads the Southern Pacific eventually secured, to
make a route ·through to New Orleans. The Californians
thought if they constructed their new acquisition westward,
perhaps they could join it with the SP before Gould could
get his own line there. Speed was important, especially to
secure the pass at Sierra Blanca in west Texas, the only feasible one for miles around. The Southern Pacific reached EI
Paso on May 19,1881, and continued energetically eastward.
Soon it had clearly defeated· the Texas and Pacific, which
signed a new agreement on November 26, 1881. 9 The two
were to meet about 110 miles east of EI Paso, but the T&P
was leased running rights' into the city. The SP- promised to
handle through traffic to San Diego, Los Angeles and San
Francisco at as Iowa rate as that on any other transcontinental route. The two roads were' to divide equally the
western business originating at New Orleans, but two-thirds of that from Houston was to be hauled over the Huntirigton
lines to El Paso. Gould's road promi.sed never to build west
of EI Paso and Huntington's agreed never to build parallel
to the T&P. Construction continued between EI Paso and San
Antonio until the two Huntington lines met on January 12,
1883.
When Huntington built from Yuma to El Paso; his. Southern Pacific followed very closely the route the Texas and
Pacific would have used to earn its federal land grant had it
ever gotten that far west. In a New Mexican court in the
early 1880's, the T&P demanded that the SP turn over to it
the completed line which Congress had authorized it to build;
it lost the suit. A related problem was that of the land grant
itself, any claim to which the Gould line released to the Huntington, road. When the Southern Pacific asked the federal
government for title to the acreage, Congress refused because
nothing in the original T&P charter authorized such a transfer and because the SP had built the line not because of Con1922), 119-139, 169-180, 199-221; "From Trail to Rail," Southern Pacific Bulletin, XVI
(1928),12-15 (Oct.)
9. Congressional Record, 48 Cong., 1 sess., 793.
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gressional wishes but rather its own desires. 10 Huntington,
who had long boasted he did not need a land grant to build
through New Mexico and Arizona, now fumed angrily be-"
cause he could not get it. Instead, Congress in 1885 declared
forfeit the grant of the T&P and a number of other railroads.
Already another railroad had become entrenched in New
Mexico: the Atchison Topeka and Santa Fe. 11 It had begun"
at Topeka and gradually worked westward. As early as 1872
it showed a definite interest in building through New Mexico
to Santa Fe, running several surveys from~easternmostColorado or westernmost Kansas and negotiating for a right-ofway through the well-known Maxwell grant. The Panic of
1873 momentarily crushed its plans for this extension. When
funds first became a~ailable again, it built into Colorado and
reached Pueblo in February 1876. But New Mexico was riot
forgotten, for the next year the Santa Fe sent A. A. Robinson
and W. R. Morley to make further surveys. Robinson, who
during his career was to build over 5,000 miles of railroad,
finally concluded as an engineer that the most feasible route
was from Dodge City southwest to Wagon Mound, skirting
much of the mountain region. But this was discarded because
it would have missed a potentially important source of business, the Raton area coal fields. Indeed conservative Santa" Fe
President Thomas Nickerson doubted if there would be
enough traffic to justify a New Mexico extension. He was
overruled by more liberal elements within the company and
in February 1878 the railway launched its project.
The first requirement was aNew Mexico charter for an
AT&SF subsidiary, the New Mexico and Southern Pacific
Railroad, which the parent company would evel)tually lease
in its customary manner of expansion. To secure the charter
the railway sen.t Col. H. C. Nutt, Miguel Otero and its Vice
President William B. Strong to the Territorial capital. There
they learned that Southern Pacific lobbyists had persuaded
the legislature to pass the so-called California Act. It provided a serious obstacle to any new railroad construction in
10. House Reports, 47 Cong., 1 Bess.," no. 1803, passim; Congressional Record, 48
Cong., 2 sess., 1877, 1888, 1894.
11. See note no. 3.
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New Mexico because the company must have in cash 10% of
the cost of the proposed line. However, Otero discovered the
new act had not yet gone into effect. The three Santa Fe men
hastened to organize a railroad under the general incorporating laws of the Territory. They then persuaded the legislature
to exempt the line from taxes for six years.
An even more serious competitor than the Southern
Pacific was the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad. 12 This narrow gauge line intended to build eventually from Denver to
Mexico City and planned more immediately to divert the
traffic of the historic Santa Fe trail to Denver. It reached
Pueblo in 1872u but found this wasn't far enough south to
get the business it sought. Hampered by the Panic ·of 1873,
it finally in April 1876 came to within five miles of Trinidad
and, stopped at EI'Moro. There the backers of the D&RG
owned a town site they hoped would prosper greatly, but the
citizens of Trinidad violently resented the railroad's failure
to enter their city immediately. The president 'of ~he narrow
gauge, the same William J. Palmer who had in'1867 directed'
the Kansas Pacific's westward -survey, repeatedly stated his
eventual aim of building through Raton Pass and had a survey run to Cimarron, New Mexico. However he had never
discussed the matter with Dick Wootton, the owner of the toll
road through the defile,or made any attempt to secure ownership of the right-of-way. Indeed 'what money could be raised
between 1876 and 1878 he used instead to build through La
Veta Pass to Alamosa, Colorado.
When the Santa Fe finally authorized construction on its
New Mexico extension, Strong urged Robinson to start l:l-t
once'at the key point, Raton Pass. The engineer immediately
took the next D&RG train from Pueblo to EI Moro. Also on
board was the Rio Grande's chief engineer, J. A. McMurtrie,
who likewise held instructions to occupy the pass for his company. Probably this was because the telegraph lines of the
two companies connected and each had broken the secret
code of the other. When the train reached EI Moro shortly
12. H. O. Brayer, "History of Colorado Railroads," in L. R. Hafen, editor, Colorado and Its Pwple (New York, 1948), 635-690; V. A. Ferrell, "Short History of the
Denver & Rio Grande Western Ry," Railway and Locorrwtive Hist~ical Society Bulletin, no. 78 (1949), 86-95.
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before midnight, McMurtrie went to find some much needed
rest but Robinson pushed on through Trinidad and up the
toll road to Dick Wootton's crude hotel. There he rounded up
transients to form a work crew while W. R. Morley was hiring more workers in Trinidad, a town bitterly hostile to the
D&RG. At 5 :00 AM the Santa Fe graders started shovelling
by lantern light on the north slope of the pass. Half an hour
later the D&RG crew arrived to find their rivals in possession.
There was room for only one road through the pass and unpleasant talk failed to move the Santa Fe men; the vanquished D&RG crew left. Although perhaps the narrow gauge
company might have found an alternate route, not so satisfactory but still acceptable, it did not persist. Instead it
turned· to an area of new mineral development, Leadville,
which at least for the moment held a far greater traffic potential than New Mexico. The mines also attracted the Santa
Fe. Again there was a passage, the Royal Gorge,.where there'
was room for only one line and the prolonged, violent struggle
for it made the contest for Raton Pass seem mild indeed; this
time the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad won.
. On fts main line through Raton Pass the Santa Fe decided
to build a tunnel 200 feet under the summit. Unusually hard
rock so d~layed the project that the company threw a temporary line over the top with grades' as steep as 6% and had
to use it for almost a year. So difficult was the emergency
route that the company had to secure for it a new locomotive
which was twice as powerful as any the railroad then owned.
Early in June 1879, the main line reached Las Vegas and
continued westward at the accelerated pace of a mile and a
half a day. Soon the question arose whether it would run
through the town of Santa Fe. There is a story that the
trouble arose because the local residents would not meet certain demands of the company, but this has been flatly denied
by a company lawyer who wrote a history of New Mexico. 13
Certainly the difficulties in building a line directly west from
the town were great and would have involved quite an expense. Palmer in his 1867 survey had recommended putting
13. R. E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Me",ican History (Cedar Rapids,
Iowa, 1912). II, 486.
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'the capital on a branch. So did Santa Fe railway engineer
W. R. Morley, who was then charged so bitterly by the people
of the town with being unfair and "opposed" to them that
the company hired an independent surveyor to investigate
the problem again. He confirmed what the other two had said
and the railway stuck to its original plan. It would not even
have built a branch to Santa Fe had not the city and county
voted a bond issue of $150,000 'to aid construction of a stub
from Lamy. It continued its main line directly westward to~
ward Bernalillo. There it intended to establish a division
point and erect considerable shops, but the local landowner
kept raising his price until he was asking $1,000 an acre. Disgusted, tpe company bought inBtead a site two miles from the
old settlement of Albuquerque. Its line reached this tract in
April 1880 and soon the area became the new center of Albuquerque's business district.
The Santa Fe as early as 1878 had begun plans for an extension beyond Albuquerque to the Pacific. It had Morley
survey to Tucson' and Florence in Arizona. He recommended
the 32nd parallel route as better than the 35th because the
hinterland was superior, with more mineral resources and no
Grand Canyon to cut the area of customers to the north.
Deeply impressed with traffic potentialities south ':,of the
border, he even dreamed imperialistically of "another Texas"
on Mexican soil. Partly because of his reports, the AT&SF
picked Guaymas, in old Mexico, to be its, port on the Pacific.
It organized, as usual, a subsidiary to build the line. This was
the Sonora Railway, whose Mexican charter ,provided that
the "enterprise shall always be Mexican, even when any or all
of its members are foreign." It was promised a s~bsidy from
,the Mexican government of $7,000 per kilometer; it got some
of the money in 1880 and 1881 and after 1890" but never all
of it. 14 Originally the line was, projected from Guaymas directly northeast to Douglas, Arizona, and Deming, New
Mexico, but soon this was changed to a less difficult route
northward to Hermosillo, Nogales, Arizona and Benson, then
eastward to Deming. Construction began at Guaymas in 1880,
with even such supplies as locomotives shipped aroulld Cape
14.

Stuart Daggett, Railway Reorganization (Cambridge, 1908), 203.
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'Horn, and by October 1882 the line reached Nogales. To connect with the Sonora Railway, the Santa Fe continued construction from Albuquerque south along the Rio Grande.
Around Isleta the local Indians tore up at night almost as
much track as was laid each day until Fr. Dourchee, a missionary, persuaded them to stop. After building south to
Rincon, the AT&SF planned to syving its main line southwest
to Deming, west to Benson, and southwest to Nogales. This
alarmed the Southern Pacific, which already had a railroad
from Deming to Benson and did not relish the idea of a competitor building a closely parall~l line. It offered' to gr~nt
running rights and the Santa Fe accepted, organizing the
New Mexico and Arizona Railway to lease the line and to
build promptly from Benson to Nogales. The two lines met
at Deming on March 8, 1881, the site actually having been
moved ten miles west of the location originally proposed because there was no water there. In 1881 the AT&SF also built
an important branch line from Rincon to El Paso;15
The new line to Deming and the Pacific did not prosper.
Santa Fe dreams of interchanging southern California traffic
with the Southern Pacific at Deming ran counter to Huntington's intention of keeping a monopoly on all transcontinental
business and making San Francisco the distribution center
for both southern California and Arizona. He made such excessive rate demands. that after one week of through service
the Santa Fe announced it would accept no more California
shipments. To break his strangle hold, it tried the experiment
of buying a seven:-eights interest in the steamship "City of
Topeka" arid offering service from its rails at Guaymas to
American ports on the Pacific Coast. Service was so slow and
uncertain that it proved a financial failure. Indeed the whole
Mexican extension turned out to be a mistake, for the mineral
wealth remained untapped and the advantage of a port
nearer to Australia than any in the United States remained.
theoretical.
15. The Santa Fe used subsidiaries, building from Albuquerque to San Marcial,
New Mexico' as the New Mexico and Southern Pacific; from San Marcial via Rincon to
Deming and from Rincon to the state line as the Rio Grande Mexico and Pacific; and
from the state line to El Paso as the Rio Grande and El Paso. Eventually the line from
Albuquerque to. EI Paso earned the nickname among railroad people of "The Horny
Toad."
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Meanwhile the narrow gauge Denver and Rio' Grande
Railroad continued to expand.I 6 In 1880 it completed a line
from Alamosa to Espanola, 35 miles from Santa Fe and as
far south as certain agreements made with the AT&SF would
allow it to go for the moment. A route to the capital city was
built in 1886 by the Santa Fe and Northern Narrow Gauge
Railroad; passed into the hands of the Santa Fe Southern,
which dreamed of a line to the Pecos River; and in 1908 was
acquired by the D&RG. The Rio Grande in 1882 built a line
from Antonito to Durango, Colorado, so close to the New
Mexican border that it twice slipped over for a few miles.
Another railroad which displayed renewed activity was
the Atlantic and Pacific. When it was reorganized as the St.
Louis and San Francisco; the so-called Frisco, the new company retained the old charter but iacked sufficient financial
strength to complete the original project. In 1880 it became
equal partners with the Santa Fe to build at once a line from
the Pacific Ocean across northern New Mexico and Arizona
on the 35th parallelto Isleta, just south of Albuquerque. Officially the trackage was to be known as the Atlantic and
Pacific Railroad Western Division. A Central Division was
planned from Albuquerque to Vinita, Indian Territory, but
was never built. Meanwhile, but not for over 30 years at the
most, the Santa Fe would handle-all Western Divisio:q traffic
from Albuquerque to Wichita, Kansas; east of Wichita the
Frisco would haul the St. Louis cars and the Santa Fe would
carry the Chicago business. If at first the earnings of the
completed line to the coast were not enough to pay the interest
on the first mortgage bonds, the Frisco and the Santa Fe
would each contribute toward the deficit as much as 25 % of
their gross earnings on their traffic interchanged with the
A&P Western Division.
.
Work began with a careful series of surveys retracing
what others had done before. The workers had no actual
trouble with the Navaho Indians, but their presence caused
enough apprehension that they were placated with considerable handouts of food. Another problem was water, at times
.in such short supply that the allotment for all' purposes was
16.

344 ICC 60 ; Brayer, loco cit., 663.
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a pint a day a man. An important result of the surveys was
the decision to strike west from the Santa Fe main line at
Isleta rather than Albuquerque because the engineering problems there were fewer. The route was approximately that
prescribed in the map of definite location, filed with the federal government in 1872. The rail laid was mostly 52 lb. steel
on the main line and iron on the sidings. One problem was
where to put bridges, for while some streams were stabilized,
others, changed their course from time to time quite disconcertingly. Another difficulty was flash floods; only gradually did the .railway learn that' what was a dry creek bed
today might tomorrow be a raging torrent. By February 1881
the line had reached Wingate, 150 miles from Albuquerque.
Construction was generally by adjacent segments steadily
moving westward, but there were two exceptions. At the very
first the A&P rushed supplies and men by wagon 180 wiles
west of Albuquerque to hold Querino Canyon against any
possible rival and to lay 21j2 miles of track. Anticipating another difficult task, the company carted supplies in advance
to Canyon Diablo. The bridge there was 56 feet long, stood
225 feet above the canyon bed, cost $250,000, and took
15' months to finish; regular construction work did not
reach the chasm until two months before completion of --,
the structure. On August 3, 1883, the line was pushed through
to Needles, California.
The A&P intended to continue building farther west, but
for the moment could not. It interpreted its federal charter
to authorize construction through to the Pacific Coast, touching at Ventura and then going northward to San Francisco.
This view was sanctioned by the Department of the Interior
when it accepted in 1872 the map of definite location and
withdrew from entry by others the entire area of the com.pany's land grant. But there was also a clause in the federal
act authorizing the Southern Pacific Railroad, building from
San Francisco, to connect with the A&P at or near the California border. To forestall the Atlantic and Pacific west of
Needles, Huntington made common cause for the moment
with slippery Jay Gould of the Texas and Pacific. They gradually accumulated stock of the Frisco until by 1882 they
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dominated it and thus had equal control with the Santa Fe
over the destinies of the A&P. They forced the AT&SF to
yield,.to accept (the California boundary as the terminal of
. the We-stern Division and to agree to a through traffic ar- .
rangement with the Southern Pacific; which hastily flung
down a branch from Mojitve to Needles. They even compelled
the A&P to pay all the cost of bridging the Colorado River
when they successfully insisted _the meeting point be Needles
rather than Topock. The first structure there was not too
strong and was swept away by a flood in 1884; everything
was ferried over by flatboats until a permanent bridge could
be built. Then through sleeping car service was established
between Kansas City and San Francisco, but still coach passengers and all freight had to be transferred from the cars
of one company to those of the other at Needles.
The Atlantic and Pacific was' open, b!1t it secured very
little through or local business. The few California shippers
who insisted upon specifying -an A&P routing found that on
the SP their shipments mysteriously bogged down ina series
of allegedly inexplicable delays. In New Mexico and Arizona,
development was just beginning and only gradually would
any appreciable amount of traffic arise locally. For the situation to continue as it was, seemed to portend a loss of at least
a million dollars annually for a number of years. To abandon
the whole venture would also be very expensive .and would
kill a long-held objective of transcontinental service to California. The only other alternative was to Duild parallel to
the Southern Pacific from Needles to Mojave. This the Santa
Fe so clearly resolved to do that the Huntington forces saw
no way to preventit, short of surrendering the disputed line
to the A&P.1f they refused, they would be left with trackage
valuable only as salvage.
Southern Pacific officials had little choice but to dispose
of their Needles-Mojave line, 242 miles at $30,000 a mile.
Although the agreement was signed in August 1884, the SP
would not complete the sale until it had paid off the mortgage
bonds for the line in 1905; meanwhile the Atlantic and Pacific
would lease the property for an annual rental of 6 % of the
purchase price. It promptly took possession. There was no
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further change until 1897, the year the Santa Fe purchased
the bankrupt Atlantic and Pacific. At that time the AT&SF
and the SP arranged a trade. The Santa Fe abandoned its
lease from Deming to 'Benson and surrendered the line from
Benson to Guaymas. its Mexican extension could most logically be operated as part of the Huntington system. The
Southern Pacific in return cancelled the lease on its NeedlesMojave segment and transferred the ownership. Both lines
were in deplorable repair and the mileage was about comparable, but the AT&SF paid the SP the slight difference in
appraised value ($156,750). Although the swap was completed in 1897, mortgage fo~malities prevented official exchange of title until 1911. Subsequent developments made the
Needles-Mojave railroad a much more valuaole property than
the Mexican extension.
With the original 1884 agreement signaling the defeat of
their_ monopolistic plans, Huntington and Gould sold their
Frisco stock. The Southern Pacific agreed to handle A&P
traffic through from Mojave to San Francisco, but in actual
faCt it so continued its obstructionist tactics that as late as
1889 the A&P had very little business with SP points. The
Atlantic and Pacific had the right to solicit traffic in the Bay
area, but only in return for a promise not to build any terminal facilities there...
To provide the necessary feeder lines for the IsletaMojave main track, the Santa Fe had to take action,17 Capitalists who controlled the AT&SF launched the California
Southern Railroad from National City and San Diego through
Fallbrook and Perris to San Bernardino. Aided by donations
of 16,000 acres of land and two milesof San Diego waterfront,
the line was completed in September 1883. Unfortunately it
was not built high enough in Temecula Canyon to avoid
very serious damage from floods the next spring and extensive repairs were necessary. As early as 1881 surveying and
a little o'ther work was done on the route from San Bernardino over Cajon Pass to Barstow on the Needles-Mojave main
17. R. V. Dodge', and R. P. Middlebrook, "The California Southern Railroad," Railway and Locomotive Historical Society Bulletin, no. 80 (1950), 10-46; Franklyn Hoyt,
"San Diego's First Railroad: The California Southern," Pacific Historical Review, XXIII
(1954),133-146; Daggett, Southern Pacific, 317-346.
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line. The task was not resumed until 1885 and the railroad'
was finished in November. By 1887 the line from San Bernardino through Pasadena to Los Angeles was completed.
With southern California connected to the Atlantic and
Pacific, the Santa Fe turned to the northern part of the State.
There the San Francisco Stockton and San Joaquin Valley
Railroad had been begun in 1896 and completed in 1898 from
Bakersfield to Stockton. It had been built as an independent
to offset the extortionate monopolistic rate practices of the
Southern Pacific. The Santa Fe purchased the SFS&SJV in
1898 and, to avoid parallel construction, secured running
rights over the Southern Pacific from Mojave to Bakersfield.
At first service from Stockton to San Francisco was by
steamer, but in 1900 the AT&SF finished laying its rails into
the Bay area.
.
The gradual accumulation of satisfactory California connections eased somewhat the financial problem of the Atlantic
and Pacific. How serious these difficulties were is shown by
the figures: from November 1, 1883, to' June 30, 1897, it
earned a gross income of $7,564,764.76, but costs resulted in
a net deficit of $13,890,275.65. 18 Economies were necessary;
thus in 1886 the Santa Fe itself took charge of the A&P's
operating department. The next spring the Arizona JournalMiner at Prescott published criticism of the company's "almost criminal neglect" to make badly needed repairs on its
roadway, to employ enough trackwalkers, to detect burning
bridges and to repair engines damaged in accidents. It declared the railroad was using the few serviceable locomotives
to concentrate on through traffic at the expense of very bad
service to the local. Two months later the paper complimented
the A&P on the great improvement made, with large crews
at work and great piles of ties being laid. Now trains were
on time and there were no accide:nts,19
The money problems of the A&P were one of many factors contributing to the fiscal difficulties of the Santa Fe itself.
18.

127 ICC 547.

Arizona Journal-Miner, May 5, May 9 and July 8, 1887. Occasional difficulties
were inevitable. In October 1890, for example, a "train ran into a herd of cattle last
Monday three miles' west of Ash Fork and derailed the passenger train. Eight persons
were more or less injured but none seriously." (Arizona Champion, November 1, 1890).
19.
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In 1889 the' AT&SF went through a voluntary financial reorganization ~hich raised its total indebtedness but lowered
the fixed amount. it must payout each year. Overconfidently
the next year it purchased the Frisco and the Colorado Midland Railroads. This expansion poorly prepared the company
for the Panic of 1893. In December it went bankrupt and
soon the Frisco, Colorado Midland and Atlantic and Pacific
followed. When the plans for reorganization prompted careful investigation of the Santa Fe's affairs, it was discovered
that in the most recent four years its earnings had been
overstated by $7,644,451. 20 Its money had not been stolen,
but its management had scandalously misrepresented financial realities in a deliberate attempt ·to rp.ake things seem
better than they were. When fiscal reorganization was completed in December 1895, the Santa Fe emerged from bankruptcy with its title changed from "railroad" to "railway"
and with a new, honorable president, E. P. Ripley, in charge.
The .revitalized AT&SF 'pondered what to do with its
subsidiaries. It cast loose the Frisco and the Colorado Midland but retained the Atlantic and Pacific. It was determined
to remain a transcontinental carrier, to profit by the A&P's
excellent location, to benefit by the California Southern and
to capitalize on the burgeoning commercial and industrial
development in California. Its plans met opposition from a
group of A&P bondholders, who charged the Santa Fe with
responsibility for their company's bankruptcy and demanded
separation of the two concerns. They had some justification,
for "Santa Fe officials admitted that the western line was
entitled to a more equitable division on through traffic receipts which would improve earnings."21 When theAT&SF
emerged from bankruptcy, the A&P remained in fiscal difficulties and a new receiver, more pleasing to the aggrieved
group, was appointed. Fiscal negotiations between the two
companies continued, aided by a three-man board of arbitration. The final result was that in the summer of 1896 the
A&P's income from through traffic was increased from $15,000 monthly to $20,000, and the Santa Fe paid half of the
20. Water.s. op. cit., 210.
21.

Ibid., 339.
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$36,000 monthly rent on the Mojave.,Needles line. In May
1897 the AT&SF purchased from the bondholders the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Western Division.
Completion in the early 1880's of the Atlantic and Pacific
to the north and the Southern Pacific to the south led to much
talk of branch lines in New Mexico and Arizona: One of the
first of these ventures was to tie the capital city of Prescott to
the A&P at Ash Fork or Seligman.22 It began with Territorial
Governor F. A. Trittle, who unsuccessfully urged his boyhood friend A&P President H. C. Nutt to·build the branch.
Disgusted, the governor in 1884 applied to the legislature for
a charter fo'r the Central Arizona Railroad to build from
the A&P through Prescott to Phoenix. He roused the Souther~ Pacific, which did not fancy sharing the Phoenix traffic
.with anybody.. The draft ofthe proposed charter for Trittle's
road somehow disappeared. Its theft was charged to a legislator, but when tracked down,he was in a hospital where the
doctor declared he would die if disturbed. In actual fact he
had the draft under his pillow.' A substitute charter was
drawn up and passed, but it contained a; proviso that it must
be ratified at a referendum by county taxpayers. By one device or another the voting was delayed for four years until
the original company vanished.
In 1885 two groups of capitalists showed interest in a line
from Seligman to Pre::;cott. A Minnesota group organized the
narrow gauge Arizona Central and a New York group headed
by T. S. Bullock established a new standard gauge project
with an old name, the Central Arizona. The former was to
have a capital of $3,300,000 and the latter $1,875,000. 'Much
bitterness arose as each made surveys which zigzagged over
the other's' proposed line. Each met strong opposition from
ranchers using the federal grazing lands free, who feared the
'coming of the railroads would encourage interlopers and
prospectors. Bullock's line won the support of the A&P and
a promise' of reduced rates for building supplies. The two
companies decided union was better than rivalry and merged
in July 1885 to form the Prescott and Arizona Central Railroad. Encouragement was offered in the form of a cOUlity
22. Ibid., 348-351 ; Marshall, oP. cit., 262-266.
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bond subsidy of $291,000. Opposition continued from the
stockmen who drove cattle across the grade, pulled up sur-:veyor's stakes, burned ties, hijacked rails and fired volleys of
shots around work camps. The P&AC was constructed with
second hand rails, few ties, weak bridges, frequent curves
and an absolute minimum of excavations and fills. When the
first train ran .the 73 miles from Prescott Jet. (Seligman) to
Prescott on January 2,1887, it was powered by a locomotive
borrowed from the A&P because vandals had damaged extensively the P&AC's two engines. Opposition continued to
the line and President Bullock because the service was. so
poor and the rates were so high that the charge of 10¢ a mile
for passengers was typical.
Another railroad, rival for a time to the original Central
Arizona project, was the Arizona Mineral Belt. By 1884 it
had completed surveys from both Winslow and Flagstaff to
Globe, but the latter was mqre often talked of as the
northern terminal. By 1890, 35 miles out of Flagstaff were
in operation, but only as a logging' railroad; nothing further
developed. 23
,.The need for a north-south line to link the two transcontinental railroads continued. 24 The governor of Arizona
thought a federal or county subsidy should be granted for it.
He argued that since through rates were so high that the
Territory could export only minerals, such a local road would
place the two big companies in competition. It would enable
the north to exchange lumber, coal, minerals and livestock
with the sout~ for hay, barley and flour. It would eliminate
such contrasts as hay bringing $5 or $6 a ton in the Salt River
Valley, but $20 to $40 a ton only 100 miles to the north. So
anxious w~s the legislature of Arizona for railroad development that in 1891 it granted tax exemption for 20 years to
any such new enterprise. The company had to file notice of
intent within six months of the passage of the law and actually begin construction within another six months. It had to
build at least 50 miles a year, and no mere shift in theroadbed
of a raiiway already operating would satisfy the law. The
23.
24.

Annual Report of the Governor of Arizona for 1884, 528; for 1890, 470.
Ibid. for 1889, 254; for 1890, 470; for 1891, 289.
.
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new venture would not earn its tax exemption until the entire
contemplated line was finished, had been accepted as satisfactory by county authorities and was maintaining operation
of at least one train a day each way for passengers and
freight. .
'
Partly because of this law the Santa Fe Prescott and
Phoenix Railway Company was incorporated in 1891. Its
president was D. B. Robinson, generalmanager 'of the A&P,
but.the enterprise was particularly the brainchild of its secretary, Frank M. Murphy, a wealthy mining man. It began construction at Ash Fork in August 1892 and encountered its
only delay at Iron Springs, where graders, who had uncovered some gold, prospected 'until convinced nothing
further was to 'be found. The railroad entered Prescott on
April 24, 1893; three months later it had driven the Prescott
and Arizona Central out of business. The SFP&P intended to
press south energetically, but the Panic of 1893 almost
wrecked the company. It was saved only by wealthy Murphy's
excellent local reputation and by the Prescott National Bank.
To the south it encountered difficult terrain, which in some
mountain areas ran the construction cost up as high as $40,000 per mile. The line was so winding that the railroad
quickly earned and still has the nickname of the "Pea Vine."
It encountered ~ome difficulty about a right-of-way into
Phoenix, which it reached in March 1895, but solved the problem by having its men start laying track at midnight into the
city.
The SFP&P contemplated further expansion. Its plans
for a line to Florence, Tucson and Nogales were not realized
nor was the dream of one to Utah. It did organize a subsidiary, the Prescott and Eastern, which built a 31-mile
branch from 6 miles north of' Prescott to the mining region
at Mayer. The SFP&P was only a mild success financially,
always earning its interest charges but never by a wide margin. It steadily increased the amount of traffic interchanged
with the Santa Fe. Gradually the AT&SF became so financially interested in the feeder line that in 1901 it took over
ownership.
An earlier but far less successful independent line was
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the Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad Company.25 Incorporated in 1882, it planned to l:iuild from Tucson northeastward
to Globe. Its subsidy from Pima County was authorized next
year by the Territorial legislature. Upon demand the County
was to exchange $50,000 of its own bonds for an equal amount
of railroad bonds; as each five mile section was actually built,
there was to be a further $50,000 swap. Almost immediately
the first trade was made, by what kind of clandestine transaction probably will never be known. Certain it is that the
stockholders never paid anything for the stock they' owned
and the County received nothing on the bonds issu~d by the
railroad. Local enthusiasm ebbed sharply, then mounted
again when the narrow gauge promoters returned to Tucson.
They laid 5 miles of railroad and secured their second $50,000
in bonds. Shortly Congress in 1886 passed a law forbidding
any Territory or its political subdivision from granting credit
or borrowing money to help any private enterprise. Either in
ignorance or defiance, Pima County flouted the law. It surrendered a third $50,000 worth of bonds whEm the railroad
completed an additional 5 miles. Soon it became clear that 10
miles of line reaching no settlement but simply stopping at
the Pima County boundary was worthless. Service was operated for a very short time, but in 1894 the engine was sold
and sometime in the 1890's the rails were removed.
The line had disappeared but the promoter's primary
interest, the county bonds, remained; much controversy arose
over them. They were illegal and void, ruled the United States
Supreme Court in 1894. This decision roused Frank M.
-Murphy of the SFP&P, who wanted to be sure Yavapai
County's Bonds for the Prescott and Arizona Central would
be paid off.' He secureq through his brother N. O. Murphy,
Territorial member of Congress, a law protecting "innocent
bondholders" and maintaining that debts authorized by the
Territorial legislature were valid. To this Pima County objected, but in 1899 and again in 1902 the United States Supreme Court upheld the federal law. The debentures were
converted in 1903 into Territorial bonds, but the County was
25. H. A. Hubbard, "A Chapter in Early Arizona Transportation History: The
Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad Company." University of Arizona Bulleti.... V (1934),
no. 3.
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still responsible for the indebtedness: It vainly sought to have
the federal government'assume the debt. It reluctantly levied
a tax to pay the interest when in 1907 the United States
Supreme Court so ordered. The County continued complaining and the debate became involved in the question of statehood. In 1910 Congress appropriated 3,000,000 acres each
to New Mexico and Arizona to payoff Territorial debts, including such bonds as those for Pima and Yavapai counties.
This has not yet been done, however, because ranchers have
leased rather than purchased the grazing land and the resulting revenue has little more than paid the interest.
Another ea~lyArizona project was a 35-mile track from
Phoenix to the Southern Pacific main line at Maricopa. For
this the Maricopa and Phoenix Railroad Company was organized by N. K. Masten and associates. Its franchise stated
that the last day it could begin construction was October 31,
1886; 'to meet the requirement chief engineer H. R. Patriek
began work that day with two horses, a garden plough and a
small scraper. Soon he secured additional equipment and he
completed the line on July 4, 1887 ~ The Maricopa and Phoenix
in 189,4 created a subsidiary, the Phoenix Tempe and Mesa
Railway, and the next year built from Tempe the 9 miles to
Mesa. In 1903 the Southern .Pacific secured ownership of
these two corporations and shbrtly merged them into the SP
system. 26
.'
The Gila Valley Globe and Northern Railroad, incorporated in 1894 to take advantage of a tax exemption, law;
began construction at Bowie, Arizona, and by the middle of
1896 had reached the border of the San Carlos Indian Reservation at Geronimo. To cross the red men's territory it had
to comply :with President Cleveland's order that all of the
Apache Indians must. give approval; at a meeting with the
chiefs in'October 1896 there was no unanimous opinion. Subsequently President McKinley changed the requirement to
majority consent. The railroad held a two day conference
with the Indians in February 1898, distributing freely gifts
of beef, flour, beans, lard, sugar, coffee and tobacco. When
the question finally came to a vote, it was a two hour process
26, Annual Report of the Governor Of Arizona for 1887, 754; for 1896, 249; "From
Trail to Rail," loc, cit., 12-13 (Nov.).
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but only one Apache opposed the concession. The company
paid the tribe $8,000 for the right-of-way, a minor sum for
property damages and promised to let all Indians ride free .
for 30 years. It resumed construction and in December 1898
reached Globe; two years later it pushed on to Miami. Business on the completed line was very small and was not remunerative enough to pay the indebtedness to the Southern
Pacific for material and equipment. In 1904 the larger company absorbed the smaller one. 27
To the north, copper magnate William A. Clark built in
1894 the United Verde and Pacific from Cedar Springs on the
SFP&P to his copper mines at Jerome. The Arizona and Utah
Railroad was organized in 1899 and that year built from McConnico, on the Santa Fe main· line near Kingman, to
Chloride, 23 miles, to serve a gold and silver mining district.
It laid a short extension to Whitehills in 1900, which was
discontinued by 1906, but only talked of a line to Utah. 28
Another possible destination was the Grand Canyon,
which began to attract visitors using stage coaches from
Flagstaff.2 9 To serve the tourists, and also the copper mine .
on the way at Anita, Lombard Goode and Company in 1897
organized the Santa Fe and Grand Canyon Railroad. It did
not actually begin construction north from Williams until
talk of a rival line from 'Kingman spurred it into action in
May 1899. The SF&GC purchased old 56 lb. rail from the
Santa Fe at $41.66 a ton, payable with its bonds at par, and
also secured rate concessions on construction material. It had
built 43 miles to Anita Jet. by the'time it went bankrupt in
September 1900, and during the process of reorganization
the remaining 20 miles were completed. In the new corporation, the Grand Canyon Railway Company, the Santa Fe
held half the common stock and all the preferred. It was
operated as an independent unit until 1924, when it was
leased to the AT&SF. Shortly after completion of the line
the Santa Fe invested over $250,000 in tourist facilities and
arranged for Fred Harvey to operate them. In its promotion
27. Ibid., 13-14 (Nov.).
28. 127 100 354; Annual Report of the Governor of Arizcma for 1894, 355; for
1899. 69-70.
29. Waters.
cit., 351-352; Marshall, op. cit., 272-274, 42()"421, 446.

op:

176

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

of passenger business the railroad placed great emphasis
upon the ·scenic wonders of the Grand Canyon, so convenient
to the main line for a stop-over. Not so publicized but equally
important to the company were the facts that it was the kind
of spot no careless visitor could mar and that, remote from
large centers of population, it insured a long passenger haul
over Santa Fe rails. There was no competition until the Union
Pacific began to develop a resort on the North Rim in the
1920's and long-distance automobile travel became popular.
The Arizona and New Mexico (an entirely separate venture from the Santa Fe's subsidiary the New Mexico and·
Ari~ona) was built mostly in 1883 by the Arizona Copper
Company from Clifton 70 miles to' tie in with the Southern
Pacific at Lordsburg. In 1902, it was converted from narrow
to standard gauge and was extended 40 miles to a connection
at Hachita with the newly-built main line of the EI Paso and
Southw~stern. When the Phelps Dodge interests took over
the Arizona Copper Company in 1919, they turned the railroad over to their own EP&SW. Another mineral line was
the Congress Gold Mine Railroad, built by local mine owners
in 1896 over the 3 miles from Congress Jet. on the SFP&P to .
Congress.
Some railways much discussed in Arizona actually never
graded a mile of track. 30 Such was the Arizona Northern
Railroad, planned in 1881 to be an extension of the Colorado
narrow gauge system. Another project was the Arizona and
Nevada Railroad' and Navigation Company, which would
operate ships from the Gulf of Mexico to Yuma and a rail
line on up the Colorado River to where the A&P crossed. The
next year there was talk of a standard gauge line from Tucson
to Port Lobos on the Gulf of Mexico, with reports of a
promised Mexican government subsidy of $9,000 a mile. In
1898 a company secured a charter to build from Kingman
through "a rich mineral region" to the Grand Canyon.
New Mexico too had lines projected which were never
constructed. 31 The Texas Galveston and Santa Fe Railroad
30, Annual Report of the Governor of Arizona for 1881, 916; for 1883, 511; for
1898,321.
31. Annual Report of the Governor of New Mexico for 1891, 349·350; for 1892, 367 ;
for 1899, 336; for 1900, 166.
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planned to run from Gaiveston to Santa Fe. The Mexican
Northern Pacific Railway wanted to build directly south from
Deming through a mining and lumber region 600 miles to
Bacoyna and then turn southwestward 400 miles to Topolobampo, with branches to Chihuahua, 150 miles, and to
Guaymas, 350 miles. The Denver. and EI Paso Independent
Railroad, a Colorado corporation, had surveys made from
Trinidad through Las Vegas and White Oaks to· EI Paso.
'Wi~h a route of 458 or 465 miles, it would pass through the
coal beds of the Maxwell grant and the timber of Mora and .
Lincoln counties. An overlapping venture was the railroad
projected from Trinidad 27. miles to Catskill in the Maxwell
grant, with branches up and down the Red River totaling 12
miles. There was talk too of a narrow gauge from Santa Fe
to Albuquerque. Another company made plans for a standard
gauge line from Durapgo to Bernalillo or Albuquerque. Still
. another in 1899 had a survey run from Las Vegas to Taos,
100 miles. There was vague talk of an enterprise to run from
Albany, Texas, through Las Vegas into the northwest and of
another venture from Durango to Gallup. At the turn of .the
century, some thought there were "substantial reasons for
believing" that the Denver and Rio Grande would build. south
from Durango to Farmington and then west to the coast, with
branches to Albuquerque and Gallup. Another possibility was
the 190-mile Black Range Railway, to go from Magdalena
to Chloride, where a heavy mineral traffic was expected to.
develop, arid on to Clifton. Also being .talked of was the'
Cochiti and Northwestern Railroad, from Thornton to Jemez
Hot Springs.
.
Though railroad construction was eage~ly sought, only
once did the New Mexico Territorial government itself extend aid. In 1893 it passed a l~w exempting any new liIie,
or extension of an old one; from taxes until six years. after
it was completed; work must start not later than February
1896. 32
A few of the contemplated lines were actually constructed.
The Denver Texas and Fort Worth, predecessor of the Colorado and Southern, built in 1888 from Trinidad through
32.

Ibid. for 1893. 363.
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northeast New Mexico to Texline. This 83-mile segment,
passing through' Des Moines, was part of a Denver to Ft.
Worth line which eventually fell under the domination of the
Burlington Route. 33 The Silver City and Northern Railroad,
a subsidiary of the ,Squthwestern Coal and Iron Company,
in 1891 laid rails the 19 miles from Whitewater to the mines,
at, Han<,>ver; eventually this became a branch of the Santa
Fe. 34 The Tierra Amarilla Southern Railroad was completed
by 1899 from Chama to Brazos, 17 miles. Whether this subsidiary of the Burns and Briggs Lumber Company was a
private road or a common carrier for all traffic is not clear. 35
A more important New Mexican venture was the Pecos
Valley Railroad. 36 It was launched by J. J. Hagerman, who
had held ,considerable stock in the Colorado Midland Railway
until he sold out In 1890 to the Santa Fe. That same year he
turned to the New Mexican line, part of an irrigation venture to develop the Pecos Valley: He built from Pecos on the
Texas and Pacific main line to Carlsbad (then called Eddy) ;
three 'years later he added an extension to Roswell. He
planned branches from Roswell to EI Paso arid to Las Vegas,
but never had the money for them. He could hardly scrape
together enough funds for the line from Roswell to Amarillo,
which he finally completed in 1898. Indeed he had to secure
ali advance of $750,000 from the Santa Fe. In the midst of
this project, in 1896, his line went into receivership and
stayed there for two years before emerging as the Pecos
Valley and Northwestern. This railroad the AT&SF'secured
in 1901 by acquiring 96% of the stock and two-thirds of the
bonds for $2,675,902; it then leased the property. The line
was not built as well as Santa Fe standards prescribed, but
having paid less than $10,000 a mile for it, the new owner
could well afford the considerable improvements promptly
begun.
The Amarillo-Clovis segment of the Pecos Valley line became part of the vital Belen cutoff, a project envisaged from
33. R, C. Overton, Gulf to Rockies: The Heritage of the Fort Worth and DenverColorado and Southern Railways, 1861-1898 (Austin. Texas, 1953). passim.
34. Annual Report of the Governor of New Merico for 1891, 350.
35. Ibid. for 1899, 334.
36. Waters, op. cit., 347-348; 127 ICC 603; Annual Report of the Governor of New
Merico for 1894, 410.
'

RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

179

the early days of the Santa: Fe to eliminate the rugged mountain climb in northeastern New Mexico. 37 At various times a
number of surveys for the cutoff were run, mostly north of
the location finally selected. Interest in the project languished,
but then again increased with the upturn in tdmscontinental
traffic. When the Pecos Valley line was purchased and competitors talked publicly of putting rival lines into the area,
President Ripley resolved to launch the route using a low
grade. In making further surveys most of the Santa Fe engineers concluded the extension should start westward from
Portales, but the chief engineer successfully insisted it must
be from Clovis. Grading began in 1902, but wa~ held in ~bey
ance for 1903-1904 because of business doldrums; track laying began in 1906 and the line was opened for through traffic
in 1908. It sliced off "a quarter of a mile straight up," for its
highest point was 1,110 feet lower than Raton tunnel, 'and its
maximum grade of 66 feet per mile contrasted very favorably
with 184.8 feet at Raton and 158.4 feet in the Glorieta Pass.
It was.so much more economical to operate than the old main
'line that ever since the great bulk of Santa Fe transcontinental freight traffic has used it.
In 1914 the AT&SF completed the last , segment. on its
railroad from Galveston to just east of Clovis, forming an
important through connection to the cutoff. It seriously considered, but never built, a major line from Raton to Clovis
to provide New Mexican 'coal with direct access to the Gulf
of Mexico. The Santa Fe built the following branch lines in
New Mexico: in 1882 from Dillon to Blossburg, 3 miles, and
from San Antonio to Carthage, 10 Il1iles; in 1884 from Silver
City to Deming, 47 miles; in 1885 from Socorro to Magdalena,
27 miles; in 1898 from San Jose to Santa Rita, 4 miles; and
in 18~9 from Hanover to Fierro, 7 miles. 38
The AT&SF had plans for a major undertaking in Arizona, a low-grade freight rOl;lte that wou}d avoid the two
high summits between Albuquerque and Needles. 39 Using the
existing Albuquerque-Deming line, it would then strike west
87.
38.
89.
Rail,"

Waters, op. cit .• 853-355.
Marshall, op. cit., 401-424.
Waters, op. cit., 141-142, 357-858; Marshall, op. cit., 267-268; "From Trail to
dit., 12-13 (Nov.).
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to Phoenix, a little to the north. of the SP main track, and
continue through Wickenburg to· the' Santa Fe's transcontinental rails at Cadiz. Going around the two sides of a triangle,
it. would be 200 miles longer but .the reduction in grades
promised operating economies. To construct it, the AT&SF
created in 1901 a subsidiary called the Phoenix and Eastern.
By September 1904 it pushed 96 miles east to Winkelman and
expected to continue on to EI Paso. It crashed into the forceful opposition of the new leader of the Southern Pacific,
Edward Harriman, who started to defend his territory from
invasion. He had the SP create in 1904 a subsidiary called
the Arizona Eastern to build from near Yuma through
Phoenix to Clifton, with branches to Jerome, Tucson and
Globe. His crews ran surveys which forecast trouble with the
Santa Fe in the courts and in the field. Evidence of it even
appeared in the bills, presented,by the contractor to the Harriman railroad, which contained as one of the enumerated
expenses the item "Defending the Right of Way." The
struggle reached a climax when Southern Pacific men, 'working a hundred feet higher in Gila Canyon, repeatedly blasted
large quantities of stone <;mto the lower Santa Fe crew.
Finally they were stormed by the men from below and there
was a real battle. The contestants went to law, where one
court orde~Gd the Southern Pacific out of the canyon and then
another allowed it to reenter when'it promised not to interfere any further with the Santa Fe; the promjse was' not
. kept. According to the final compromise, the Santa Fe was
to finish its line into Winkelman and the SP was t~ have the
right to build from Deming to Dudleyville. In March 1907 the
AT&SF surrendered its dream of the low-'grade freight line
by selling the Phoenix-Winkelman trackage to its enemy.
Meanwhile it had already launched construction westward
from Wickenburg in March 1904 by the action of its subsidiary the Arizona and California Railroad. The prospects for
heavy ore shipments were in themselves sufficient justification for the line. The company encountered difficulties in
securing laborers willing to work under the scorching sun,
in bridging the Colorado River' at Parker and in financing
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during the Panic of 1907; but it completed the line through
to Cadiz in 1910.
The Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific long dominated
New Mexico and Arizona, but unexpectedly a rival arose:
The 'EI Paso and Southwestern. 4o It was a part of the copper
mining ventures of the Phelps Dodge interests, operating as
a formality under its own name but for all practical purposes
identical with the Phelps Dodge group and expanding only as
the needs of the copper industry dictated. Initially the mining
firm entered the railroad business without intending to
begin' any widespread operations. It simply was trying to
solve the problem of wagon transportation from the SP at
Benson 65 'miles to its mine at Bisbee. Attempting to persuade
the Santa Fe to build through Bisbee at the time of the
Guaymas extension, the firm's representative met "with supreme indifference" from the AT&SF president and subsequently learned how the railroad leased from the SP rather
than undertake parallel construction. The Santa Fe did, however, build from Benson to Nogales through Fairbank, a
point closer to Bisbee than any on ,the Southern .Pacific. It
received the regular patronage of Phelps Dodge, which tried
wagons and a steam highway engine for the haul to the railhead without very sa'tisfactory results. The miners then incorporated the Arizona and Southeastern to build the 30 miles
from Bisbee to Fairbank and completed this ,line in 1899 at
it cost of $40'0,000, about twice the original estimate. it
handled a larger volume of freight daily than could the wagon
trains and cut expenses five-sixths. Several, years later the
Phelps Dodge interests got into a squabble with the Santa Fe
over rates on lumber from the northwest. Aggrieved at the
out~ome, the miners extended their line to a direct connection
with the Southern Pacific at Benson.
, Another Phelps Dodge venture, at first quite independent
from the Arizona and Southeastern, was the narrow gauge
Morenci Southern Railroad. It ran 19 miles from the mines
40. R. G. Cleland, A History of Phelps Dodge (New York, 1952), 138-150,213-214;
Willson and Taylor, op. cit., 81 ; Railway Age. LXXIV (1923), 823 and LXXVII (1924),
611; 70 ICC 795; 86 ICC 122; 90 ICC 732; Annual Report of the Governor of Arizona
for 1900, 82.
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at Morenci to the Arizona and New'Mexico tracks at Guthrie.
This was a difficult line to construct, with four complete loops
·and grades up to 4 %. When veteran railroad financier Arthur
Curtiss James inspected it, he wrote to his Phelps Dodge
~
associates:
I do not wonder at all at its cost. It is by far the most difficult
piece of railroad building I have ever seen. The Marshall Pass,
the St. Gothard, and the Great Northern switchback, are all
easy compared with it. It winds back and forth up the side of
the mountain" through looped tunnels and over immense
trestles, twisting and turning upon itself in a most wonderful
but immensely costly way.41
.

About 1920 it was converted to standard gauge and the junction changed from Guthrie to Clifton.
A third Phelps Dodge railroad materialized when the
company began to develop a mine in Sonora and erected a
smelter north of the border at Douglas. To connect the two
it built under Mexican charter the 77-mile Nacozari Railroad.
It also extended the Arizona and Southeastern to Douglas;'
this provided a connection to the SoutHern Pacific at Benson
but no longer to the Santa Fe, which had by this time traded
off the line west of· Deming.
The Benson interchange .proved unsatisfactory as huge
. shipments from copper mines of other companies began to
roll into the Phelps Dodge smelter. To improve the situation
the Southern Pacific was urged to build a spur from Lordsburg, or some other point far east of Benson, to Douglas. The
affairs of the SP at this moment were iIi such an upset state
because of the recent deathof Huntington that nothing could
be undertaken. The Phelps Dodge group decided to solve its
difficulties by building its own line from Douglas, not to
Lordsburg but 215 miles toEl Paso. It organized the EI Paso
and Southwestern Railroad, merging into it the Ariz'ona and
Southeastern and appending as a Mexican subsidiary the
Nacozari. This activity convinced the Southern Pacific it had
made· a dangerous mistake, which it sought to correct by
making a variety of propoE\als to the mining firm. All were
41.

Cleland, op. cit., 143.
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considered, such as the suggestion of a joint trackage agreement, but none were accepted. With conciliation failing, the
SP turned to warfare.· It cancelled all joint tariffs for
handling traffic at through rates with the Phelps Dodge railroads and imposed a high local rate of 14¢ a ton-mile for all
material needed on the construction project. It met quick
retaliation when the EP&SW enlarged its plans to include
a branch from Hermanas to Deming, 32 miles away, the
most convenient point for a connection with the Santa Fe.
The SP tried to block the venture by p:reventing the EP&SW
forces from laying tracks across its main line at Deming.to
the desired interchange with the Santa Fe. After carefully
organizing his men, Phelps Dodge construction engineer
Darbyshire suddenly rushed his rails over the crossing before
the SPcould mobilize enough men to prevent it. Immediately
he hurried through the crosso~er 500 carloads of construction equipment and material.
Defeated at Deming, the Southern Pacific fought at El
Paso to prevent the entry of the EP&SW. A court injunction
was secured forbidding the Phelps Dodge road from utilizing
the route it had planned into the city. The newcomers selected
and used another· one, less desirable than the first because
it cost $1,500,000 more. to build. On June 20, 1903, the
EP&SW was officially completed. Meanwhile the Southern
Pacific had come under the control of the astute Edward
Harriman, who was eager for peace with Phelps Dodge because it was one of the most valuable sources of freight in
Arizona. T'he miners set the price of friendship at $1,500,000,
the extra expense at El Paso; the SP paid it and thereafter
received a fair share of Phelps Dodge traffic. Quic}dy another
difficulty developed for the miners' railroad - the grades
carrying the main line directly into Bisbee proved too heavy
for economical use. The trackage was relocated in 1903-1904,
38 miles of new line replacing 33 miles abandoned, so that it
passed 8 miles south of Bisbee; a branch was' built into the
city. The EP&SW coristructed other branches also: Fairbank
to Tombstone, 9 miles, in 1903; Douglas to Courtland, 36.
miles,. in 1909; and Lewis Springs to Fort Huachuca, 13
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miles, in 1913. Through a subsidiary named the Burro Mountain Railroad, it partly lea~ed and partly built new a line
from Deming to Tyrone, 48 miles, in 1914.
Another railroad project which had already been much
discussed at El Paso was a connection northeastward toward
Kansas City.42 As early as 1889 the Kansas City El Paso and
Mexican Railroad was organized to' build from El Paso
through Texas and Indian Territory into Kansas; its plans
were never realized. More promising was the Chicago Rock
Island and Pacific"In 1888 it started from its Kansas CityDallas ~ine at Herington, Kansas, and built southwest through
Hutchinson and Pratt to Liberal; its ultimate objective was
somewhere nearer El Paso. The Rock Island took no further
action until its stockholders in 1901 approved an increase in
its capital stock for, among other things, an extension into
New Mexico. To connect with it from the south was the El
Paso and Northeastern. This railroad had completed in 18~9
a line from EI. Paso northeast to Carrizozo, 144 miles, and
then 21 miles directly east, over a switchback in the mountains, to the coalfields at Capitan. It was' a subsidiary of the
New Mexico Railway and Coal Company in which Charles
B. Eddy was the leading figure. When the Rock-Island .began
its extension, the EP&NE, creating as Ii _.subsidiary theEl
Paso and Rock Island, built from Carrizozo 128 mile's to 'a
junction with the Rock Island at Santa Rosa. The EP&NE .
had more difficult grades to contend with'on its extension
than did the Rock Island'and, even more serious, had a very
difficult time developing an adequate water supply. The two
roads met at Santa Rosa in 1902.
The El Paso and' Northeastern promptly constructed a
branch from Tucumcari, 60 miles east of Santa Rosa, to the
coal fields at Dawson. It talked of a line to Trinidad, but
never built it. It secured control of the Alamogordo and Sacramento Mountains Railway, completed in 1899 from the
large saw mill at Alamogordo to the timber region at Cloud42. w. E. Hayes, Iron Road to Empire: The History of 100 Years of the Progress
and Achievements of the Rock Island Lines (New York, 1952), 119-120, 151, 159, 164,
171; Daggett. Railway Reorganization, 319, 327; ,4nnual Report of the Governor of New
Mexico for 1889, 456; for 1898, 650; for 1900, 166; for 1901, 149-150; for 1902, 143-144;
for 1903, 361; for 1906, 91; Annual Report of the Governor of Arizona for 1900, 82; for
1901, 107-108.
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croft with 26 miles of standard gauge main line, grades as
steep as 5.2 % and curves as sharp as 3'0 degrees. Out from
Cloudcroft there were 9 miles of. narrow gauge branches up
the canyons of the Sacramento Mountains. The Rock Island
was also expanding; in 1903 it extended its MemphisAmarillo line through to Tucumcari and provided through
service from the Mississippi River to the EP&NE.
The El Paso and Northeastern was in ~'uch poor shape
financially that shortly a sale, was forced. It fell into the
hands of Phelps Dodge, who owned the coal fields at Dawson
and wished to control the carrier going toward it's Douglas
smelter. It promptly changed the junction point with the
Rock Island from Santa Rosa east to Tucumcari, where the
Dawson bran~h diverged. It merged the EP&NE into the El
Paso and Southwestern.. Much of the new acquisition had to
be rebuilt because, as financier James wrote in 1905, "When
we took over the management, the ties were hanging over
the banks and the rails were all out of shape."43
In 1911-1912 Phelps Dodge built a western extension 65
miles from Fairbank to Tucson. Starting with a 30-mile spur,
the needs of its copper business and the attitude at times of
other carriers had forced it to create an international railroad system, in 1911 containing 1,217 miles of total route.
The final expansion of the EP&SW came when Phelps Dodge
in 1921 purchased the Arizona Copper Company and its subsidiary, the Arizona and New Mexico Railroad. Though the
chief traffic of the consolidated railroad was the products of
rhines, it hauled a variety of commodities.' In 1923" for ex- '
ample, 15 % of its tonnage came from products of agriculture;
chief among these were California fruits ftnd vegetables
carried through from the Southern Pacific connection at
Tucson to the junction with the Rock Island at Tucumcari.
A California extension of the El Paso and Southwestern
in 1923 was a distinct possibility. Certain'individuals closely
connected with Phelps Dodge bought land in Phoenix and
Los Angeles which would make excellent terminal facilities.
Their activities alarmed the Southern Pacific, which began
considering the merits of buying the EP&SW. By its line to
,43. Cleland, op. cit., 149.
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Tucumcari the smaller company furnished much faster service from southern California to Kansa~ and Illinois than did
any other SP connection. Between EI Paso and Tucson, there
were attractive possibilities of securing a better balance of
traffic. The SP had an excess of 90,362,000 gross-ton miles
eastbound and the EP&SW an overage of 70,335,000 westbound, making a total of 160,697,000; if the two were merged,
this would be reduced to 20,027,000 and the annual savings
in train operating costs would be $662,000. General economies in operation and administration would amount to $1,487,860 a year more. If the SP remained separate, it would
soon have to double-track its line east of Tucson to carry the
traffic; if it merged, instead of double-tracking it could use
the EP&SW as a second main line. This would save maintenance and amortization of building costs totaling annually
$1,954,100. In all, consolidation would save $3,439,950, the
Southern Pacific figured.
' .
It arranged the merger; it secured the approval oi-the
Interstate Commerce Commission; for there was little, if
any, opposition, and on October 31, 1924, assumed control
of the property. For the EI Paso and Southwestern system,
including the Nacozari Railroad, the Southern Pacific paid
Phelps Dodge nearly $64,000,000 in stock, bonds and cash. 44
In 1926 the SP placed Phoehixori the main stem, rather than
at the end of a stub from Maricopa; partly by construction
~nd partly by using existing trackage it 'created a'loop from
Picacho, 46 miles northwest of Tucson, to Welton, 37 miles
east of Yuma. The new route, when combined with the'former
EP&SW, gave the Southern Pacific a second main line from
EI Paso to within 37 miles of Yuma, except for 46 miles of
joint, single track northwest of Tucson.
'
A New Mexico railroad venture on a much smaller scale
ran from Santa Fe, crossed the Belen cutoff at Willard and
44. One of the leaders in Phelps Dodge, Arthur Curtiss James, aIso held much stock
in the Western Pacific. When in the late 1920's it aunounced plans to throw a long
branch down California's San Joaquin Valley and another northward to connect with
the Great Northern for a through line into Portland, there were some who thought James
was again using the scare technique, so effective with the EP&SW, to force the Southern
Pacific to buy its competitor. If so, the plan failed. The Western Pacific actually did
build the northern extension, but not the southern.
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made connections with the EP&SW at Torrance, 116 miles,45
There were dreams of a connecting link from Moriarity to
Albuquerque, but only 8 miles of the 45 were ever built, as
well as extensions to EI Paso, to Roswell and to the mines at
San Pedro. The venture was incorporated in 1900 as the
Santa Fe Central, with a subsidiary called the Albuquerque
Eastern. It was actually built by a construction company and
opened for business in 1903. No great volume of local traffic
developed and the line never handled much through business
,except some Colorado-EI Paso cars during the federal control
of the First World War. Financial difficulties were long continued. A fiscal reorganization in 1908 put the track under
the control of a new company, the New Mexico Central Railroad, which went bankrupt in 1910 and finally left the hands
of the receiver in 1918 with its corporate title changed from
"railroad" to "railway." None of these three companies ever
paid any dividends or interest on their bonded indebtedness.
Most years there were deficits: for example, $77,779.11 in
1924 and $78,856.89 in 1925.
In 1926 the Santa Fe purchased the NeiW Mexico Central.
It believed the ownership by such a large company would
pI:oduce some economies. It thought to increase traffic by such
devices as sending 8 or 10 carloads of coal daily over the line
to its Pecos Division at a savings of 90 miles over the previous
routing. Two years later the AT&SF was ready to chop off
some of its purchase. It discarded the 22-mile line direct from
Santa Fe to Kennedy, as it could send cars via Lamy, 27 miles.
It cut the route from Willard to a connection with the
Southern Pacific 36 miles away at Torrance for three
reasons: the average annual tonnage over the segment from
1922 through 1926 was only 9,477 tons; the local timber
traffic had never developed as anticipated; and the track was
in very poor condition. In approving these abandonments,
the Interstate Corrimerce Commission made a gesture toward
maintaining competitionby authorizing the Southern -Pacific
to make sO:rne kind of arrangement for through service over
45. 106 ICC 435; III ICC 468'; 145 ICC 241; Annual Repart of the Governor of
New Mexico for 1904, 449; Marshall, op. cit.• 436-438.
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the entire Torrance-Santa' Fe line, but the SP was not
interested.
,
The St. Louis Rocky Mountain and Pacific was incorporated in 1905.46 In the next two years it built 105 miles of
line, the main one from Des Moines to Ute Park and the
branches from Clifton House to Raton and Koehler Jet. to
Koehler.' Reportedly this railroad caused a "remarkable development" in the coal fields of Colfax County. The company's
stock was all bought in 1915 by the AT&SF, which two years
later leased the line and absorbed operations into its main
system. In the same general area another independent railroad arose, the Santa Fe Raton and Eastern. 47 To service coal
mines and an ice-produci'ng lake, it builtIn 1905 about 9
miles of track from Raton to Carisbrooke, Yankee and
Sugarite. It talked of an extension to Woodward, Oklahoma,
but never accomplished it. The financier of the line was E. D.
Shephard and Co. of New York City, who owned one of the _
coal mines served. Eventually all of Shephard's New Mexico
operations went bankrupt and were purchased in 1924 by a
coal mining subsidiary ofthe Santa Fe. TheSFR&E was then
turned over to the parent company.
The AT&SF was also expanding in Arizona. 48 It built in
'1902-1904, through a subs'idiarynamed the Bradshaw Mountain Railway, from Mayer to Crown King-, 29 iniles. The last
13 miles, -Middleton to Crown King" was speculative as the
mining area had once been quite 'active ; indeed one mine between 1870 and 1896 paid $600,000 in dividends, but at the
time of construction only the dumps were qeing wor,ked.The
line crossed deep canyons on 19 wooden trestles, climbed
grades as steep as 3.5 % and wound around on 9 switchbacks,
on which the maximum train was one engine and five cars.
The expected mineral revival never came and, probably the
13 miles had been a mistake from the start. It was abandoned
in 1926. The Santa Fe in 1905 purchased the bankrupt Ari~ona and Utah Railroad, running from McConnico to Chlo46. 127 ICC 104, 340; Annual Report of the Governor of New Mexico for 1907,
593 ; Marshall. op. cit.; 432-435.
.
47. 86 ICC 409,; 108 ICC 221; Annual Report of ,the Governor of New Mexico for
1907,594; Marshall, -op. cit., 436-437.
48. 105 ICC 605; 108 ICC 712 ; 127 ICC 350, 354.
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ride. Another AT&SF venture was a 38-mile branch from
Cedar Glen on, the "Pea Vine", to Clarkdale. Built in 19111913 under the charter of the Verde Valley Railway, the line
cost $1,329,983.24 to construct. $1,300,000 of this was advanced by the United Verde Copper Company and was repaid" with interest at 4%, on the basis of a certain amount
for each ton of freight hauled over the line. At this time the,
copper company abandoned its own United Verde and Pacific.
In partial replacement it built the Verde Tunnel and Smelter
Railroad over 4 % grades from the Santa Fe branch at Clarkdale-n miles to Jerome. The VT&S was abandoned in 1953,
but the AT&SF spur is still operated.
The Santa Fe secured authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1927 to build its branch from Beardsley, Arizona, to Litchfield; in 1938 for a 6-mile line from
Ennis; and in 1939 for a 10-mile spur from Loving, New
Mexico. The first two served maturing farm areas and the
other a potash deposit. 49 Four New Mexico branch~s which
the AT&SF contemplated, but never built, were a 13-mile
stub to the mines at Cowles, a spur'from Engel to mines at
Chloride, a line to Farmington and a track from Lubbock,
Texas, to Roswell.
A more ambitious Santa Fe project was the so-called Colmor cutoff. 50 Its origins lay in engineer Robinson's report of
1877 that the most feasible route for the then propose~ main
track was, from Dodge City southwest to Wagon Mound,
skirting much of the mountain area. Instead of following
this recommendation, the AT&SF used Raton Pass. Much
later it began to build along the alternate line, in 1913 from
.Dodge City to Elkhart, Kansas, and in 1925 from E~khart to
Felt, Oklahoma. In 1930 it received Interstate Commerce
Commission approval to complete the project from Felt to
the old main line at Colmor, New Mexico, nort~east 60 miles
, from Las Vegas and 15/from Wagon Mound. This would form
a new main line from Dodge City to Colmor, 228 miles long
with a maximum grade of "1 %, as compared with the old one
49.
50.

124 ICC 569 ; 224 ICC 433 ; 236 ICC 319;
162 ICC 477; 175 ICC 464; Railway Age, CXXX (1942),383,458,855; Waters.
op..cit., 375, The WPB had plans for seizing other lines also for their rails, but actually
did little.
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over Raton, 357 ruiles long with a m;:tximum grade of 3.5%
westbound and 3.3 % eastbound. It would form a more direct
AT&SF route for Raton coal to Kansas, Oklahoma and
northern Texas, especially as it would intersect the Santa
Fe's new line building from Las Animas, Colorado, to Ama":
rillo, Texas. It also would open up to adequate transportation
a local area which the AT&SF optimistically told the ICC
was quite suitable for agriculture. Construction began at the
stllrt of the depression, which perhaps was the deciping factor
in leasing 17 miles of the Colorado and Southern main line
between Clayton and Mt. Dora rather than building parallel.
In 1931 the tracks reached Farley, 225 miles from Dodge
City and there they stopped. Rumors were that there was
sharp disagreement among top management about the cu'toff,
but if so it was not made public. Skeptics elsewhere doubted
the need for the line, as passengers liked the scenery at Raton
and the grades for freight on the Belen cutoff were better
than west of Colmor in the Glorieta Pass. At any rate; no
more was built. In 1942 the Santa Fe applied to the ICC to·
abandon the trackage from Boise City to Felt and Farley, 96
miles, because there was such a wartime shortage- of rails
that they could be put to better use elsewhere on the company's system; To this local residents protested and an ICG
hearing was to be held. Before the date set, the War Production Board - intervened-without~warningand-abruptly
requisitioned the rails. To the astounded railroad and local
communities the WPB calmly:explained that the armed
service heeded the track more than they did. Much later it
developed that part or all of the material was used on a military line from the Persian Gulf north toward Russia. After
the war, the Santa Fe did not make any effort to rebuild the
line or to revive the Colmor cutoff plan.
Another major southwestern railroad project was from
the mines in Cochise County, Arizona, through the New Mexico coal field to Durango, Colorado.,51 There was talk in 1901
of the Colorado and Gulf undertaking such a venture; more
51. A-nnual Report of the Governor of New Merico for 1901, 151; for 1907, 91;
"From Trail to Rail,"loc. cit" 13 (Nov.).
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concrete, the next year the Southern Pacific incorporated a
subsidiary named the Arizona and Colorado Company to execute the project. The A&C actually did build in 1902 from
Cochise to Pearce, 16 miles, serving the Commonwealth mine
there; in 1909 it constructed extensions from Pearce to Gleeson, 19 miles and also from Kelton 24 miles on the way to
Naco. It completed by 1906'surveys for a line from Durango
to Morenci, but did nothing further. Perhaps this was because
of th~ Panic of 1907; perhaps because others shared the
privately expressed view of Santa Fe President E. P. Ripley
that it was "a rather foolish project."
Another Southern Pacific venture was a. through direct
route from Tucson 66 miles to Nogales. In 1910 it purchased
trackage from Tucson to Sahuarita, which had been constructed in 1906 by the Twin Buttes Railroad Company, and
built southward to Calabasas, connecting there with another
of its branch lines which ran to Nogales. The SP, through its
subsidiary the Arizona'Eastern, also laid down tracks from
Winkelman to Christmas, 7 miles, in 1909; Phoenix to Has:sayampa, 39 miles, in 1910; and Avondale to Litchfield, 5
miles, in 1920. A somewhat related project was the Yuma
Valley Railroad, built in 1914.,.1915 by the United States
Bureau of Reclamat~on to aid in the construction and maintenance of the Colorado River levee south of Yuma 20 miles
to, the Arizona-Mexico' international boundary. As farmers
began occupying the area and growing farm products, the
Southern Pacific acquired running rights in 1935 over the
line from Yuma to Somerton, 18 miles.
,
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad in 1905
built a standard gauge line from Durango 50 miles to Farmington. The only connection was with the D&RGW narrowgauge trackage at Durango, but there was at the time talk
of other companies entering the general area. None did and
the branch was narrowed to slim gauge in 1923.
Gradua,lly various small short line railroad companies
~ppeared in the Southwest. In 1882 the Santa Fe had built
a branch froni San Antonio, New Mexico; 10 miles to Carthage, but abandoned i~ in 1896. In 1904 the Carthage Fuel
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Company ran its New Mexico Midland Railway between the
same places; the line hauled coal almost exclusively.52 Also
in 1904. the Impefial Copper Company built the Arizona
. Southern trackage from Red Rock 22 miles to Silverbell ; here
again the mine.provided virtually all the traffic. In 1915 both
the mine and the railroad were sold to Lee Goldschmidt. 53 The
Burns and Briggs Lumber Company at least as early as 1909
completed its Denver and Southwestern from Lumberton to
El Vado, New Mexico, 38 miles. The Ray Consolidated Copper Company in 1909-1910 constructed the Ray and Gila
Valley Railroad in two separate segments, Ray Jct. to Ray,
7 miles and Hayden Jct. to Hayden, 3 miles. 54 In those same
years the Arizona and Swansea was laid down from BousE!.
Arizona, 21 miles to the copper mines at Swansea. 55 The
Apache Railroad, Holbrook to McNary, 76 miles, was incor. porated in 1917 by the lumber company jt was to serve.
Phelps Dodge built the Tucson Cornelia and Gila Bend Rail.;.
road in 1915-1916 from Gila Bend the 44 miles to their mine
at Ajo. The miners' did not include this property in the s,ale
of their other railroad interests to the Southern Pacific and
still have it today. 56 The Magma Arizona Railroad was owned
by the copper mine it served. It was laid down from Magma
to Superior, 28 miles, as a narrow gauge in 1915, but. was
converted in 1923 to standard gauge. From the Santa Fe Railway to Hagen, 13 miles, the Hagen Company in 1921 built
a' private branch to serve its coal mines. In 1924, although
77% of the traffic anticipated would be coal, it converted this
line into a common carrier for general public use, named the
Rio Grande·Eastern Railroad. 57 The Cimarron and Northwestern Railroad was built in 1907 from Cimarron the 22
miles to PonilPark. Its traffic was 90% timber. As the forest
was cut away, there was nothing else to haul and 14 miles.of
the line was abandoned in 1924; the rest in 1930.
Another independent venture, whose history is quite
complicated, was the line from Bernalillo northwest about 50
I

52.
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miles. 58 The Santa Fe Northwestern was built 26 miles to
San Ysidro, for the purpose of hauling logs from the woods
to the lumber mill at Bernalillo. It was owned first by the
White Pine Lumber Company and later by its successor, the
New Mexico Timber Company. There were plans to build
further northwest to Cuba, 35 miles. The project was under- .
taken by the Cuba Extension Railroad, which leased rails and
certain other materials from the Santa Fe Railway, and was
pressed forward 24 miles. The Cuba Extension went bankrupt in 1927 and was sold to the Banta Fe Northern, which
went bankrupt in 1928 and was sold to the Santa Fe San Juan
and Northern, which also went bankrupt. The'SFSJ&N was
at first run only as a private line of the San Juan Coal and
Coke Company, but after the receivership it served as a commoncarrier. The traffic was almost all coal, originating at
La Ventana. Between 1929 and 1933 there were various
washouts anQ. how much the railroad was operated after that
is not clear. In 1939 the receiver proposed to sell the property
again, but then the Santa Fe stepped in, repossessed the rails
and ended the line's existence. All during these developments
the Santa Fe Northwestern continued to operate and was
even extended slightly. It handled coal from the SFSJ&N and
originated lumber on its own line; it hauled little else. In
May 1941 a big washout of three miles of SFNW tracks did
$90,000 worth of damages. The timber company experimented with hauling iogs in trucks over the highway, found
it cheaper and abandoned the Santa Fe Northwestern.
'.
The Denver and Rio Grande in 1914. built a narrow gauge
branch from Taos Jet. 16 miles to La Madera. The lumber
company there advanced the cost of the line, except for rails
and fastenings, and was gradually repaid from revenue
earned by the branch. It closed its mill in 1927 and the line
was abandoned in 1930. 59
Two major new railroads proposed to build in New Mexico and Arizona in 1923, but neither could convince the Interstate Commerce Commission it should authorize construction.
One project of 1,240 miles was the Staley System of Electri,

58.
59.

193 ICC 545; 249 ICC 342.
175 ICC 151.
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fled Railway.60 The main stem was to run from the Gulf of
California to the Colorado-Utah boundary, 66 milesin Mexico
and 745 in the United States. Branches were to go to southern
California; to Phoenix, Tucson, Benson and Winkelman in
Arizona; and to Durango in Colorado. On the Gulf of California the company would create its own port, large enough
to handle 15,000-ton vessels, and operate its own steamship
line. The standard gauge railroad was to be powered by electricity, which the Staley group thought would bring much
lower operating costs than did the ICC experts. The entire .
project was to beflnanced through the sale of stock, as the
charter would forbid ever mortgaging the line to bondholders
or bankers. The employees must be non-union, but would
receive 10% higher than the union wage scale and also half
the profits over 8 %. This unique application to build was
turned down by the ICC because the estimates of revenue to
be earned were excessive when compared with the Los Angeles and Salt Lake (then quasi-independent but now part
of the Union Pacific) or the EP&SW; the assumptions of
population increase and industrial expansion were not warranted; and the visions of greatly increased coal production
providing the backbone of the traffic were grossly optimistic.
The other proposal for ::J. great new southwestern system
was that of the Colorado Columbus and Mexico Railroad. 61
The main line was to go from Farmington through Reserve,
Tyrone, Deming and Columbus, Ne;w Mexico, to Durango,
old Mexico. Various branches were eventually to reach Fruitland, Gallup, Springerviile, Ft. Bayard, EI Paso, Mazatlan
and Guadalajara. The company, incorporated in 1905, had
surveyed one-third of its route and made cost estimates before the First World War; these were not revised to meet
the new conditions of the 1920's. It said it had available all
the money necessary to build its lines, but declined to state
de~ails. The ICC was not impressed with the company's
presentation of reasons why construction should be authorized. The commission thought that the estimates of coal and
mineral traffic were excessive, especially as the coal had such
60.
61.
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small commercial ,possibilities ; that the visions o~ a heavy
lumber traffic were quite speculative, as, all the timber was
in a national forest; and that in the mountainous area south
of the Santa F~ main line very little local traffic was available.
It pointed out that the outdated cost estimates would have
to be increased at least 50%; that a survey showed in the San
Juan basin 90% of the traffic would originate north of Farmington and flow to California; and that the southern part of
New Mexico was already quite adequately served by railroads. The commission concluded that the CC&M had no
particular value as a through route and denied its application.
A more attractive project was a line for Lea County, New
Mexico. 62 It was launched by the Texas and Pacific through
its subsidiary, the Texas-New Mexico Railway, which still
today operates in quasi-independence. The T-NM was built
in 1928 from the T&P main line at Monahans 34 miles north
into a new oil' field in Winkler County, Texas. When the oil'
field grew into New Mexico, the T-NM asked to do so too.
While petroleum was the chief attraction, it told the Interstate Commerce Commission, it expected considerable busi;ness from the vigorous livestock industry there and hoped
for notable expansion in the area's truck gardening, dairying
and farming. Its application for the new line encountered
opposition from the, Santa Fe. The AT&SF proposed itself
to serve the Lea County area by an e~tension of its LubbockSeagraves branch. To secure the maximum railroad development that was economically reasonable, the ICC approved
of all the T-NM proposal and part of the Santa Fe's. It authorized the Texas-New Mexico to extend into Lovington, making the line in all 113 miles long. It gave permission for the
Santa Fe to build to Lovington, but would, not allow further
construction south. The T-NM promptly laid down its line;
the AT&SF, perhaps because this was at the start of the
1930's depression, never constructed its extension.
The depression years saw no other proposals to build, but
several to abandon lines no longer profitable. 63 Because the
mines
they had been built to serve were exhausted, the Ari.
,
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zona Southern, New Mexico Midland and Burro Mountain
. railroads were all abandoned. The Southern Pacific cut off
31 miles from Deming to Hermanas, which had mostly
handled through traffic from the Burro Mountain trackage
to Douglas; the 72 miles of the Douglas-Cochise line and its
.spurs; the 4 miles from Amster J ct. to Amster; the 38 miles
from Hachita to ~ordsburg; and the 5 miles of the Jarilla
branch. The Santa Fe scrapped 4 miles south from Blue Bell ;
13 miles from Nutt to Lake Valley; 3 niiles from Carisbrooke
to Yankee; and 4 miles from Swastika to B"rilliant. It eliminated the stretch from Dillon 45 miles to Des Moines;
although the mines could still be operated, the steady encroachment of oil and gas in the Texas panhandle had nearly
eliminated the market for coal. The Arizona and Swansea
had closed down when mining operations were suspended
in 1930; when they resumed in 1937, it proved more economical to haul by truck and the .railroad was discarded.
More than just mineral trackage was abandoned in the
1930's.64 The Santa Fe eliminated five miles of its branch
from Las Vegas to Hot Springs, as the resort Montezuma
Hotel had closed in 1913 and the ice harvesting, begun in
1880, stopped in 1937 because of intense competition. It cut
in 1939 the 5-mile segment from Kennedy to Stanley, as very
little traffic originated locally, and in 1943 pruned back 13
miles further to Moriarty. The Southern Pacific cast off 17
miles from Maricopa toward Phoenix, as the local traffi<; was
negligible and through cars for the capital city now went
over the main line opened in 1926. On the Benson-Nogales
line it clipped off 13 miles from Calabasas, which had always
been 'subject to high water and in 1929 suffered $30,000 in
flood damages. Its other line easily handled the BensonTucson through traffic.
By 1941 a long steady decline in traffic finally forced the
Denver and Rio Grande Western to abandon its 125 miles of
narrow gauge from San Antonito to Santa Fe. 65 This branch
had long borne the nickname of the "Chili line." Reportedly
in the early days whenever the train of parlor car and coaches
64.

170 ICC 237; 202 ICC 701; 221 ICC 449; 233 ICC 147.
344 ICC 60; Railway Age, eXI (1941).350; New Mexico: A Guide (New York,
1947),414."

65.
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made the stop for lunch at a station cafe, the large number
of Mexican riders always ordered chili. One of the conductors
when he was supposed to call "30 minutes for lunch," instead
always aimounced "chili stop" and thus got the name started.
By the 1930's there was only· a daily mixed train for both
passengers and freight. On it one day the engineer gave such
a big sneeze that his false teeth flew out the window. Quickly
he stopped and backed up, but the crew and passengers
searched for a considerable. time before finding the dentures:
Less easy to solve were the other problems of the branch.
Livestock traffic, once large in volume, had declined .sharply,
in part because of poor equipment and the company's inability to furnish sufficient cars when needed. What little
timber remained adjacent to the tracks was ·now hauled by
truck. High-value items, such as automobiles, were seldom
carried because shippers feared the possibilities of damage
when transfer was made from standard to narrow gauge
cars. When the ICC approved the abandonment, Senator
Johnson of Colorado tried to get a Congressional investigation; he failed.
During the Second World War the Santa Fe eliminated
its 48 miles from Preston to Koehler and Ute Park. The SP
pulled up its track from Carrizozo to Capitan, 22 miles, and
in 1947 discarded the tracks from Alamogordo t,o Cloudcroft
and Russia, 33 miles.
In 1954 the San Manuel Railroad was bu.ilt by the mining
company it serves from WInkelman the 20 miles to the new
copper mine at San Manuel, Arizona.
From time to time over the years there was discussion
about railroad rates. The Atlantic and Pacific redl,1ced its
passenger fare from 8¢ a mile to 6¢ in 1885 and the next year
the Santa Fe cut its own from 6¢ to 4¢.66 Freight rates too
caused comment; on July 31, 1885, the Prescott Weekly
Courier complained, "It begins to look as if the Atchison &
A. P. railroad companies are taking lessons in cinching people
from the Southern Pacific people."
The first important step locally in the regulation of rates
66. Prescott Weekly Courier, May 15, 1885; Annual Report of the Governor of
New Mexico for 1886, 876.
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came in 1909 when the Territory of Arizona created a railroad commission. It lacked power to enforce its rulings, but
could argue with the railroads and, if needful, could complain
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 67 The first year it
obtained reductions of 8%"-32% on local freight from practically every carrier in the Territory. It secured cuts of 25%30 % on goods moving from El Paso into Arizona. The EI
Paso and Southwestern also' promised to eliminate certain
discriminatory rates, such as the one favoring El Paso fruit
at Bisbee. The next year the Santa Fe lowered its local Arizona rates by 10% and slashed charges from San Francisco
and Los Angeles to Arizona stations by 13%. With the coming
of statehood, local regulation by means more effective than
persuasion became possible.
Long distance rates came under the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission. It had to consider complicated
situations, as when it approved the western railroads charg-,
ing less per mile for citrus fruits than Florida or Texas lines
in order that all fruit could sell at the same price in the Midwest and East. In 1909 it established for transcontinental
rates a system of zones which is still in effect. 68 Rates were between broad zones rather than specific towns and placed competitors on the same footing over a large area. Thus they
enabled all farmers in a large western growing region ,to pay
the 'same charges in_shipping to a sizable eastern market district. In the same way they made for equality among eastern
manufacturers, dealing with western purchasers. For eastbound commodity rates, generally speaking, about threequarters of the State of California was in one zone; Ari~ona,
Nevada, Utah (west of Ogden), New,Mexico (west of Albuquerque-and EI" Pa§o) and the rest of California we~e in the
second. 69 But there have been exceptions ;,for·example, fresh·
67: Annual RepoTt of the Govern<>r of Arizona for 1909, 544; for 1910, 330; for
1911, 576. In 1911 the SP refused the commission's request to stop using Pacific Time
for operations in Arizona when everybody else in the State used Mountain Time.
68. Stuart Daggett and J. P. Carter, The Structure of Transcontinental Railroad
Rates (Berkeley, 1947), passim.; Daggett, Southern Pacific, 275-292.
69. There are two types of transcontinental railroad rates, class and commodity.
Class rates contain lists of almost every conceivable commodity, specifically describing
it and assigning it a classification. For each classification there are rates, or a combination of them, to and from each station in the United States. Although it may take considerable looking, a correct class rate can always be worked out. Commodity rates are

RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT

199

fruits, lettuce and vegetables from California and Arizona for
years took the same rate, but in 1936 the ICC changed the
charge from the Phoenix district to 90 % of that from California. Westbound commodity rates generally included-in one
zone California, Arizona, 'Oregon, Washington, Utah, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada and most of New Mexico. Before 1909 this
,had not beeh so, for the charge from eastern points to some
Pacific Coast cities was less than from those same eastern
points to intermountain towns. This unfairness'the ICC tried
to stop through its 1909 system of zones, and by the time
of the First World War, it succeeded in eliminating the
inequities.
'
Railroad taxes occasionally caused controversy. The most
prolonged was over the ,clause in the Atlantic and Pacific's
1866 federal charter exempting its right-of-way from taxes
in the Territories. The precise meaning of the wording was
not clear, so for many years the company compromised with
the counties on the taxes it would pay. ,This irritated other
taxpayers; Hoof and Horn characterized it as "blackmail"
and wondered if a railway could negotiate its taxes why
others couldn't too. The question of interpretation was
carried to the United States Supreme Court. The justices
ruled that the right-of-way, to a' width of 100 'feet on either
side of the track and the things ~n 'it (such as rails) were
exempt, but rolling stock, tools, office equipment and other
"personal property" were taxable. 70 So the matter remained
until New Mexico and Arizona became states.
The only railroad to earn a land grant in the states of
New Mexico and Arizona was the Atlantic and, Pacific, which I
in 1897 transferred it to the Santa FeY The 13,413,272 acres
were suitable only for grazing, except in, the ve'ry-'fewareas'
that' coul<;l 'be' irrigated:' Before the-turn of the century the
railroad found few purchasers. It turned in the early 1900's
to trading its land within the boundaries of national forests
defined by Daggett and Carter, op. cit., 24, as '-specialized rates developed to cover moyements of individual commodities or groups of .commodities between particular stations
or groups of stations." They are usually, but not always, lower than class rates., Today
comparatively little western traffic moves on class rates, but mostly takes commodity
rates.
70, Hoof and Horn, December 20,1888; 172 US 171.
71. Greever, op., cit., passim.
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and Indian reservations to the national government, which
issued so-called lieu rights good elsewhere on the public domain; these the company sold. It gradually persuaded local
ranchers to lease its land, protecting them with an excellent
system of tenure. The Santa Fe sold. most of its grazing lands
in the boom periods of the First and Second World Wars.
Greatly to its credit, it refused to locate eager farmers in its
arid area unless a dependable source of water was available
and it never conducted a colonization campaign for its lands.
Sales efforts began in 1880, but not till 1956 was the task
accomplished and the land department closed. .
As a labor force, the A&P and Santa Feat first used only
Irish on the tracks, but gradually turned also to Mexicans.
In -1881 the Atlantic and Pacific was paying track-layers and
graders $2.25 a day, while spikers and iron men got $2.50.
The two roads started quite early to use Indians, especially
Apaches, Navahos and Mojaves. They excelled' as shovelersand at the start, when there wa1?a wreck, as thieves. At first
they refused to wear any clothes, which embarrassed some
of the passengers. Eventually many of the red men were
trained by the railroad to work in the Albuquerque shops.
To care for their employees, the major southwestern railroads early provided company medical service. In 1884 the
Santa Fe opened the first of its 'hospitals, at Las'Vegas. Occasional labor disputes arose. For example" in 1893 shopmen became irritated when the Santa Fe failed to' match
wage increases given by other 'railroads. When negotiations
dragged, the workers twice walked off their jobs for a total
of 23 days but eventually won most of their demands. In 1922
a brief wildcat strike of train service .employees on the
AT&SFstaIled 19 trains with 1,721 passengers between Albuquerque and N eedles~ 72
'
The passenger service offered by the main lines improved
in quality over the years. The first major named train on the
Santa Fe was the California :Limited, established in 1892;
"it,was supreme on theAT&SF until the coming of the Chief
in 1926 a1,1d the Super-Chief in 1936. Other Santa Fe trains,
72, Waters, op. cit.• 294-296, 318-320, 327; Marshall, op. cit., 168; Railway Age,
,LXXIII (1920); 345.
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in service at various times, have been the Scout, the Missionary, the Navajo, the Hopi, the Santa Fe .DeLuxe, the Grand
Canyon, EI Tovar and EI Capitan. The AT&SF has always
hauled the major mail train from the east-to southern California. The Southern' Pacific's most important'Chicago-Los
Angeles train has always been the Golden State,established
in 1902 and supplElmented from time to time by the Californian, the Apache and the Imperial. The major New Orleans service has been on the Sunset Limited, aided at first by
the Sunset Express and in later years by the Argonaut.
Speed has steadilY increased on all routes; perhaps the greatest acceleration came with the introduction of streamlined
trains in the later 1930's. The first schedule westbound from
Albuquerque to Los Angeles, for example, was 35 hours ; in
1904 the fastest train was 28% hours; 1924, 281,4 hours;
1938, 17 hours, 20 minutes; and 1956, ~6 hours, 5 minutes.
Probably the most important contribution to the comfort of
. passengers was the advent of air-condition~d cars in the
middle 1930's.
Santa Fe passenger service had a valuable ally in Fred
Harvey.73 At appropriate intervals trains stopped for 30 min:utes while patrons ate at the Har,vey House. With strict
.standards of quality, cleanliness and service, Harvey was a
culinary missionary in a frontier wilderness of badly cooked
food, sloppily served in unappetizing surroundings. In the
early days his establishments were incomparably better than
rivals in the area; gradually standards improved until at
present others are his equal. At the maximum, there were
Fred Harvey dining rooms at Kingman, Peach Springs, Holbrook, Belen, Roswell, San Marcial, Rincon, Deming and.EI
Paso. There were both hotels and dining rooms at Needles,
Ash Fork, Grand .Canyon, Williams, WInslow, Gal!up, Albuquerque, Lamy, Santa Fe, Las Vegas, Hot Springs, Raton,
Trinidad, Vaughn and Clovis. During the train schedule
acceleration of the 1930's, the' Santa Fe turned increasingly
73. Waters, op. cit., 174, 261-285; Marshall, op. cit., 97·113, 163. Harvey did not
take over the food service on the A&P until 1887. If historians ever examine the records
of the company,. it will be interesting to find out why Harvey stuck so closely to the rail~
road that the firm did not expand with tne 'growing West to become today a giant of
the hotel and restaurant business.·
..
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to the use of dining cars, Harvey operated. 'There was, however, a revival of the eating houses during the passenger rush
of the Second World'War;-thereafter came a major curtailment of facilities. One of the most famous Harvey Hotels
was the Montezuma, 6 miles north of Las Vegas at Hot
Springs,opened in 1882 as "the Carlsbad of America." For
years wealthy people and nobility flocked to the spa from all
over the world. Gradually styles in resorts changed, patronage declined and in 1913 the hotel had, to be closed. 74 In the
early days the food service of the Southern Pacific was dis-'
tinctly inferior to Fred Harvey's and even yet does not quite
equal i t . '
.
,
At first highways offered no. serious competition to the
southwestern railways, but after the turn of the century
improved roads and the rise of the gasoline engine began to
cause changes; As eariy as 1907 there was an auto bus line
from Torrance ,to .Roswell,75 At first the railways were dis. dainful of the competition, .but by the 1930's they were so
alarmed that they fought back with better service and some
lower rates. The Southern Pacific secured a substantial ~
proportion of the stock in the major bus line paralleling its
rails, the Pacific Greyhound Lines, and the Santa Fe bought a
share in the bus line following its rails, a company which
eventually became a part- of the Trailways 'system. The two
railroads' began operating trucks,c both for intercity service '
and for local pick up and delivery. After;the Second WorId
War, the Santa. Fe tried to start an air line, but federal government opposition prevented. In 1955 a Southern Pacific
. subsidiary buiit a $34,000,000 petroleum pipe line, mostly on
railroad right-of-way, from. El Paso to Los Angeles. 76 In the
mid-1950's the two railways started carrying truck trailers in
"piggyback" service on freight trains.
The southwestern railroads faced their most severe test,
so far, during the Second-World War, when a tremendous
volume of traffic descend'ed on them. Pearl Harbor caught
everyone by surprise, but for the Santa Fe and Southern
74.. In'1920 the building was turned over to the Baptists, who established Montezuma College. It had an enrollment of 75 in 1937 and has since d'isappeared.
75. Annual Report of the Governor of ,New Mezico for 1907, 594.
76; Railway Age, CXXXVIII (1955),8 (Feb. 28).
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Pacific it meant immediately rushing soldiers to prevent any
possibility of a Pacific Coast invasion. ,For several days the
SP put a troop train west every half hour, so clogging its
lines that once an eastbound passenger train, the Argonaut
from Los Angeles, arrived in Tucson 12 hours late. As the
war continued,pressure on the southwestern roads remained
heavy because of the large number of western military establishments and the fighting in the Pacific; compared with
normal peacetime business, the increased traffic load on them
was considerably heavier than on railroads in the east. During the emergency the Santa Fe supplemented its fleet of
steamers by placing in service the nation's first long-distance
diesel freight locomotives. After the war, the most important
change was the shift from the steam engine to the more
economical dieseI.locomotive; by the mid-1950's the Santa Fe
was completely dieselized and the Southern Pacific expected
to become so by the later 1950's.
The railroads of the Southwest originated in the American demand for a transcontinental line and were speculative
enterprises, built"in advance of fraffic. Gradually they became
profitable, lowered their rates and improved their service.
They spread out branches, spawned independent short lines
and battled with rivals. Their facilities helped develop the
area continually. In many counties they still are the, largest
business enterprise carried on within the county. ,The history
of the railroads of New Mexico and Arizona is typical of th~
American Middlewest and West.
'

STAGECOACHING IN TERRITORIAL NEW MEXICO
By WILLIAM S. WALLACE
"THE MAIL and passengers came in Thursday morning
. . from the east in a wagon. An axle of the coach broke
on this side of Gregg's and a wagon had to be substituted.
There were five sacks of mail for this office. B. Seligman and
family of Santa Fe were passengers." 1
Such a notice as quoted above was common fare for the
reader of Territorial New Mexico newspapers. When the
stagecoach was early, late, or did not arrive. at all the press
was quick to note the fact; usually in a sarcastic vein. But,
when operations were normal, little attention was paid to
this major form of commercial transportation prior to the
coming of the railroad to New Mexico. The Territorial citizen
was prone to take the various stage lines for granted except
when they inconvenienced his own movements or disrupted
his mail service. Judging from the amount of space consumed
in the Territorial newspapers it would seem that the matter
of poor mail service was one of the major irritants in coping
with life/in New Mexico.
Tuesday evening's coach brought in about· as much mail as
one man could wheel on a wheelbarrow from Santa Fe. The
coach Wednesday morning brought no eastern- mail at all. It
.thus seems as if,the largest portion ·of the mail-for this place
must be taken through to Santa Fe and then returned the next
day. Where is the mail agent? We suppose that all the mail
for Las Vegas, Cimarron and even Trinidad and EI Moro will
soon come around by Fort Garland and .Santa Fe. 2
Despi~e the complaints and threats of the traveling
public, stagecoach lines were numerous eveJ1. if short-lived.
In 1882, when the railroad had already entered considerable
portions of New Mexico, there were still thirty-eight separate
stage lines· serving the various mining centers. The total
mileage of these stage lines was approximately 800 as compared with a total of 1,114 miles of railroads within the Territory as of December 1, 1882. The longest regularly operated
1.
2.

i

La. Vega. New Mexico) Gazette, October 28, 1877.
Ibid.
.
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route was from Deming to Mogollon, a distance of ninety
miles. 3
Stagecoach lines in New Mexico operated through two
distinct eras. The first was that of pre-railroad days.4 Until
the railroads penetrated various parts of the Territory from
1879 on, the stagecoach lines represented the only means of
regular commercial transportation. After 1879, the stagecoach lines became feeder operations u'sed entirely to supplement rail transportation. 5
3. Cf., William G. Ritch, IllUJItrated New Mexico (Santa Fe, 1883), VIII-XI: Ritch
cited the following stage routes as being hi. operation in 1882: Aztec, Rio Arriba county,
S. E. of Durango, Colorado, 42 miles by stage; Alma, Socorro county, in Mogollon
distriCt, N. M. from Silver City; Burro Mountains, Grant county, N. of Deming; Black
Range, Socorro county, W. of Engle, 40 to 80 miles; Clairmont, Socorro county, in
Mogollon district, N. W. from Silver City; Cooney, Socorro county in Mogollon district,
N. W. from Silver City; Carisillo or. Stonewall, Grant county, S. of Deming, 32 miles;
Central City, Grant county; N. W. of Deming, 40 miles; Cimarroncito, Colfax county,
N. W. of Springer; Canon del Agua, Santa Fe county, ,18 miles from Cerrillos station
on A. T. & S. F. railroad; Dolores (Old Placers, gold), Santa Fe county, S. of Cerrillos,
6 miles; Elizabethtown, Colfax county, 45 miles N. W. of Springer; Georgetown, Grant
county, 50 miles N. W. of Deming, or 54 miles N. E. of Lordsburg; Gallinas, Lincoln
county, 68 miles E. of Socorro; Golden, Santa Fe county, S. of Cerrillos, 12 miles;
Hillsboro, Dona Ana county, N. of Nutt, 25 miles; Hanover, Grant county, N. W. of
. Deming, 48 miles; Jarilla, Dona Ana county, E. of Las Cruces, 42 miles; Kingston,
Grant county, N. W. of Nutt, 35 miles via Lake Valley; Lone Pine, Santa Fe county,
S. of Cerrillos, 15 miles, stage to Golden; Lake Valley, Dona Ana county, N. W. of
Nutt, 12 miles; Lietendorf's, Grant county, S. of Lordsburg, 7 miles; Magdal'ma,
Socorro, S. W. of Socorro, 25 miles; Mogollon, Socorro, N. W. of Deniing, 90 miles,
stage via Silver City; New Placers, Santa Fe county, S. of Cerrillos station, 15 miles,
st~ge to Golden; Organs, Dona Ana county, E. of Las Cruces, 18 miles; Pueblo, Socorro
co~nty, W. of Socorro,. 30 miles; Pinos Altos. Grant county. N. W. of Deming, stage via
Silver City; Percha, Grant county, N. W. of Nutt, 35 miles; Santa Rita, Grant county,
N. W. of Deming, stage via Silver City; Shakespeare, Grant county, S. of Lordsburg,
3 miles; Silver City, Grant county, N. W. of Deming, 46 miles; San Pedro, Santa Fe
county, ,S. of Cerrillos, 16 miles; Telegraph, Grant' county, on the Rio Gila, stage via
Silver City; Ute Creek, Colfax county, N. W. of Springer, 40 miles, coach via Cimarron;
Virginia, Grant county, S. of Lordsburg. 10 miles; Vera Cruz, Lincoln county, S. E. of
Socorro, 80 miles, stage via White Oaks; White Oaks, Lincoln county, E. of Socorro:
80 miles.
4.' Literature on this period is scant and often eludes the researcher interested in
the history ofstagecoaching. The standard work on the Butterfield operation is Roscoe
Conkling and Margaret B.' Conkling, The Butterfield Overland Mail, 1857-1869: Its organization and operation. . . . (Glendale, Calif., 1947), 3 vols. Other sources making
references to stagecoaching in Territorial New Mexico are: John ~. Clum~ "Santa Fe"
in the 70's," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, II (Oct., 1927), 381-382, in which
C1um describes his trip from Kit Carson, Colorado, to Santa Fe in 1871 via Trinidad and
Raton Pass; Bess McKinnan, "The Toll Road over Raton Pass," ibid., II (Jan., 1927),
83-89, includes some data
the use of, Raton Pass by stage coaches; W. H. Ryus, The
S~cond WiUiam Penn: A True Account of the Incidents 'that happened along the Old
Santa Fe Trail in the Sixties (Kansas City, Mo., 1913), passim, is replete with references to stagecoaching during" the first period of stagecoaching in Territori~l New
Mexico.
5. Stagecoaching during this second periOd is involved in varying degrees .of
thoroughness in: Theron M. Trumbo's, u~he Little Bonanza," Ne,w Mexico Magazine,

on
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The first era of stagecoach operations started in 1849
when a line was established between Independence, Missouri,
and Santa Fe. This line operated on a monthly schedule. It
was lat~r expanded to a daily service: Fares were about $250
one~way with a baggage, limit of forty pounds and $1 per
pound for' excess. Thirteen days and six' hours was the
scheduled time betw~en Santa Fe and Kansas City.6
Because of the east-west orientation of transportation in
the United States in so far as the nation as a whole is concerned, the major stagecoach lines provided relatively good
service across New. Mexico but, for commercial trapsportation north and south, service was left to the smaller independent carriers. The early Territorial newspapers contain
frequent advertisements of these independent 'carriers, and
they nearly all followed the same pattern of operation. Fares
were quoted on a one-way basis. 7 Terminals were located at
hotels,. and the route connected one or· more: communities
with a railroad.
The following advertisement in the Las Vegas Gazette on
April 6, 1881, is an example,of:what the small independent
stage lines offered the public: .HACK LINE
Strausner's hack line running weekly to White Oaks. ·Passengers carried 165 mile~ for $15. Leave orders at SumnerHouse,
Las Vegas or Burk's Hotel, White Oaks. Will make the trip. in
three or four days according to weather.

It was to the advantage of merchants to.have people use
the stagecoach in order to get potential customers and settiers
into the Territorial shopping centers. The local newspapers
were dependent on the success of the' local merchants and the
growth of a town's surrounding area. The editor would occasionally feature an article ~ncluding some mention of the
local stagecoach line service while reporting about trips to
28 (April, 1950), 28, wherein a hack line operation is referred to as operating between
Las Cruces and the Organ Mountains and William S. Wallace, "Short-Line Staging in
New Mexico," NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW, XXVI' (April, 1951), 89-100.
6. Cf., Ralph E. Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History (Cedar
Rapids, 1912). II, 139-142: LeRoy Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849-1869 (Cleveland,
1926),70-75,97,236: and Frank W. B1ackmar, Kansas: A Cyclapedia or State History
••. Etc. (Chicago, 1912), II, 736.
7. An exception to this is the round-trip reduced fares in effect on the Lake
. Valley, Hillsboro and Kingston, Ne~ Mexico Stage ·line. See: Wallace, op. cit., 97.
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potentially prosperous regions within the Territory. The
editor had to work diligently over his potential readership in
order to stay in business. One of his methods of accomplishing this was to take trips himself to neighboring communities and to report in his paper on the beauty of the scenery,
the sagacity of the merchants, and the beauty of the women
in the smaller towns visited.
One such article prior to the coming of the railroad involved a stagecoach journey from Las Cruces to the Silver
City area and return during the spring of 1871. 8 Aside from
the author's comments on mining, scenery, and the people
encountered along the way, he manages to impart some slight
observations on the trip itself. The driver, for instance, had
a coaching horn' and was mentioned as using it numerous
times. A horseman accompanied the stagecoach as far as the
crossing of the Rio Grande in order to cross before the stagecoach to,"see if the ford is the same as yesterday." The author
points out that if it "were not for this precaution our leaders 9
might plunge out of sight in some deep hole, and go,undergiving us (the only passenger) a right smart chance of a
•
ducking in the bargain."
The driver of the stagecoach kept the horses in a "steady
trot," and after stopping at a ranch, where a way station
was maintained, for a meal, "the team comes from the stable
very well cleaned, and looking as if they had fared' as well
as yourself." At the community of Rio Mimbres, the author
had to transfer from the
.
J. F. Bennett & Co.'s S. O. M. and Ex. Line, and take passage
"

with the W. H. Wiley & Co., who run a first-class branch line
to Fort Bayard, Silver City and Pinos Altos. An easy-riding,

8. The article referred to was a four column narrative by either N. V. Bennett or
A. C. Aabacock, editors of the paper in which the article appeared, the Las Cruces
weekly The BordereT, March 16, 1871: Another newspaper account of travel over this
territory in 1858 is Waterman L. Ormsby's series of articles published in the New York
Herald between September 26 and November 19, 1858. This series has since been published: Waterman L. Ormsby. The Butterfield Overland Mail, ed. by Lyle H. Wright
and Josephine M. Bynum (San Marino, California, 1955).
9. C<Leaders" is a term applied to the leading two horses when four or more horses
are used to pull a carriage, wagon. or stagecoach. The two horses nearest the driver
are called Hfwheelers." For further information on teams and stagecoach harness see
Wallace, op. cit., 98·101. The art of driving coaches, once so -well understood, is now
almost lost. The only published bibliography on the subject is Count Gerard de Contades',
Le Driving en France (151,7-1896) [Paris?, 1898], 209 PP. Maj. Gen. Geoffrey White's,
"Driving.,', Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago, 1936), VII, 665-667, is probably the
best discussion of the subject.
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open, spring wagon, ,giving one an opportunity to look about
him in every direction; a good span of California horses; Wiley
, and Smith for companions, make the, traveler, we can ass~re
him, a very pleasant trip over this, the most beautiful part of
the country.

/One of the more colorful stagecoach lines operated during
the second era of stagecoach operations in New Mexico was
the Kingston Stage Line, operated by Mr. and Mrs. S. J.
Orchard from 1888 to 1902. This line operated between Lake'
'Yalleyand Kingston by way of Hillsboro, New Mexico. 10 The
line apparently owned two Concord stagecoaches and an express wagon. Changes of teams were required four times
between Lake Yalley, where connections were made with the
railroad, and Kingston. l l An average of sixty horses was
needed to keep the line in operation,12'
,
This line was to become particularly well,..known because
Mrs. Sadie Orchard frequently drove the stagecoaches herself. This was the same Sadie Orchard referred to in some of
the w'ritingsof,Eugene Manlove Rhodes. 13
To insurepron.table operations, most stage lines sought
contracts for carrying the mail. The extent to which the Federal government aided Territorial stagecoach lines in this
respect is problematical. Post Office Department files concern:
ing star routes and other'types of cO]1tracts covering private
carriers of mail from 1870 through 1914 appear to have been
destroyed by authority of Congress. 14 That a great deal of
planning went into the determination of some of the routes,
however, is evident from a hitherto' unpublished document.
concerning the surveying of a route from Las Vegas to Fort
Elliott in 1885,11; During April and May of 1885, First Lieu. 10. Clay W. lOaden,. "Sadie Orchard. One of New Mexico'. Women Stage Drivers,"
unpublished MS. in New Mexico Writer's Project File, Library, Museum of New Mexico,
Santa Fe.
11. Ibid.
. 12. Betty Reich, "Stagecoach Days," unpublished MS. in New Mexico Writer's
Project HCity File," Library, Museum of New M.exico, Santa Fe.
,13. Vaden, op. cit.
14. Letters from the Chief Inspector, Post Office Department, to W. S. Wallace,
May 4, 1950, and F. R. Holdcamper (Industrial Records Branch, National Archives) to
idem, May 9, 1950. A small amount of statistical information on a few stage routes in
New Mexico in the early 1880's is found in the RePfJTt of the Postmaster-'Jeneral of the
United States; Bcing Part of the Message and Documents com·municated to the Two
Houses of Congress at the beginning of tile Second Session of the !,7th Congress (Washington, 1882),65, 132-135.
15. This route is referred to in Lillie Gerhardt Anderson's "Indian Country Outpost," New Mexico Magazine, 34 (March, 1956), 53.
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tenant E. H. Plummer, of the Tenth Infantry, under orders
. from the Post Adjutant at Fort Union, New Mexico, undertook to layout and carefully measure with odometers the
route;16
During a fifty-two day period, Lt. Plummer made a meticulous survey of the rOl).te to Fort Elliott by way of Fort Bascom, New Mexico, and Tascosa, Texas. The total mileage of
the route was 317.81 miles. Fort Elliott was located near
present day Mobeetie, in the Texas panhandle. In concluding
the report, Lt. Plummer explained:
I 'also measured frequently ove~ different kinds of road
to test the accuracy of the, odometers, I found that by driving
careful [ly] I could obtain a more accurate'measurement over
rocky winding roads with the odometer than I could with the
chain.
'
As the spring wagon and escort wagon loaded differently,
the above method was practically the same as measuring the
route twice, and by taking the mean of the two measurements
which usually differed from each other by less than one hundred
feet in twenty miles I am of the opinion that the measurements
are as near correct as can be. obtained by odometer measurement - or any other method.

Messr's. Cooke & Shaw

16. This document was made available through the kindness of Lt. Plummer's
daughter, the late Miss Bessie Plummer of Pacific Grove, California. The document consists of six manuscript pages and appears to be in the handwriting of Lt. Plummer.
17. Ryus. op. cit.• 22-23; 99-103, 161; Ft. Union Medical History. Dec. 31, 1873
(Arrott roll No.4) ; Ft. Bascom. Letters Sent. Dec. 19, 186'8 (Arrott roll No.8). These
and subsequent references to "Arrott . . ." refer'to the Arrott ·Collection of Western
Americana, Rodgers Library, New Mexico Highlands University. The co'Uection 'is
based primaril~ on transcripts and microfilms from the National Archives.
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Mail Contractors or Agent,
Santa Fe, N. M.
Gentlemen:
. I ain instructed by the Brevet Major General, Commanding, to
furnish you the enclosed c'opy of a letter from Fort Craig, N. M. dated
the 5th instant, with copy of General Hazen's endorsement thereon, and
to inform you that the escort now furnished your coaches from Fort
Craig, N. M. will be discontinued after the 1st proximo, unless you
reserve seats in your coaches for this escort or provide the necessary
transportation, furnishing both, animals, and wagons.
I am, Gentlemen, Very respectfully.
Your obedient servant
Edward Hunter
1st Lieutenant, 12th Infantry
,A. A. A.' GeneraP8

No less important an aspect of Territorial stagecoach
operations than carrying the mail and passengers was that
of carrying express. Typical of such express transactions is
the accompanying phOtograph of a way-bill for a'package Of··
currency carried by the Barlow and Sanderson organization. 19 Little is known concerning the freight rate structure
during the Territorial period within New Mexico. One extant
document dated at Pueblo, Colorado, October 26, 1874, and
on the letterhead of "Wells, Fargo & Company's Express,"
shows that that firm charged eighteen dollars per hundred
pounds on packages weighing more than fifteen pO,unds be"tween Pueblo, 'Colorado, and Las Vegas, New' Mexico; while
packages weighing less than fifteen pounds were charged
"according to size and value of the package."2o The average
of passenger Jares charged on two New Mexico rout.es· about
whose rates we have some information was lO%¢ .per mile. 21
18. Arrott File. Fort Union, New Mexico, 1868. (File No.2).
19. The original of this way.-bill was presented to Rodgers Library,. New Mexico
Highlands University, by Mrs. Rose Hanosh of Mora, New Mexico, The sender of the
package ..... indicated ·on the way-bill, Joseph Rouelle. 'was one of the last of the early
trapperB and traders in the Southwest. At one time or another be had been connected
with Kit Carson, .Ceran St. Vrain, and other well-known figures. Rouelle died at Mora
October 9, 1877. See: Las Vegas (New Mexico) Gazette, October 30, 1877.
20. Letter from W. C. Griffin (Pueblo Agent for Wells, Fargo) to J. Rosenwald
& Co., Las 'Vegas, New Mexico. New Mexico File, Rodgers Library. The present (1956)
rate per hundred pounds between Las Vegas and Pueblo is $5.28.
21. Las Vegas to White Oaks, 9'12¢ per mile, supra note 7, Lake Valley to Kingston,
11'12¢ per mile, Wallace, op. "it., p. 97. A line running between Santa Fe and Mesilla in
1867 charged $75 one-way. The latter rate is based on the line's ledger book for that
year in the possession of Mr. William Griffith of Socorro, New Mexico.

AUTHORS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Averam B. Bender, Professor of History, Harris Teachers
College.
Author of The March of Empire: Frontier Dejf/nse in the
Southwest.
Co-Editor of Exploring Southwestern Trails, 1846-1854
(with Ralph P. Bieber).
William S. Greever, Associate Professor and Chairman of
History, University of Idaho.
Author of Arid Domain.
Max L. Moorhead, Professor of History, University of
'Oklahoma.
Editor of Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies.
William S. Wallace, Associate Librarian & Archivist, Highlands University.
Author of Antoine Robidoux, 1794-1860: the Biography
of a Western Venturer; Editor of A Journey Through
New Mexico's First Judicial District in 1864; and The
Land Between (with F. W. Bachman!!).
Oscar O. Winther, Professor of History and Associate Dean
of the Graduate School, Indiana University.
Author of Express and Stagecoach Days in California;
The Old Oregon Country; and The Great Northwest.
Cover design by Robert W. Chavez, student in the College of
Fine Arts, University of New Mexico.
Illustrations by courtesy of the Library, Museum of. New
Mexico, Santa Fe; the Library, University of New Mexico;
and Mrs. Rose Hanosh, Mora, New Mexico.
Frontispiece Reprinted by permission of the publishers, ,The
Arthur H. Clark Company, from The Butterfield Overland
Mail by Conkling and Conkling, p. 73.
The map by courtesy of The Huntington Library, San
Marino, California.
211

UTAH

TERRITORY

(
I,)

~,

,0

.,.

Co
",.

0

...

","

eo

..

Q

.

~

+
/
TIm BUITERFIELD OVERLAND MAIL ROUTE
~

Sf. Louis 10 San Francisco

eer

DMslII1U IIfllb. Raru

C'

o

r

ISt-5m F...ncisco to Los Angeles
ad-Los Angeles tn Fon Yuma

)d-Fon Yuma to Tucson
4 th- Tucson to Fr:anklin (EI Paso)

sth-Fran!din [0 Fon Oladboume
6th-Fon Chadbournc to Colbert's Fcny
,th-Colbcn's Fc"'}' to Fon Smith

8th-Fon Smith to Tipton
9th-Tipton to 51. Louis

